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The Year of Morocco:
An Introduction
Dan Paracka
Marking the 35th anniversary of Kennesaw State University’s award-winning
Annual Country Study Program, the 2018-19 academic year focused on Morocco
and consisted of 22 distinct educational events, with over 1,700 people in
attendance. It also featured an interdisciplinary team-taught Year of Morocco
(YoM) course that included a study abroad experience to Morocco (March 28-April
7, 2019), an academic conference on “Gender, Identity, and Youth Empowerment
in Morocco” (March 15-16, 2019), and this dedicated special issue of the Journal
of Global Initiatives. Most events were organized through six different College
Spotlights titled: The Taste of Morocco; Experiencing Moroccan Visual Arts;
Multiple Literacies in Morocco; Conflict Management, Peacebuilding, and
Development Challenges in Morocco, Moroccan Cultural Festival; and Moroccan
Solar Tree. There were also five YoM Learning Modules developed for use in 12
different classes across three colleges, and directly involving 375 students. As in
the past, a semester-long senior-level graphic design class developed the Year of
Morocco logo.
The breadth and depth of these programs provided a strong basis for
understanding Morocco in its historical and contemporary contexts. Participating
faculty integrated these programs within existing coursework thus allowing for
further investigation and analysis. For example, one faculty member worked with
KSU students to offer curricular modules focused on Morocco at local area schools.
A graduate art student assisted in creating an interactive Arts of Morocco timeline
game which was delivered at Renaissance Elementary in Fulton County. In
addition, undergraduate art students learned traditional Moroccan designs and zellij
clay-making processes which they taught to 30 middle school students at Pine
Mountain Middle School in Cobb County.
The Morocco Solar Tree project involved students enrolled (Fall 2018) in the
courses Solar Power (EE4405), and Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Senior
Project (EE4800, ME4201, ME4202) courses. These students formed
multidisciplinary teams and competed to design a Year of Morocco Solar Tree.
Students from the winning team built and installed the tree on the Marietta campus
(Spring 2019). The solar tree is a permanent mechanical structure mimicking a real
tree with small solar modules attached to its branches to harvest solar energy.
Electrical energy produced by the tree now illuminates a KSU logo at night,
showcasing KSU’s commitment to sustainability and highlighting Morocco’s major
efforts at developing alternative energy sources. Indeed, Morocco’s NoorOuarzazate Solar Power Complex will be the world’s largest solar plant (580MW)
when completed in 2020.
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Students in these classes and many others developed a nuanced appreciation of
Morocco and its diversity, strengths, and challenges. This appreciation was
demonstrated in course projects, research papers, conference presentations, and
Model Arab League and Model African Union simulations. For example, two
presentations on literacy in Morocco were delivered by KSU students at the Year
of Morocco Conference in March 2019, with one team also presenting their research
at the National Conference on Undergraduate Research conference in April 2019.
As a faculty advisor commented, “these students’ future career goals and
trajectories of scholarship have been significantly impacted through their
involvement.” The Multiple Literacies project provided the Bagwell College of
Education Literacy Center with new acquisitions of children’s books and scholarly
books related to Morocco, Islam, and literacy in the MENA region. Through the
Morocco Library Project lecture, KSU faculty, staff, and students along with the
Fulton County Public Library at Ocee were inspired to donate more than 12 boxes
of English language children’s books to the Children’s Medina Library in Fez,
Morocco. In addition to the donated books from the Ocee Library, advanced French
students wrote and illustrated their own children’s books about Moroccan culture
which also were donated to the Children’s Medina Library in Fez.
As one of the major culminating events, the YoM Conference brought in a
leading expert on women and youth in Morocco who delivered what one attendee
described as an “incredibly powerful” keynote address. There were just over 90
KSU faculty and students at the conference as well as 30 off-campus guests. The
conference was also attended by seven visiting scholars from Hassan II University
Casablanca (H2UC), and featured an ecstatically well-received concert by Innov
Gnawa, a Grammy-nominated music group originally from Morocco and currently
based in New York City. The concert was co-sponsored with the Center for African
and African Diaspora Studies and was attended by over 230 people, many from the
local Moroccan-American community. Gnawan ritual trance music has its roots
with enslaved soldiers brought to Morocco from sub-Saharan West Africa, their
trauma of displacement, worship of ancestral spirits, tradition of praise songs, and
sufi mysticism (el Hamel, 2008, pp. 247-256). A highly regarded five-star Atlanta
restaurant, Imperial Fez, catered the conference and helped promote the concert.
Formal and informal evaluation feedback from the YoM conference showed that
the conference was a resounding success, especially for junior scholars from outside
KSU for the networking that occurred. Collaborative partners that helped promote
the conference and attract the participation of scholars by posting announcements
in their newsletters, websites, and listservs included the Friends of Morocco,
Fulbright, and the American Institute for Maghreb Studies.
As in previous years, the YoM resulted in new courses and curriculum, research
projects, education abroad programs, grant writing, publications, and global
partnerships. These initiatives directly contributed to student learning, academic
scholarship, and community engagement. As one of the faculty members in the
YoM learning community reflected, “to grasp the full complexity of the Year of
Morocco one must appreciate that in actuality it takes at least three years to propose,
develop, manage, and execute, to say nothing of the follow up, the consequences,
and the efforts put toward sustainability and future growth.” The “Year of” program
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is a strategic investment made by the university and its faculty that provides longlasting and diverse learning experience for our students. It involves broad outreach
and engaged collaborations with important community partners. In this regard, the
program benefitted through its established international partnership with H2UC.
KSU’s partnership with H2UC began in January 2005, when KSU President
Dr. Betty Siegel (1981-2006) visited Morocco to meet H2UC President Dr. Rahma
Bourquia. The partnership was codified with the signing of a Memorandum of
Understanding by both institutions in 2007. More than 100 KSU faculty, students,
administrators, and staff have visited Morocco and about 30 faculty, students, and
administrators from Hassan II have been hosted by KSU. Past KSU collaborative
projects in Morocco have included the following:
• The creation of a master’s degree program in American studies at
Hassan II University and involvement in the establishment of the
Morocco American Studies Association.
• A compilation of oral histories, production of a documentary video,
and creation of the Ben M’sik Community Museum (BMCM) in
Casablanca.
• A 2011 grant awarded by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of
Education and Cultural Affairs and the American Association of
Museums to fund the creation of an online exhibit titled “Identities:
Understanding
Islam
in
a
Cross
Cultural
Context”
(www.marb.kennesaw.edu/identities). This intercultural exchange
and collaborative partnership continues, currently developing
additional exhibits on “Morocco in World War II” and “Morocco, the
United States and the Slave Trade.”
• Participation in Morocco’s Annual International University Theater
Festival in Casablanca (FITUC) including an award-winning
production of an adaptation of Herman Melville’s Moby Dick
performed by KSU’s students both at KSU and H2UC.
• Work with low-income Artisan groups in Morocco who are designing
new art products that preserve indigenous arts and crafts traditions. In
Marrakesh, this project included work with Anarouz, a social
enterprise cooperative engaging more than 2,000 local artisans and
their families and communities.
• Funding of a KSU Strategic Internationalization Grant to interview
and conduct research on women leaders in Morocco.
These projects provided a strong basis for the designation of the 2018-2019
academic year as the “Year of Morocco” at KSU and led to H2UC being named the
2019 KSU Distinguished International Community Partner.
In addition to the seven H2UC faculty who visited KSU for the YoM
conference, 23 KSU students and seven faculty visited the Ben M’sik campus in
Casablanca as part of the team-taught spring-break study abroad experience. The
study abroad program visited four cities: Marrakech, Casablanca, Fez, and Tangier.
This itinerary helped participants experience Morocco’s cultural diversity.
Highlights of the experience included planting trees with the High Atlas
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Foundation, visiting the Amal Women’s cooperative, donating books to the Medina
Children’s Library, visiting the Tangier American Legation Museum (TALIM), and
interacting with Hassan II faculty and students. While abroad, our students and
faculty were interviewed by and appeared on Morocco National Television.
These projects all helped to advance campus internationalization and a more
nuanced and scholarly understanding of Morocco—especially as it relates to
important issues that impact both Morocco and the United States. As Clifford
Geertz, who has written extensively about Morocco, argues in The Interpretation of
Cultures understanding cultures necessarily involves the craft of interpretation, a
constantly changing, relational process. The following introductory essay on
Morocco was developed to help undergraduate students appreciate Morocco’s rich
cultural heritage and complex place in a global society.

Introductory Essay on Morocco

Amazigh, Arab, Sub-Saharan African, and European identities are among the
many influences on Moroccan identity. A geographic and cultural crossroads, it is
a country continuously negotiating its place in today’s changing world. It is both a
constitutional monarchy and an Islamic state that protects the rights of other
religious communities to exist and to practice. Its history is one of extensive
diplomatic relations with the enduring influence of the monarchy being one of its
most salient characteristics.
A sustained history of intercultural and commercial interactions in what is now
Morocco has taken place among diverse civilizations such as Amazigh, Phoenician,
Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Arab, Andalusian, Egyptian, and Ottoman. Morocco has
also had long-lasting and substantial trade with sub-Saharan African empires such
as the Ghana, Mali, Songhai, and Sosso. From 1912 to 1956, it was a colony of
France and Spain, with Tangier as an International Zone administered by several
European powers.
The Amazigh (meaning freeborn in Tamazight) or Berbers (connoting
uncivilized non-speakers of Greek/Latin), are the indigenous early inhabitants of
Morocco. 1 At present, approximately 40-45% of Moroccans speak one of three
Amazigh languages: Tamazight, Tashlheit, or Tarifit (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011, p.
1). According to Phillip Naylor (2009), the Amazigh have “evinced an ability to
adapt to and to absorb other cultures. Their transcultural receptivity has
distinguished their culture” (p. 4). On the other hand, they have been a major force
of resistance against foreign invaders, and the Romans, Arabs, French, and Spanish
all lauded the Amazigh’s desire for freedom and independence (Maddy-Weitzman,
2011, pp. 177-178). Retaining their culture and language amidst relentless pressure
to change has been a constant struggle.

1

I will use Amazigh rather than Berber throughout this essay except when quoting other
works.
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The Spread of Arabic and Islam across the Maghreb

Islamic states have generally controlled Moroccan territory since the Arab
invasions of the 7th century. Arab influence has been significant, with Arabic and
Islam permeating North African societies. Arabic became the language of learning,
diplomacy, and trade throughout the region, which came to be known as al-Maghrib
or “west.” The relationship between trade and Islam was especially close (Brett,
1999, p. 62). Notably, as Dunn (1986) observed, “one of the strengths of an
expanding Islam was its successful adaptability to local patterns of culture” (p. xix).
Its focus on ensuring successful business relationships contributed to its emphasis
on cultural adaptability.
It was the Umayyad caliphate (661-750), which was based in Damascus, that
initially conquered North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula (al-Andalus). The
Umayyads did not force Jews and Christians (dhimmi, or “peoples of the book”) to
convert but required them to pay a tax (jizya) that Muslims did not have to pay. In
the Maghreb, as Bennison (2014) highlights,
[t]he Islamic conquest itself was a long drawn-out process that involved
ongoing interactions between two tribal peoples, the Arab invaders and the
indigenous Maghribis, the latter of whom came to be lumped together in
Arabic writing as the Berbers although they did not see themselves as a
single ethnos. Indigenous tribes fought the newcomers, allied with them
and rebelled against them. Such high levels of conflict slowed the pace of
conquest but also generated intimacy through recruitment and the capture
of Berber prisoners, male and female, who entered Arab Muslim ranks in
a way that sedentary peasant populations, many of whom were Christian
and thus inscribed in the new order as tax-paying ahl al-dhimmi, did not.
(p. 139)
Across the Maghreb, the Amazigh’s desire to preserve their autonomy and select
their own leaders contributed to ever-changing alliances, for example, between
Sunni Umayyads, Khariji, Ibadi, Sufi, Sunni Abbasids, Fatimids, and Umayyad
Andalusian Islamic groups. As Bennison (2016) notes, the Khariji message “that
the caliph should be selected for his qualities as a Muslim and a leader rather than
because of ancestry was appealing to Berber troops who resented their inferior
status to the Arabs” (p. 12). It was the Umayyad rulers’ excessive demands for
extraordinary taxes and slave tributes from Amazigh Muslim converts that was the
primary reason for the “Great Berber Revolt” or “Kharijite Revolt” of 739-743, the
first successful secession from the Umayyad caliphate. Having broken away, the
more moderate forms of Sufri Kharijites and Ibadi Kharijites in their Amazigh
interior strongholds of the Atlas Mountains did not continue to pursue warfare
against Muslims of other sects and maintained a tolerant attitude toward both
Christian and Jewish communities (Bennison, 2016, p. 232).
Writes Brett (1999), “The overthrow of the Umayyads by the Abbasids in 750,
however, was not a victory for the doctrine of Kharijism . . . but a triumph of the
call for a member of Muhammad’s family” (p. 59). After the overthrow of the
Umayyads by the Abbasids (750-1258), who were based in Baghdad, North Africa
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became a decentralized network of largely independent Islamic states. The
Abbasids emphasized their religious authority but did not exercise as much direct
political authority over these states. One such state, the Idrisids (789-920) of
Morocco promoted widespread commercial and cultural exchange, especially with
Umayyad al-Andalus, a region which had long been an important trading center.
The establishment of the Moroccan monarchy (one of the oldest in the world) dates
to Idriss, a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad (Sater, 2010, p. 3).
Idriss I and Abd al-Rahman I had fled Abbasid rule to Morocco and al-Andalus
respectively, claiming sharifian status (descent from the Prophet) and establishing
new states. Abd al-Rahman I was the son of an Amazigh mother as was Idris’s son
Idriss II. Being the proclaimed royal offspring of Arab rulers and conquered peoples
aided in establishing local legitimacy. As Menocal (2002) points out, “Umayyad
princes descended from the caliphs of Arabia and Syria were also visibly their
mothers’ sons” (p. 67). The practice of intermarriage with conquered peoples was
also evidenced during the reign of Ali ibn Yusuf, an Amazigh ruler of Almoravid
Andalusia descent whose mother was a Christian (Rosser-Owen, 2014, p. 169).
Generally, racial and ethnic distinctions were less emphasized under Arab
patrilineal ideas as compared to those of Europe (Bennison, 2016, p. 180).
Genealogy and kinship have been critical concerns for establishing the authority of
Muslim leaders in the Arab world. As Rosser-Owen (2014) notes, “Berber regimes
. . . deliberately constructed Arab genealogies to legitimize their rule in the Islamic
West” (p. 155).
After being overthrown, the Umayyads fled their capital of Damascus to settle
in al-Andalus. They brought with them invaluable knowledge and attracted a retinue
of experts that helped the region connect with a wide array of trading centers and
led to a period of great economic prosperity where Muslims, Christians, and Jews
lived together in relative peace known in Spanish as the convivencia.
Describing how the Great Mosque of Cordoba was modeled after the Great
Mosque of Damascus, Menocal (2002) considers its orientation south instead of
east to face Mecca, as though it was located in Damascus, as “a conscious
continuation of what had been destroyed in Syria,” and a symbolic expression of
“the Umayyad’s care not to destroy a multiethnic and religiously pluralistic state”
(pp. 58-59). Ironically, there had first been a Roman temple on the Cordoba site;
the temple was converted into a church by invading Visigoths in 572, and the church
was demolished and completely rebuilt into the Great Mosque in 784, and then
converted into a Catholic church in 1236 leading up to the Reconquista.
The spiritual ideas of Islam were appealing to North Africans but were also
used for political purposes as throughout the empire. North African Amazigh
groups proved themselves adept at making scholarly arguments of jurisprudence
based on Islamic law to assert their rights, a practice that resulted in a rich Islamic
competition of ideas as well as a struggle for supremacy.

The Amazigh Imperial Age: The Almoravids and Almohads

Throughout the 10th century, Umayyad Andalusian ideas and practices
diffused across the Maghreb, especially in Morocco (Naylor, 2009, p. 76). The
success of Umayyad Andalusia gave rise to the Amazigh Almoravids (1053-1147)
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and Almohads (1147-1269), “two of the most powerful states in the history of
Western civilization’s Middle Ages” (Naylor, 2009, p. 7). These two Amazigh
Muslim empires united North Africa with al-Andalus, Tamazight becoming the
language of the palace in the Almohad period and being used for explaining the
Qur’an and hadiths (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011, p. 168). As Bennison (2016) stresses,
while frequently “lumped together under the rubric ‘Berber,’ the Almoravids and
Almohads drew their support from opposed and linguistically distinct groups of
tribes in North Africa”; and at the same time, both dynasties represented “the
maturing of an Islamic society in the Maghrib” (pp. 4-5).
The Almoravids and Almohads left an impressive array of architecture across
their empires. This included creating symbols of power through monumental
architecture and relocating, rebuilding, and repurposing as a means for legitimizing
their authority (Rosser-Owen, 2014, p. 152). Contrary to historiography that has
tended to vilify Amazigh African tribes for destroying a more “civilized” Europe or
simply mimicking their art and architecture, the extensive and intensive cultural
exchange between al-Andalus and North Africa went in both directions (Carillo,
2014, p. 68).
The Almoravids, a confederation of Sanhaja Amazigh tribes, first consolidated
their power and wealth by controlling the Saharan trade and in military excursions
against the Soninke kingdom of Ghana (Naylor, 2009, pp. 89-90). The Almoravid
rulers recognized the Abbasids as the spiritual leaders of Islam, but they looked to
Umayyad civilization and the Maliki school of jurisprudence for political and
cultural exemplars. They made Marrakech their capital in 1070, developed the water
supply, and created a unique layout where the ruler’s residence was not placed
adjacent to the great Mosque as had been the Umayyad tradition in Damascus and
Cordoba, an indication that their empire represented something new and perhaps
more egalitarian. The still-standing Qubbat al-Ba‘diyyin is an exceptional example
of the ingenious and original style of the Almoravid period (Bennison, 2016, p.
294).
In asserting their power and expanding their rule, the rival Almoravids and
Almohads each claimed to be more religiously faithful than the other, but each also
went to great effort to deliberately evoke symbols of their predecessor’s
accomplishments (Bennison, 2014, p. 143). For example, the Almoravids
remodeled the miḥrāb of the Qarawiyyn mosque in Fez after the one in Cordoba,
and both the Almoravids and the Almohads transported numerous columns over
800 kilometers from the famous Madinat al-Zahra ruins in Cordoba to Marrakesh
(Rosser-Owen, 2014, p. 157, 174). The Almohads were extremely ambitious
builders, expanding cities, installing new hydraulic water systems, irrigating
orchard plantations, establishing hospitals, and building imperial fortresses,
gateways, and mosques with distinctively large square minarets. They destroyed
and rebuilt many Almoravid mosques claiming that they were incorrectly oriented
towards Mecca, further asserting their righteousness and power (Rosser-Owen,
2014, p. 182). Still, many of their designs also evoked Cordoba’s influences. For
Amira Bennison (2016), the Almohad period demonstrated a true artistic cultural
synthesis, as Andalusi and Maghrebi craftsmen worked together on projects on both
sides of the straits, setting a tone for the art and architecture of both regions for
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centuries to come (pp. 320, 328). The imperial cities of the Almoravid and Almohad
dynasties were impressive, and many of the Almohad structures are still in use
today.
Both empires used religion as a mechanism for extending their control and
asserting the ruler’s religious authority, a process that elicited a strong grassroots
response in the form of Sufism. Sufi practice emphasized ritual retreat, fasting, and
meditation to commune with God. It was “Maliki juridical cliques whose receipt of
state patronage and exercise of religious power . . . often seemed self-serving rather

than righteous” that led to the increased appeal of Sufi mysticism and asceticism,
including the Sufi notion of the divinely inspired guide or charismatic holy man
(Bennison, 2016, pp. 238-39). The Almohads were fervent critics of the Almoravids
and are noteworthy for their ideological zealotry for instance in recognizing their
messianic leader Ibn Tumart as the mahdī, or the one sent to restore true Islam.
Bennison (2014) writes, “The Almohads viewed their message not simply as
revived and restored Islam, but as pure Abrahamic monotheism (tawhid) which all
Muslims, Christians and Jews should accept” (p. 148). Thus, in violation of the
dhimma, they prohibited Jews and Christians from practicing their religion
(Gottreich & Schroeter, 2011, p. 13). Ironically, the rising power and attraction of
Sufi charismatic leaders may have contributed to Ibn Tumart’s assertion of
infallibility as mahdī, as well as to the Almohad emphasis on a source-based
approach to law rather than the commentary-based Maliki approach (Bennison,
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2016, pp. 253, 257-58, 274). This Islamic competition of ideas encompassed
different notions of religious practice, legal schools, and leadership styles.
One of the leading philosophical protagonists within these debates was Ibn
Rushd al-Hafid (1126-1198), also known as Averroes, who served as a judge and
court physician. The “quintessential Almohad intellectual,” he wrote extensively
about many subjects including philosophy, theology, medicine, astronomy, physics,
law, and linguistics. His philosophical works include commentaries on Aristotle
that were very influential among Jewish and Christian scholars including his
contemporary, Moses ben Maimon, also known as Musa ibn Maymum or
Maimonides (1138-1204), who lived and worked in Morocco before migrating to
Egypt (Bennison, 2016, pp. 261-62).
The Amazigh were not simple rebel nomads, but intellectual rulers of a vast
empire. As Bennison (2014) describes the change, “by the end of the Almohad rule,
the idea of normative urban-based Islamic rule had become generalized throughout
the Maghreb and the sectarian tribal landscape of preceding centuries had changed
dramatically and permanently” (p. 154). Conflict increased as urban-based centers
attempted to expand their power and control. Unfortunately, increased military
conflict between Castilian Christians and the Almoravid and Almohad Islamic
empires in Iberia/Andalusia saw the rise of a crusade-based and jihad-based
political paradigm (Bennison, 2016, p. 19). More and more, “politicized Islam and
Christianity narrowed perspectives and produced ‘misreceptions’ and
misperceptions of others” (Naylor, 2009, p. 106). Thus, religious intolerance
increasingly became a weapon for empire building among competing Christian and
Islamic states.
After the Almohads were defeated and pushed out of al-Andalus, they faced
rising competition in the Maghreb, and were eventually defeated and succeeded by
the Marinids (1269-1465). Unlike their predecessors, the Marinids were not a
sharifian dynasty that claimed ancestry from the Prophet (Naylor, 2009, p. 98).
They were, however, actively involved in the gold trade with Sub-Saharan Africa,
and provided support to the last remaining Islamic kingdom in Andalusia, the
Nasrids of Granada. Granada did not surrender until 1492, ending nearly 800 years
of Islamic rule in al-Andalus. The Marinids re-established the Maliki school in their
capital of Fez and were known for building large madrasas, including one that
featured an extraordinary mechanical water-clock (Blair & Bloom, 1994, p. 122).
Thus, carrying on Fez’s tradition as a seat of learning—the oldest existing and
continually operating educational institution in the world being the University of alQarawiyyin, founded in 859 AD by a Muslim woman, Fatima al-Fihri.

A Cosmopolitan Era

It was during the period of Marinid rule that two very influential North African
luminaries left their mark: Ibn Battuta and Ibn Khaldun. Born into a family of legal
scholars in Tangier during the Marinid dynasty, Ibn Battuta (1304-1368) is the
greatest traveler of premodern times. Far exceeding Marco Polo, he traveled
approximately 73,000 miles and visited more than 40 different lands, including
Spain, China, Kazakhstan, Tanzania, and Mali. His narrative story of this grand

10 Journal of Global Initiatives

tour, or rihla, reports on a wide variety of political events, human geography, and
social and economic conditions in great detail (Dunn, 1986, pp. 1-5).
Ibn Battuta studied in the Maliki school of jurisprudence and was also
influenced and interested in Sufism, which recognizes the possibility of achieving
a direct personal communion with God. Sufi saints, known as marabouts in the
Maghreb, attracted many followers. Today, their tombs dot the rural and urban
landscape of the Maghreb and are major pilgrimage sites (Zillinger, 2014, p. 41). In
many ways, his traveling career represented a grand world tour of the lodges and
tombs of famous Sufi mystics and saints (Dunn, 1986, pp. 22-24).
The scholarly class of the Islamic world was an extraordinarily mobile group,
connecting Islamic centers of study and worship with its distant outposts (Dunn,
1986, p. 24). Ibn Battuta, who spent eight years in India serving as a judge in the
Sultanate of Delhi, exemplified this practice. According to Ross Dunn (1986),
[m]embers of this cultural elite who were living and traveling in the further
regions consistently maintained close ties with the great cities of the
central Islamic lands, thereby creating not merely a scattering of literate
and skilled Muslims across the hemisphere, but an integrated, growing,
self-replenishing network of cultural communication . . . Islam tended to
encourage a higher degree of social mobility and freer movement of
individuals from one city and region to another than was the case in the
other civilizations of that time. Islamic culture put great stress on
egalitarian behavior in social relations based on the ideal of a community
of believers (the umma) having a common allegiance to one God and his
Sacred Law. To be sure, a great gulf separated the rich and powerful from
the poor and weak, as was the case in all civilized societies until very
recent times. But Islam mightily resisted the institutionalizing of ascribed
statuses, ethnic exclusivities, or purely territorial loyalties. (p. 10)
Originally from the area of Tunisia, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), author of the Kitab
al-‘Ibar, a history of Amazigh North Africa under Islamic rule, put forth in the
Muqaddima (introduction) an influential theory of political world history.
According to Bennison (2016), Ibn Khaldun argued in this work that “government
preserved humankind from savagery,” but civilization “fostered an effete, decadent
and morally questionable lifestyle in comparison with the simple, virtuous and
hardy ways of the tribes” (pp. 6-7). In some ways, this theory asserted the necessity
for ruling groups to be replenished by incorporating new or previously
disenfranchised groups into society. Ibn Khaldun, considering the specific case of
the Almoravids and Almohads, believed that tribal differences were surmounted
“by a charismatic leader with a particular religious message,” as was certainly the
case of Ibn Tumart (Bennison, 2016, p. 7).

European Imperialism and Colonial Rule

As Islamic rule ended in the Iberian Peninsula, Portugal and Spain embarked
on an Age of Discovery that entailed establishing control of the high seas.
Sanctioned by Papal Bulls (decrees) such as the Dum diversas of 1452, the Catholic
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Church encouraged an aggressive approach that would “vanquish and subdue all
Saracens (Muslims) and pagans and other enemies of Christ, to reduce their persons
to perpetual slavery, and to convert to Christianity” (Ghazanfar, 2016, p. 43). As
Lambert (2005) explains, “When Spain expelled Muslims from Iberia, that
Christian power confiscated their property, denied the Barbary powers favorable
trading terms, raided their territory, and enslaved their people” (p. 109). The 1494
Treaty of Tordesillas fixed a boundary between the competing Portuguese and
Spanish empires that, in part, allowed Spain and Portugal to fight together against
the Ottomans and Arabs in the Mediterranean and Arabian Seas in order to
monopolize the Atlantic and Indian Ocean trade routes to Asia and Africa. Figuring
prominently in this effort, the Strait of Gibraltar was always a disorderly and highly
contested space (Pennell, 2001, p. 55).
The Portuguese exploited the intense rivalry between Morocco’s closely
related Zanata Marinids and Zanata Wattasids (1465-1554) to seize control of
Ceuta, the entrance to the Mediterranean, in 1415. In 1437, an expedition
commanded by Prince Henry of Portugal was surrounded by Moroccan forces at
Tangier and allowed to return to their ships only upon the promise to surrender
Ceuta. Prince Henry’s younger brother Dom Ferdinand was held hostage and died
in prison in Fez, since the promise to surrender Ceuta was never fulfilled (Boxer,
1975, p. 26). The Portuguese later took al-Qasr al-Saghir, Tangier, and Arzila but
were expelled from Agadir in 1541 by Morocco’s Sa‘adi (1549-1654) sharifian
dynasty. The Sa‘adi forced the Portuguese to abandon the cities of Safi and
Azenmour, thereby reopening the Atlantic coasts to Moroccan commerce (Naylor,
2009, p. 124). The Wattasids, allied with the Ottomans, briefly occupied Fez, but
were also defeated by the Sa‘adi. Ottoman incursions in Morocco led the Sa‘adi to
pursue a strategic alliance with Spain. At the same time, the Sa‘adi extended their
control over the Saharan trade routes. They also continued the emphasis of
incorporating water features within their urban architecture, adding many public
fountains (Blair & Bloom, 1994a, p. 260).
The Battle of the Three Kings (1578) resulted in the death of the childless King
Sebastian of Portugal, his ally the deposed Moroccan sultan, al-Mutawakkil, and
the Sa‘adi Sultan Abd al-Malik. The Sa‘adi victory resulted in Abd al-Malik’s
brother Ahmad al-Mansur becoming the next ruler of Morocco. The rule of Sultan
al-Mansur “protected Morocco from the predations and ambitions of Spain and the
Ottoman Empire” (Naylor, 2009, p. 26). He created the makhzan, a term connoting
the central organization of government administration. Contrary to the colonial and
post-colonial discourse of decline often used to characterize non-Western responses
to the onslaught of European imperialism, Moroccan responses demonstrated a
resiliency distinguished by cautious strategic thinking and selective appropriation
of new ideas and technologies, with the Sultans often taking the lead in initiating
modernizing reforms (Miller, 2013, p. 29). At the same time, European alliances
grew in the face of such ambitions. For example, in 1662, the cities of Tangier and
Mumbai became dowry gifts from Katherine of Braganza in her marriage to Charles
II providing a critical link between the Portuguese and British empires.
The Sa‘adi and Alawi (1654-present) sharifian dynasties implemented
numerous reforms and generally managed to protect Morocco from incursions by
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the Ottomans, Portuguese, and Spanish. One of the most famous Alawi Sultans,
Mawlay Isma‘il, whose mother was from sub-Saharan Africa, raised a large
professional army known as the “Black Guard” with an elite cavalry unit,
constructed a corsair fleet to assert Moroccan power in the Atlantic and
Mediterranean, moved the capital to Meknes, and made an offer of marriage to
Louis XIV’s daughter (Bennison, 2002, pp. 27-28; Blair & Bloom, 1994a, p. 260).
During his reign, the Alawi pushed back Portuguese and Spanish positions on the
African continent (El Jadida, Sebta, Melilla, Peñón de Alhucemas) (Sater, 2010, p.
4).
Moroccan Dynasties
Idrisid

789-920

Fatimid Rule

922-974

Umayyad Andalus Rule

974-1040

Almoravid

1040-1147

Almohad

1124-1269

Marinid

1248-1465

Idrisid interlude

1465-1471

Wattasid

1471-1554

Saadi

1549-1659

Dila'i interlude

1659-1663

Alawi

1666-present

The death of Sultan Isma‘il was followed by prolonged civil war (his son was
deposed five times during his 30-year reign) which led to other endemic problems
that greatly weakened the state and resulted in the navy being disbanded. Isma‘il’s
grandson, Muhammed III (reigned 1757-1790), however, was a great reformer who
sent numerous emissaries to learn from the Ottoman court in Istanbul. Believing
that peaceful commerce with Europe was wiser than continuous warfare, he
implemented new duties on overseas trade and rebuilt the port of Essaouira on the
Atlantic coast to promote trade (Miller, 2013, pp. 8-10).
Muhammed III was the first head of state to recognize the United States as an
independent nation. Morocco was also the first nation in the world to recognize the
new U.S. Constitution of 1787 and to address George Washington as the first
elected president. It can therefore be said that Morocco has the oldest, unbroken,
perpetual treaty of friendship and peace with the United States (Tise, 2005). This
relationship was brought about, in part, due to the activities of the Barbary corsairs
(Lambert, 2005, pp. 50-59).
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In the Mediterranean, Barbary corsairs, the majority of whom were European
exiles from the Iberian Peninsula, operated primarily out of Algiers, Tunis, and
Tripoli as regencies of the Ottoman Empire. Historically, European corsairs were
also active throughout the Mediterranean and attacked North African shipping
interests. Both groups engaged in seizing cargo and enslaving and ransoming
captives. In Morocco, the port of Salé (Rabat) also had active groups of corsairs. In
the early 17th century, 70 to 80 European ships were being captured annually
(Weiss, 2011, pp. 7-11). As shipping raids increased, European powers began
paying tribute to North African rulers, negotiating individual treaties with the Sultan
of Morocco and Ottoman regencies, in order to ensure safe passage. Similarly, what
came to be known as privateers, not unlike corsairs, became an institutionalized
form of piracy licensed by governments to disrupt as well as carry out military and
commercial activities. European states recognized the corsairs as privateers and
even financed some Barbary corsair expeditions. The American colonies relied
heavily on privateers during the War of Independence, with 2,500 mercenary ships
deployed against British shipping (Silverstein, 2005, pp. 184-187). Military
competition over trade routes at sea was at its height in the period.
Ratified by the U.S. Congress in 1787, the Treaty with Morocco established
free trade without tribute between the two nations. It was hoped that this treaty
would be a model that the United States could take to the other Barbary powers
(Lambert, 2005, p. 59). But this was not to be. Between 1785 and 1796, Algerian
corsairs captured thirteen American ships and held more than 100 Americans
ransom. The United States eventually agreed to pay $600,000 in ransom for the
captives and in tribute, to buy peace. The new nation soon negotiated other treaties,
bringing the total cost to $1.25 million or 20% of the U.S. federal government’s
annual budget (Lambert, 2005, p. 93). This eventually led to the Tripolitan War
(1801-1805), as the United States decided to fight rather than continue paying
tribute (Silverstein, 2005, p. 181). Significantly, it also contributed to deeper
questioning of slavery in America, for in 1800 there were 750,000 Africans and
people of African descent enslaved in America, compared to a few hundred
Americans enslaved in North Africa (Lambert, 2005, pp. 120-121).
Muhammed III’s extensive reforms challenged the status and privileges of the
elite religious classes, who eventually enlisted the Sultan’s son, Yazid, to lead their
opposition. Following Yazid’s short rule, Muhammed III’s second son, Sulayman,
continued reversing his father’s policies, attempting to close the doors on trade and
interaction with Europe (Miller, 2013, p. 11). A distinguishing characteristic of
hereditary monarchies is generational with a distinct and unpredictable rhythm of
change. How and which issues each ruler addresses is based on their unique
experiences, skills, and interests. They do not always follow their predecessor’s
footsteps, but they often learn lessons from their missteps.
Sulayman’s successor, his nephew Abd al-Rahman (reigned 1822-1859),
suffered significant military defeats and was forced to recognize that Morocco had
fallen far behind Europe in terms of its military capability as well as in industrial
technology and manufacturing. Abd al-Rahman’s son, Muhammad IV (reigned
1859 to 1873), who commanded the Moroccan army defeated by the French at the
Battle of Isly in August 1844, launched a series of military reforms establishing the
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first European-styled regiment, building a munitions factory and setting up a
military training school in Fez; however, tribal resistance to foreign intrusions
remained the most effective line of defense (Sater, 2010, p. 13). Unfortunately,
following raids by Anjera tribesmen on a Spanish garrison at Ceuta, Spain, declared
war. The Spanish-Moroccan War (1859-1860) included naval bombardment of
Tangier, Asilah, and Tetouan and resulted in widespread devastation. The British,
concerned about Spanish occupation, brokered a treaty that imposed a crippling
indemnity payment on Morocco and that was paid from custom tariffs collected by
Spanish authorities stationed in the ports (Miller, 2013, pp. 24-25).
From the time of the French conquest of Algeria in 1830 until the establishment
of the protectorate in 1912, Morocco was constantly under threat by European
powers looking to establish a greater colonial presence. The severe and conclusive
military defeats to France in Algeria in 1830 and 1844 and to the Spanish in
Morocco in 1860 made clear the immense disparity in the military might of the
Maghreb and its European neighbors pressuring the Alawi monarchy to accept
preferential commercial treaties and eventually colonial rule. The first such treaty
was with Britain in 1856, which the Sultan knew was keen to press any advantage
in its rivalry with the French. One of the most problematic terms of the treaty
provided the extension of legal protection to any foreigner involved in a dispute
who could choose to have the case heard in a consular rather than a Moroccan court.
The status of protégé, or protected person, grew quickly to include Moroccan
citizens employed by foreign enterprises (Miller, 2013, p. 23). Most of the
Moroccan protégés were successful merchants and entrepreneurs who operated
within legal frameworks, but others operated illegally in exploitive and banned
activities. Miller (2013) reports that notably, “while Jews figured disproportionately
among the protégés, they were no means the majority. Most Jews who benefitted
from the practice were bankers and wealthy merchants, while the mass of Jews—
poor artisans, shopkeepers and laborers—were not affected at all” (pp. 43-44).
The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 shortened the distance from Europe to
India via the Mediterranean, further heightening tensions and rivalries throughout
the region. The British went to war with Egyptian nationalists in 1882 to establish
outright control of the canal and surrounding territory (Anderson, 2013, p. 55). The
intense competition for world power led to the 1884 Berlin Conference and the
“Scramble for Africa” during which the continent was divided into spheres of
influence among the European powers. Miller (2013) further elucidates: “when
British-French rivalry ceased due to Germany’s increased colonial ambitions under
Wilhelm II (1888-1918), Morocco’s independence was far less secure, opening the
way for French colonial ambitions in North-West Africa” (p. 15). The Entente
Cordiale of 1904 between Britain and France gave Britain a free hand in Egypt, and
France the right to “preserve order” and “provide assistance” in Morocco (Miller,
2013, p. 72).
Hassan I (reigned 1873-1894) continued Muhammed IV’s emphasis on
military and administrative reforms, further organizing and modernizing a
professional corps of ministerial and managerial roles. This included sending
students abroad for training and building a cadre of professionals who could deal
effectively with Europeans. Most famously, he organized regular annual tours of
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the countryside to project his authority, during which he was accompanied by as
many as 15,000 soldiers, court officials, traders, and staff. The impressive show of
force and commercial benefits of these local diplomatic expeditions were aimed at
reducing conflict within the empire (Miller, 2013, pp. 34-37). However, growing
inequalities due to expanded contact with Europe and the inflationary pressure of
foreign capital exacerbated rising tensions and competition within the empire
(Miller, 2013, p. 53). As Miller (2013) highlights, “Morocco was [gradually]
transformed into another subaltern state feeding European expansion by offering
raw materials, cheap labor, and unprotected markets” (p. 27). Moreover, Europe’s
“civilizing mission” sanctioned intervention on behalf of subjugated peoples
everywhere and drove increased militancy in Morocco as elsewhere (Miller, 2013,
p. 55). Morocco’s annual trade deficit reached 14 million francs annually by 1902,
and a French loan of 62.5 million francs in 1904 was a clear sign of the Moroccan
state’s financial crisis (Miller, 2013, pp. 61-63).
The Acts of Algeciras of 1906, brought on by European imperial ambitions and
brokered unsuccessfully by Theodore Roosevelt, was signed by Sultan Moulay Abd
al-Aziz (reigned 1894-1908) (Naylor, 2009, p. 162). It stipulated greater foreign
economic presence and administrative authority in Morocco, especially in the port
cities, and led to the overthrow of the sultan in 1908. In an unprecedented move,
the bay‘a (oath of allegiance) issued by the ulama (religious scholars) imposed
terms on the new sultan, Moulay Abd al-Hafid, requiring him to abrogate the
Algeciras Act, restore Morocco’s territorial integrity, and expel French troops from
Casablanca and Ouja (Miller, 2013, p. 77; Naylor, 2009, p. 16). This proved an
impossible task and only served to increase French pressure. On March 30, 1912,
Abd al-Hafid signed the Treaty of Fez, making Morocco a French protectorate. The
Fez Riots took place in the capital two weeks later. The Jewish quarter was leveled
before order was restored, when French artillery shelled the centers of resistance in
the city and forced insurrectionaries to surrender. In the end, 66 Europeans, 42 Jews,
and some 600 Moroccans were killed, and Sultan Abd al-Hafid abdicated his throne
(Gershovich, 2000, p. 57). French colonial rule in Morocco would last for the next
44 years.
Generally, French colonial practice in Morocco, especially under ResidentGeneral Hubert Lyautey’s administration, aimed “to work with, not against, native
socio-political elites and respect pre-colonial customs and traditions. . . . [Preserving
the Sultanate] put the traditional sources of power and its administration at the
disposal of the French. This [however] had the potential to seriously delegitimize
the monarchy in the eyes of the [burgeoning] nationalist movement” (Sater, 2010,
p. 5). The Resident-General signed all royal edicts in the name of the sharifian
government (Laskier & Bashan, 2003, p. 473). In reality, there existed two systems:
the sultan managing a simplified and stripped down, mainly religious, cultural
affairs division; and the French governing a large technocratic state bureaucracy
(Miller, 2013, p. 91). As exemplified in the 1930 “Berber Dahir (decree),” the
French also pursued a divide-and-rule strategy that aimed at splitting traditional ties
between Arab and Amazigh communities (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011, p. 166). In
general, colonialism emphasized the physical segregation of ethnic, social, and
cultural groups (King, 1976, p. 7). Special schools for Amazigh taught entirely in
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French were established, and all legal matters occurring in Amazigh territory were
placed under French jurisdiction rather than in shari’a courts (Naylor, 2009, pp. 1920). Relatedly, language policy in schools has been a crucial on-going issue in the
formation of national identity ever since this time.
The Spanish also acquired colonial rule over portions of northern Morocco in
1912, and it was here that some of the strongest resistance occurred with the
establishment of the independent Rifian Republic in 1921. The Rif region had been
a site of resistance for centuries, as highlighted by a 1799 treaty between Morocco
and Spain that acknowledged the inability of the sultan to prevent local people from
attacking the Spanish and therefore excluded the region from the treaty (Pennell,
2001, p. 58). Fighting lasted until 1926, when French forces entered the conflict. It
took more than 150,000 colonial soldiers to defeat the 40,000 Rifian troops.
Moreover, “the French unleashed a barrage of modern weaponry perfected during
World War I with terrifying effect – aerial bombardment, poison gas and armored
tanks and cars” (Miller, 2013, pp. 104-110). Ironically, during the Spanish Civil
War (1936-1939), Francisco Franco used northern Morocco as a staging area and
hired nearly 80,000 Moroccan mercenaries (Miller, 2013, p. 137). The Rif has been
the site of uprisings and protests ever since. In 1959, Crown Prince Hassan
commanded the newly formed Forces Armées Royales to try to crush a Rifian revolt
that had begun in 1957.
Large numbers of French settlers began arriving in Morocco following World
War I. They worked not only in construction but also in managerial and professional
roles. Some became large landowners. They built the new port of Casablanca, a
railroad system, major dams, a massive electric grid, and developed mining
concessions (Miller, 2013, pp. 111-113). By the 1940s, the population of European
settlers in Morocco reached 400,000 (Laskier & Bashan, 2003, p. 474). Ironically,
colonial rule, imposed from outside, necessitated increased consultation and power
sharing within Morocco. It opened up spaces for previous non-state actors to voice
concerns and called for a deep questioning of Moroccan society and values.

The Jewish Experience in Morocco

The Jewish community in Morocco is one of the oldest in the world dating as
far back as the destruction of the first temple in 586 BCE, or perhaps even the time
of Phoenician traders (7th century BCE) or the time of King Solomon (10th Century
BCE). By the time of the Roman Empire, they were a well-established community,
later known as the toshavim, or “original residents.” In addition to these ancient
Jewish communities, large numbers of Sephardic Jews, known as megorashim, the
expelled, arrived in Morocco from the Iberian Peninsula along with Muslim exiles
escaping persecution during the 15th century. These two groups did not always get
along well together (Kenbib, 2011, p. 27).
These Moroccan Jewish communities spoke Judeo-Arabic and Amazigh
languages depending on which region of the country they lived. As dhimmi, they
had a protected status that provided them with some rights (freedom of worship,
property ownership) and a degree of administrative autonomy. Most lived in
segregated walled city quarters with locked gates called mellahs and all were
required to wear black clothing and a hairstyle different from Muslims. Their main
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sources of livelihood were food production and farming (including making wine,
forbidden by Islam), spice trading, butchering, tailoring, leatherwork, jewelry
makers, blacksmithing, and woodworking. Most were poor or low income. The
largest communities lived in Fez, Marrakesh, and Essaouira (Laskier & Bashan,
2003, pp. 476-480). Muslim-Jewish relations varied considerably by place and time
depending on local circumstances and exigencies (Kenbib, 2011, p. 26).
The Jewish trading community had extensive ties throughout the
Mediterranean and Islamic world extending all the way to India (Bennison, 2016,
pp. 203-204). They thrived as partners with Arab traders (Nabhan, 2014, pp. 130132). Because of these important commercial relations, many were incorporated
into the makhzan as key advisors and occasionally sent on diplomatic missions to
Europe. In the 19th century, affluent Moroccan Jewish traders became influential
royal merchants who leased government monopolies and port customs on key
agricultural and manufacturing sectors (Wrytzen, 2015, pp. 180-182). Enmity
against Jews increased during the 19th century and throughout the colonial period
as they were increasingly seen as a privileged and protected class (Laskier &
Bashan, 2003, p. 486).
In 1860, French colonial administrators in Algeria allowed French language
and culture schools for Jews operated by the Alliance Israelite Universelle (AIU).
As Wyrtzen (2015) relates, “the AIU encouraged the ‘moral progress’ and
‘emancipation’ of Jews living in the Islamic world” (p. 183). The first such school
in Morocco opened in 1862 in Tetouan and expanded to most other cities over the
next two decades. These schools were open to girls and provided vocational
training. In 1863, in part in response to British aristocrat Sir Moses Haim
Montefiore’s visit, Sultan Muhammed IV issued a royal dahir (decree) ensuring
equal justice under the law for all Jews. In 1870, the entire Jewish population of
Algeria was given legal status as citizens of France (Miller, 2013, pp. 45-46).
According to Laskier and Bashan (2003), “the Jewish press chronicled the
deterioration of Jewish-Muslim relations since the 1860s that was partly the result
of the growing French and British interest in Moroccan domestic affairs – and the
increasing intervention of European Jews on behalf of Moroccan Jewish
communities” (p. 485). This included philanthropic assistance to impoverished
Jewish communities in overcrowded mellahs (Kenbib, 2011, p. 27).
Rising nationalism and anti-Semitism in Europe prompted the Zionist
movement of the late 1890s. Its idea spread to the colonies in the Middle East and
North Africa gaining momentum after the 1917 Balfour Declaration (that promised
to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine) and the divisions created by further
partitioning of the region following World War I (see Fromkin, 1989). With the rise
of Nazi-Germany, more than 300,000 Jews emigrated from Europe to Palestine
between 1922 and 1936. During World War II, Mohammed V refused to sign the
pro-Nazi Vichy regime’s plans to collect and deport Morocco’s quarter million Jews
to the killing factories of Europe (Miller, 2013, p. 142). He is also purported to have
responded to a Nazi commander demanding a list of Moroccan Jews that “We have
no Jews in Morocco! Only Moroccan citizens” (Raoul Wallenberg Foundation,
2009).
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The question of Jewish statehood remained unresolved until after World War
II when Israel declared independence in 1948, launching a regional war and the
defeat of Arab forces (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, pp. 239-271). The rise and
formation of the Jewish state coincided with the imposition and maintenance of
colonial rule throughout the region. The impact for Morocco with its large Jewish
community was highly disruptive. By 1948, the Jewish population in Morocco had
risen to approximately 275,000 with the largest presence in Casablanca. Wrytzen
(2015) reports, “while formally preserving the status of Moroccan Jews as subjects
of the sultan, French administrators increasingly took direct control over them” (p.
179).
Amidst the complex circumstances of Zionism and looming Moroccan
independence following World War II, a massive emigration ensued and deeply
rooted Jewish communities vanished from the country (Kenbib, 2011, pp. 28-29).
Laskier and Bashan (2003) estimate that between 1949-1956 90,000 Jews emigrated
from Morocco to Israel under a semi-legal apparatus called Cadima, about 18,000
thousand Jews were smuggled out illegally following Moroccan independence
between 1956-1961, and about 80,000 left legally between 1961-1964 by chartered
planes and ships under Operation Yakhin (pp. 499-502). By 1970, 230,000
Moroccan Jews had settled in Israel (Laskier & Bashan, 2003, p. 502).
André Levy (2015), sums up the developments that led to the migration of Jews
from Morocco thusly:
Modern historical processes, whose roots were in Europe, arrived in
Morocco and created an irreversible disruption (in the daily life of the
community) . . . first and foremost, from the Jews’ point of view, was the
changes in the dhimmi status, even though it wasn’t abolished de jure, it
ceased to be relevant de facto. This change was accompanied by a
demographic process in which initially Jews moved around within
Morocco; they left their villages and moved to the larger cities, situated
mainly on the coast, with the intention to join the colonial project
manifesting itself as inclusive and cosmopolitan. The Muslim majority
saw this desire to join the colonial project as a betrayal of Moroccan
nationalism . . . [as] Moroccan nationalism began shaping its collective
identity as Arab and Muslim. Most of the Jews saw this move as an act of
rejection. Zionist activity also contributed to the Jew’s disengagement
from Morocco and to an even greater undermining of their sense of
belonging, as Zionist activists encouraged Jews to emigrate. Israel’s
chronic involvement in bloody conflicts with the Arab world also had its
share of the effect on this outcome. (p. 178)
Today, there are under 3,000 Jews living in Morocco, mostly in Casablanca
(Eickelman, 2018).

Independence Movement and the Monarchy

Following World War II, the call for Moroccan independence (in concert with
calls for decolonization around the world) increased significantly. In 1944, the
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Istiqlal (independence) Party, led by Allal al-Fasi, called for an independent
Morocco under the sultan and that the sultan should negotiate independence on
Morocco’s behalf. Sultan Mohammed V gave an important speech in Tangier in
1947 affirming the inalienable rights of the Moroccan people to self-rule and in
1952 wrote a letter to the French president calling for the end of the protectorate
that was decisively rejected. Meanwhile, widespread strikes and demonstrations
resulted in violence and many deaths. Writes Wyrtzen (2015), “Between 19531956, the Resistance [various urban guerrilla organizations] engaged in 4,250
violent attacks in Morocco’s cities, primarily Casablanca, targeting infrastructure”
(p. 277). France, desiring to maintain control over Morocco and faced with a
national movement inextricably linked to the monarch, orchestrated with the help
of the Grand Caid of Marrakech, Thami al-Glaoui, a petition that called for the
deposition of the sultan. Demonstrating the effectiveness of the divide and rule
strategy, the petition was signed by many other Amazigh leaders, who either feared
urban nationalists or like Abd al-Hayy Kettani opposed Alawi rule (Sater, 2010, pp.
21-23). Sultan Mohammed V was deposed and exiled first to Corsica and then to
Madagascar in 1953. Exile served to heighten Mohammed V’s standing and
strengthen the nationalist cause. France faced with other colonial conflicts in
Tunisia and Algeria and increased riots and violence in Morocco, allowed his return
to Morocco in 1955. Morocco gained its independence in 1956 and established a
constitutional monarchy. The challenges facing the country at independence were
significant. For example, 90% of the population was illiterate and only 15% of
school-aged children were in school at the time of independence (Miller, 2013, pp.
153-154).
King Mohammed V adeptly managed a complex array of factions vying for
influence in Morocco, both internally and externally. With keen attention to specific
interests, he translated traditional symbolic legitimacy and his stature as
Commander of the Faithful (Amir al-Mu’minin) and defender of Moroccan
nationalism into modern political alliances and popular support amidst often
competing regional, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural differences. He worked with
Amazigh leaders to create a post-independence alliance, suppressed Amazigh
insurgents, integrated the Royal Armed Forces, reformed Sufi orders, controlled the
most important ministries, and encouraged a multi-party system (MaddyWeitzman, 2011, p. 166; Naylor, 2009, p. 229). He died unexpectedly in 1961 with
his son Hassan II succeeding him.
Hassan II also navigated a complex and contested political landscape, including
the rise of political Islam and an increasingly urbanized population. Most
immediate, he had to build institutional capacity, and hence engaged in a process of
decolonization that involved the nationalization of French-owned agricultural
lands, Moroccanization of industry, and Arabization of education (Sater, 2010, pp.
39-40).
Over the course of five constitutions (1962, 1970, 1972, 1992, and 1996),
Hassan II gradually succeeded by associating politics with the traditional Islamic
idea of shura consultation (Sater, 2010, p. 30). However, his early years were
extremely difficult, as he provoked the inconclusive War of the Sands with Algeria
(1963-64), dissolved parliament in 1965, instituted a state of emergency that lasted
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five years, saw the kidnapping and murder of opposition leader Mehdi Ben Barka
in Paris, and survived two assassination attempts on his own life in 1971 and 1972
(Naylor, 2009, p. 229). The first attempt occurred on Hassan II’s 42nd birthday
party at his beachside palace and resulted in the death of 100 guests and 125
wounded as well as 150 rebels killed and 900 held in custody. The second attempt
involved an attack on a Royal Air Maroc flight by Moroccan fighter jets. The king’s
bullet-riddled passenger jet miraculously landed safely. Both attempts were
orchestrated by members of the Moroccan military (Miller, 2013, pp. 176-77).
His survival, perceived by some as baraka (divine blessing or fortune), coupled
with the politically savvy Green March of 1975, when 350,000 Moroccans armed
only with the Koran entered the Western Sahara, secured popular nationalist support
for the King (Sater, 2010, pp. 125-126). In the Tripartite Agreement of 1975, Spain
gave Morocco and Mauritania administrative control over Western Sahara. In 1976,
the indigenous Saharawi people, led by the Polisario Front, declared itself the
Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Mauritania withdrew from the
agreement in 1979. Morocco withdrew from the Organization of African Unity
when the OAU recognized the SADR in 1984. The 16-year insurgency ended with
a UN-brokered truce in 1991 and the promise of a referendum on independence
which has yet to take place (BBC, 2018).
Numerous strikes and bread riots occurred in the 1980s throughout Morocco,
in part due to International Monetary Fund and World Bank imposed austerities,
removal of subsidies, and debt restructuring. Structural adjustment programs
mandated the privatization of government--controlled monopolies that were bought
by wealthy Moroccan elites with foreign partners. This neoliberal approach aimed
to improve efficiencies, curtail corruption, and reduce mismanagement issues, but
it also led to a shrinking of the public sector and increased unemployment (Miller,
2013, pp. 185-186, 208-209).
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Politics of Reform:
Human Rights, Amazigh Rights, and Women’s Rights

Human rights, Amazigh rights, and Women’s rights have been at the center of
reforms since the 1990s. Organizational campaigns for change began as early as
1984, when Christine Daure, wife of imprisoned dissident Abraham Serfaty,
founded the Association for the Defense of Human Rights in Morocco. In 1988, this
was followed by the founding of two additional organizations, the Moroccan
Organization of Human Rights and the Moroccan Association of Human Rights
(Miller, 2013, p. 201). In 1990, Gilles Perrault published an exposé titled Our
Friend the King about corruption and human rights abuses in Morocco. These
efforts forced a reevaluation by the King that led to significant reforms.
Naylor (2009) states that, “after the ‘leaden years’ of the 1980s, which featured
severe repression and infamous detention, King Hassan permitted a deliberate
‘liberalization’ through reforms and amnesties during the 1990s” (p. 233). This
included closure of the infamous Tazmamart prison and government creation of the
Advisory Council for Human Rights in 1990 and the Ministry of Human Rights in
1994. In May of 1994, seven members of the Telelli (Freedom) Cultural Association
were arrested for unfurling banners promoting Amazigh language rights. Their
harsh treatment provoked an avalanche of protest. In response, King Hassan II
during his 1994 Throne Day speech broadcast on television recognized Amazigh
language and culture as an authentic component of Moroccan identity. In 1995, he
issued a royal decree calling for the teaching of Tamazight in public schools (Miller,
2013, p. 196). However, it took nine more years before Tamazight was actually
taught, in fall 2003, to first grade pupils in 300 schools (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011,
p. 171).
The new constitution of 1992 explicitly confirmed adherence to “human rights
as they are universally recognized” and led to parliamentary elections the following
year that were touted as the freest since independence (Sater, 2010, p. 61). The 1996
constitution created a bicameral parliament with the lower house directly elected,
and where, during the following year, an Islamist party was allowed to put forth
candidates for the first time. As Miller () stresses, “more important, however, was
the unwritten understanding that the King would name a prime minister from the
party having an electoral majority” (p. 205).
Following Hassan II’s death in 1999 (he ruled for 38 years), his son,
Mohammed VI, ascended to the throne and almost immediately accelerated political
reforms with an emphasis on social welfare (Sater, 2010, p. 74). Within months,
Mohammed VI fired the notorious Minister of the Interior Driss Basri and made a
high-profile symbolic visit to the northern Rif Region where Amazigh protests and
rebellions had been regular historical occurrences.
The issuance in 2000 of a Berber Manifesto, the 2001 royal dahir establishing
the Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture, and Mohamed Chafik’s appointment as its
leader were groundbreaking developments in Moroccan history and demonstrated
the King’s commitment to ending Amazigh marginalization (Maddy-Weitzman,
2011, p. 166). These steps were backed up by generous budgetary allocations for
the institute.
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As the “Berber Manifesto” made evidently clear, there was a long history of
neglect and abuse to address. The hard work of educational and cultural change laid
ahead. One of the unmet major demands of the Manifesto, was the recognition of
Tamazight as an official language in the Moroccan constitution. No doubt,
addressing the issue of Amazigh rights was part of a larger movement advocating
for human rights and broader participation in public life. In this regard, the
government sponsored 2004-2005 Equity and Reconciliation Commission which
collected testimonies from people who survived torture while imprisoned during
Hassan II’s reign. While those responsible were immune from prosecution, it was
an unprecedented acknowledgement of wrong-doing. Said Miller (2013), “Overall,
nearly ten thousand victims of the ‘years of lead’ received indemnities totaling more
than $200 million” (p. 223). The process also showed that the majority of victims
were Amazigh (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011, p. 155). In this effort and others, the
Moroccan press also played a vibrant role providing an informative platform for
public debate (Miller, 2013, p. 219).

Women’s Movement and the February 20th Movement

Women’s lives in Morocco are shaped by numerous factors including social
class, geography, ethnicity, religion, and education. For example, women’s
experience varies greatly depending on whether they live in cosmopolitan urban
centers like Casablanca, Rabat, and Tangiers or whether they live in traditional rural
settings. Still, in general, “compared to men, women in Morocco are less
represented in decision-making processes and in areas such as education, health,
and employment” (Gender Profile Morocco, n.d., p. 3). The 2015 World Economic
Forum Global Gender Gap Index (2015) ranked Morocco 139 out of 145 countries
in overall gender equity, with ranks of 140 and 123 in economic opportunity and
educational attainment. The illiteracy rate for women in 2012 was 47.6% and much
higher in rural areas (Gender Profile Morocco, n.d., p. 6).
In the face of such changes, however, “the women’s movement not only
advanced the cause of women; [but] it also had the electric effect of opening . . .
new forms of debate associated with a more inclusive political culture” (Miller,
2013, p. 194). As Salime (2012) underscores, “for two decades the movement had
launched a sustained mobilization to challenge women’s secondary status in family
law” (p. 103). In 1992, a campaign collecting one million signatures called for
reform of the 1957 mudawwana, or family law. This led to a 1993 reform of the law
that permitted women to sign an employment contract and obtain a passport on their
own without male consent (Sater, 2010, p. 68-71). In 2004, the mudawwana was
renamed the Family Code and additional changes stipulated that women have the
right to marry without consent of a male guardian as well as the right to divorce
(Gender Profile Morocco, n.d., p. 4). Recognized for its relatively progressive
position on women’s rights within the Islamic world, the Family Code reforms have
provided women with greater rights; however, awareness and implementation of
the reforms have been limited by the lack of training of judges as well as social and
religious conservatism, particularly in rural areas of the country (Eisenberg, 2011,
p. 693). The law has been an insufficient mechanism when it comes to changing
people’s attitudes and behaviors as local customs often conflict with the law. In
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addition, ambiguities within the law can be interpreted as reinforcing patriarchal
perspectives and gendered division of labor. Most significantly, despite the 2011
constitutional reaffirmation of Morocco’s commitment to human rights as they are
universally recognized, the sharia-based Family Code remains above international
law (Elliott, 2014, pp. 16-25).
Secular women’s movements in Morocco have tended to focus on working
within the system for political and legal changes to expand and improve women’s
rights and representation, whereas Islamist movements have tended to focus on
social change at the grassroots level although at times opposing more feminist
positions (Salime, 2012, pp. 107-109). No doubt, while legal codes that recognize
women’s rights are important guideposts, absent widespread social attitudes that
support and affirm women’s full participation in public life, systematic
discrimination, and pervading attitudes prevent the implementation of greater
equality. Therefore, Skalli (2011, p. 340) has emphasized that efforts to promote
women’s rights should not be siloed in ways that look only at women or that are
sponsored solely by women’s organizations, rather they must engage with an
intersectionality of movements and issues. Nonetheless, it was women’s
organizations that took the lead disseminating the code in darija (spoken Moroccan
Arabic) and Amazigh dialects (Miller, 2013, p. 228). Since the February 20th
movement (Morocco’s version of the Arab Spring), Salime (2012) asserts that
“feminism has not only penetrated the social imaginary of a new generation of
activists, but has also informed their practices” (p. 101). She sees “women and men
working together as partners in the struggle for social and economic justice”
(Salime, 2012, p. 105). Such joint efforts are especially prevalent in emerging forms
of civic engagement through social media-based activism but are also increasingly
prevalent in face-to-face interactions.
The February 20th movement represented broad societal concerns that seek
greater political representation, economic reform, and government accountability.
As Zerhouni (2017) described, “the movement asked for a democratic constitution,
the independence of the judiciary and the media as well as the separation of wealth
and power” (p. 6). Growing unemployment, poverty, and inequity fueled
dissatisfaction. Despite successive parliamentary elections since 1993, there is
significant discontent with political parties and elected officials (Sater, 2010, p. 85).
Furthermore, these officials were largely regarded as ineffective in a system that
invested so much power with the king. Young people were especially active in the
movement as they are keen to see substantive change; however, they do not tend to
participate in elections at very high percentages. In 2002, the voting age was
lowered from 20 to 18 years old. One of the few political parties with an active
youth section, the Justice and Development Party (Islamist Party) won a majority
of seats in the 2011 parliamentary elections obliging the King to select a prime
minister from the party (Zerhouni, 2017, pp. 9-10). The king was also applauded
for his quick response to the movement by putting forth a new constitution
(approved on July 1, 2011 by 98.5% of voters, with nearly 10 million votes cast,
representing close to 75% of the eligible electorate). The new constitution included
changes that enhanced legislative powers, increased the judiciary’s independence,
and limited the King’s ability to intervene in day-to-day politics (Miller, 2013, p.
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235). Since 2011, within the lower house of the Moroccan parliament, a minimum
of 60 seats out of 395 are reserved for women.

Society and the Economy

With a population of 35 million people, Morocco is rich with natural resources
such as fish, phosphates, and fertile agricultural lands, but it struggles with rural
poverty, urban unemployment, and illiteracy (Sater, 2010, p. 87-88). Primarily an
agricultural economy, it also benefits from tourism and remittances. It has invested
heavily in renewable energy. As entrepreneurship has grown and Morocco works
to diversify its economy, there has also been increased attention given to fighting
corruption (Sater, 2010, p. 104). Its annual gross domestic product is approximately
$110 billion with a 4% growth rate and $8,600 per capita annual income.
Unemployment is at 10%, the inflation rate is 1.6%, and 53% of the population is
under 30 years of age.
While Morocco has a trade deficit with Europe, it has benefitted by securing
European Union (EU) capital and through market integration with Europe (70% of
all its exports go to the EU). The EU has also linked foreign aid to human rights
and democracy promotion, and Morocco is the primary recipient of EU aid in North
Africa (Sater, 2010, p. 133). Mohammed VI’s doctoral thesis focused on the
European Economic Commission and the Maghreb.
EU relations are also important in regard to issues of migration. Nearly 3
million Moroccans live in Europe (Miller, 2013, p. 232). Illegal Moroccan
immigration results in tens of thousands of annual expulsions. In October 2005,
thousands of Sub-Saharan migrants attempted to breach barbed wire fences at
Melilla resulting in 13 deaths and hundreds wounded (Naylor, 2009, p. 236). For
those interested in learning more about the personal circumstances of these
migrants, Laila Lalami’s 2005 novel Hope and Other Dangerous Pursuits is
insightful and engaging.
King Mohammed VI has been a force for social change in Morocco supporting
the efforts to improve and expand human rights, Amazigh rights, and women’s
rights. Perhaps most important has been the king’s efforts at alleviating poverty and
extending social welfare as was evident in the National Initiative for Human
Development which received a $3.3 billion budget in 2007 and inaugurated 7,000
projects (Sater, 2010, p. 83). Still, as the February 20th movement demonstrated,
people are concerned about the economic effects of globalization, the concentration
of wealth in the hands of a few elites, and the increased securitization of the state in
the wake of high-profile terrorist attacks.

U.S. Relations and the War on Terror

Morocco’s cooperative and close relationship with the United States dates back
to Mohammed III’s acknowledgement of the U.S. Declaration of Independence in
1777 and the 1787 trade agreement. It found continued relevance when Theodore
Roosevelt participated in the Algeciras Conference of 1906 (Potter, 1922, pp. 577583). Its importance was underscored again in the 1943 Casablanca Conference
held in the Anfa hotel where Allied commanders met to coordinate the on-going
war effort and discuss peace plans, including discussions related to decolonization
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and Morocco’s independence (Miller, 2013, p. 144). Morocco also firmly allied
with the United States during the Cold War. In the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. had
several air bases, radar and communications installations, and a naval station in
Morocco (Wyrtzen, 2015, p. 292).
None of these examples are as straight forward as they appear. They all
involved complex strategic calculations. More recently, as Miller (2013) has
highlighted, “the U.S. steadily supplied arms to Morocco for its [Western] Saharan
war, and in return, Morocco became a consistent supporter of U.S.-Middle East
policies” (p. 209). Morocco also remained a staunch U.S. ally following invasions
of Iraq and Afghanistan. Mohammed VI has cooperated with America’s “war on
terror” and often faced criticism at home (Miller, 2013, pp. 224-225). However,
high-profile terrorist attacks at or near home have informed this decision. Such
attacks include a 1994 attack in Marrakesh that led to the closing of the Algerian
border, a 2003 attack in Casablanca in which 45 people were killed (33 victims and
12 suicide bombers), and the lethal Madrid bombings in 2004 that killed 191 people
and injured 1,800 followed by the conviction of Moroccan and Tunisian nationals
for carrying out the attack. Moroccans have been unequivocal in their rejection of
such extremism. This may be best characterized by the Marrakesh Declaration of
2016 that defends the rights and liberties of religious minorities in predominantly
Muslim communities and rejects “the use of violence and armed struggle as a means
for settling conflict and imposing one’s point of view.”

This Volume

Tracing Morocco’s diverse influences, powerful empires, cosmopolitan
achievements, colonial resistance, and modern nation building efforts, the above
essay provides a basis for further examination and understanding of these topics.
Morocco is an active participant in today’s global society, facing challenges that are
confronting every country and community, and that demand thoughtful and
innovative responses. The essays in this volume provide a more in-depth analysis
of Morocco, its history, cultural diversity, and changing contexts.
This issue, then, begins with an article titled “Between the Line and the Circle:
Ibn Khaldun’s View of History and Change” by Allen Fromherz that contextualizes
the 14th century scholar’s views on historiography in ways that remain relevant
today. It is followed by “The Ebbs and Flows of U.S.-Moroccan Relations in the
Context of the Anfa Conference” by Karim Bejjit that meticulously reviews the
conversations held between President Roosevelt and Sultan Mohamed V during
WWII that helped set the stage for Moroccan Independence. The next two articles
turn to the world of art. In “Moroccan Artistic Presence at the Centre Pompidou
Collections,” Tunisian scholar, Sirine Abdelhedi shares a fascinating analysis on
the “decolonization of the gaze” and how best to represent Morocco on the world
stage. This piece is complemented by Samir El Azhar’s composition focused on
“The Changing Roles of Female Visual Artists in Morocco” with its particular
attention on how these artists have overcome prejudices, corrected misconceptions,
and transgressed taboos. Next, two very different and powerful articles further
question issues of changing identities in Morocco. The first, titled “’Your
Opportunity to Hear Your Voice’: Akaliyat Magazine and the Creation of Queer
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Community in Morocco" by Benjamin Ale-Ebrahim, looks specifically at an online
journal’s attempt to build a greater sense of community as well as emerging
coalitions across communities. The second article, “A Study of the Vernacular
Literacy Practices of a Newly Literate Moroccan Woman: An Ethnographic
Perspective” by Reddad Erguig examines the central role of the family in literacy
acquisition. Continuing with the theme of language acquisition, Taoufik Jaafari
considers the contentious landscape of language education policy in Morocco and
its implications for the future. Delving deeper into educational and cultural policy,
Brahim El Guabli describes “Moroccan Society’s Educational and Cultural Losses
during The Years of Lead.” While difficult to quantify, an analysis of influential
journals such as Lamalif as well as official reports such as those issued by the Equity
and Reconciliation Commission shed light on this important topic. Maintaining a
focus on national politics in “Moroccan Islamists Debate the Causes of Violent
Extremism,” author Jack Kalpakian outlines the theological challenges posed by
certain Wahhabi and Salafist views that reject mainstream Moroccan Islam and the
implications for the government as it works to combat terrorism. Further examining
the inner workings of Moroccan government, Zakaria Fatih, uses the prism of
inclusive and extractive institutions to consider the makhzen’s effectiveness in
terms of national development. While in “Empowering Rural Participation and
Partnerships in Morocco’s Sustainable Development,” Yossef Ben-Meir analyzes
the implementation of specific government policies. His assessment is based on a
long career of working closely with rural communities. The final article in this
volume by Touria Khannous considers Morocco through the influence of film and
the transnational, with special attention to the complex role of women in society.
Given the breadth and depth of subjects addressed in this volume, readers will no
doubt come away with a strong understanding of Moroccan society and its
important place in the world today.
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Between the Circle and the Line:
Ibn Khaldun’s View of History and Change
Allen James Fromherz

Historians from many different eras and contexts have viewed history and
historical change as either linear or circular in nature. Giambattista Vico (d. 1744
CE), the Italian philosopher and historian, organized history in a cyclical way as
different nations and peoples rise and fall. At the same time, according to Vico
(2000), humanity was destined towards equity. Sima Qian of China (d. 86 BCE)
viewed the past as a series of circular attempts to restore the Mandate of Heaven
and consolidate central power, attempts that were then followed by breakdowns into
feudal states (Qian, 1995). For Qian, history seemed to favor evildoers as much as
followers of Confucian principles; historians therefore had a moral duty to bring
justice to the past. Leopold von Ranke (d. 1886) was the originator of modern,
primary source-based historical science in Europe. He promoted a largely linear,
narrative view of the past. Change occurred at a granular level. Events and peoples
of the past should be described for their own sake, not as a tool for understanding
or reifying a larger philosophical, moralistic, or deistic destiny (von Ranke, 2010).
More recently, the French historian Fernand Braudel (d. 1985) combined both linear
and the broader cyclical approaches. For Braudel, history occurred on different
levels. There was the past of the long term, which tended towards patterns
determined by geography, and the short term, which was more linear and event
dependent (Braudel, 1996). Today, historians are sharply divided between
progressivists and Marxists who see humanity on a line towards some destiny that
will embrace a global vision, and relativists and determinists who view the modern
and the postmodern system as a particular cultural artefact of the West, doomed to
collapse and be replaced, in the optimistic view, by a cosmopolitan vision. For
pessimists, however, the replacement of the West will be far more traumatic
(Appiah 2019; Fukuyama, 2006, 2018; Pinker, 2019). 1
The circle and the line have never been farther apart, it would seem, than they
are today. Historians attempt, in vain, to tackle the challenges of reconciling rapid
1

For the progressivists see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New
York: Free Press, 2006 and Stephen Pinker, Enlightenment Now: the Case for Reason,
Science, Humanism and Progress, New York: Penguin, 2019. For a cosmopolitan vision
see Kwame Appiah, The Lies that Bind, Rethinking Identity, New York: Liveright, 2018,
and the counter argument by Fukuyama, Identity: the Demand for Dignity and the Politics
of Resentment, New York: FSG, 2018, who seems to abandon his linear vision of the end of
history.
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global change with the puzzling rise of identity-centered politics. It seems as if
feelings of loyalty to the “tribe,” which were supposed to have disappeared with the
rise of global institutions and mores, have not died, but only increased in an age of
rapid global “progress.” This paradox, in fact, is not new. At its heart, it is a result
of two ways of looking at human history, the circular and the linear.
Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406 CE), the great North African historian and philosopher,
seemed to be a partisan of the circle. Within the Muqaddimah, or his “Introduction”
to history, written to describe the “meaning of events,” there seemed to be ample
evidence that Ibn Khaldun saw the past in ways that would resonate with Qian,
Vico, and some elements of Braudel. Ibn Khaldun engaged in more theory, more
interpretation of history than any other known, pre-modern work of history written
in Arabic. This has made him a modern hero of Arab nationalism, recognized in
school names and street signs from Qatar to Casablanca. Much of Ibn Khaldun’s
thought appears, at first, to fit a circular pattern based on a moralistic view of
inevitable human failing. Looking more deeply at Ibn Khaldun’s writing, however,
the picture becomes much more complex. There appear to be many exceptions to
the circular rule. Ibn Khaldun’s understanding of history and change is, in fact,
much more complex than a simple circular pattern of humanity doomed to a cycle
of rise and fall. Ibn Khaldun also saw a line of history through religious prophecy
and the importance of granular, exceptional events that could stand up to the rigors
of von Ranke. Rather than seeing the linear and the circular patterns of the past in
conflict or as cancelling one another out, Ibn Khaldun described a combined system,
a spiral.
The Circle
According to Ibn Khaldun’s circular vision of the past, dynasties and states
have a maximum life span of about 100 years, or five generations, roughly the same
as individual human bodies (Ibn Khaldun, 2002). They start vigorous and young,
founded on tribal solidarity, or asabiyya, of the first generation, which originates in
the mountains or deserts, far from the enervating, and for Ibn Khaldun’s day,
sickening and plague-ridden influences of the city. Each subsequent generation of
rulers, however, becomes more and more dependent on urban structures of power,
raising taxes, becoming more and more distant and detached from the original vigor
of the founders and the people at large who flock to some new dynasty and new,
vigorous ruler who can call upon the protection and loyalty of a different, rural tribal
group. This seems to trap history into a perpetual cycle of doomed states. As Ibn
Khaldun stated, although government is necessary for civilization, it is also the root
of its own destruction. He cited multiple examples of dynasties that fit this pattern
and that fill the chronicles of his much larger history, the Kitab al-Ibar. Indeed, both
North African history and Islamic history, and even world history more generally,
up until the 14th century, could fit this pattern, one that can be attributed to many
large, agrarian-based economies and societies before the rise of modernity
(Hodgson, 1974). Just in the far west of North Africa, known today as Morocco, for
instance, there were the Idrisids, who ruled independently for around a century.
They were initially supported by the Berber tribes around Fez. They fell to the
Fatimids who rose in the region of Algeria with the support of the Kutama Berbers.
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The Fatimids even took over Egypt. Next were the Almoravids who emerged among
the Lamtuna, the Berber tribes of the Sahara. They created a great empire stretching
across trans-Saharan trade routes, sending their valuable currency throughout the
Mediterranean basin (Bennison, 2016). After the desert came the mountains as the
Masmuda Berbers of the majestic, High Atlas valleys streamed into Marrakech in
1147, purifying the mosque of the Almoravids and declaring the beginning of a new
era. Their movement began with the preaching of the Mahdi Ibn Tumart and was
made a great success with the military genius of ‘Abd al-Mu’min who was the first
ruler in history to conquer and control North Africa, including the Atlas Mountains,
which served as a fortress for the empire. Over time, however, the solidarity of the
original mountain Berbers, like that of the Saharan Berbers before them, began to
diminish. Military defeats such as at Navas de Tolosa or Al-‘Iqab in 1212 and
Christian incursions, including the adoption of a Castilian mercenary guard by the
Caliph in Marrakech, seemed to confirm the end was near. After about a century of
effective rule the Almohads also met their fate. Their empire broke apart, replaced
in Morocco by a new, vigorous dynasty, the Marinids, founded by Zanata Berbers
who came from the plains around the oasis of Figuig. It was the Marinid ruler Abu
‘Inan who employed Ibn Khaldun. In Granada, the Nasrids, famous for building the
Alhambra, arose. Muhammad V, one of the more powerful Nasrid princes, also used
the services of Ibn Khaldun. A remnant of the Almohads remained, in much
changed form, as the Hafsid dynasty in Tunis; Ibn Khaldun worked there as well.
Each of these broken and fragmented sections of the once great and unified
Almohad Empire fell into war and rivalry with one another. While they tried to
reassert the unity of the past, their divisions provided opportunities for Castilian
and, later, Portuguese incursions. Nonetheless, Ibn Khaldun held out the hope for a
restoration of the glories of the past, for a retaking of the lands lost in Muslim Spain,
al-Andalus, which was the homeland of his ancestors, the Banu Khaldun.
As I argue in Ibn Khaldun, Life and Times, he had many reasons for his
pessimistic view of the past and for his strange mixture of revulsion and attraction
towards urban life (Fromherz, 2016). In the light of the dizzying, damning, and
distressing rise and fall of dynasties and the failure of a unified response to Christian
incursions, Ibn Khaldun was one of the first Muslim chroniclers to note the rise of
the Renaissance and Christian power in the Mediterranean. This pushed Ibn
Khaldun against the idea of divine providence driving the events of his times.
Rather, it seemed, humanity must be at fault. Human structures and especially largescale urban life and government, with all of their luxuries and cosmopolitan
compromises of identity, while the source of civilization, were also the source of
plague. Ibn Khaldun (2002) wrote, “City air causes sickness as it is mixed with
putrid vapors and a great quantity of odors” (p. 810). Air is that which gives vivacity
to the spirit, and the air of civilization, of cities, ultimately weakens the body and
the body politic. Thus, even as humanity builds culture, arts, and cities, it also builds
the foundation of its destruction in the form of corruption, luxury, and sickness. The
seeds of decline are planted with the founding ambition of every urban civilization.
This plague had a profound impact on Ibn Khaldun and helped inspire him to think
differently. As he stated, “it is as if the entire creation had changed and the whole
world been altered … a world brought into existence anew. Therefore, there is a
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need at this time that someone should systematically set down the situation of the
world” (Ibn Khaldun, 2015, p. 30). He tells us the plague, which wiped out what
was before and cycled humanity back to a new beginning, was the reason why he
decided to write the Muqaddimah. The cycle of history was not simply a theory for
Ibn Khaldun, it was personal.
Ibn Khaldun lost his parents and most of his family to the pestilence. He was
left alone at an early age, under the tutelage of his brother. The death of his father,
a profound influence on the young Ibn Khaldun, especially due to his spiritual and
Sufi tendencies, seemed to haunt him the rest of his life. Ibn Khaldun seemed unable
to give up the ghost of his father. He described as an addiction his exercising power
and politics in his various roles as minister, judge, and high functionary in Fes,
Granada, Tunis and, finally, Cairo. He even met the great conqueror Tamerlane and
explained to him the reasons for his success.
Here is the explanation [for your rise]. Power does not exist without tribal
solidarity (‘asabiyya). Power is at its greatest extent among mainly tribal
peoples, those whose lives are mostly governed by tribal solidarity. Men
of science are agreed on the fact that the two nations most tribal on earth
are the Turks and the Arabs. You know of the great power of the Arabs
after they were united by the religion of their prophet [Muhammad]. As
far as the Turks, their [successful] rivalry against the Kings of Persia is
sufficient witness to their power...No King on earth, neither Chosroes, nor
Caesar, nor Alexander nor Nebuchadnezzar had at their disposal a sense
of tribal solidarity such as theirs.... (Ibn Khaldun, 1951, pp. 366-367)
His constant travelling and his diminishing hope of restoring the North Africa and
Islamic governance to its former glories weighed on him. At various points in his
life, he yearned for the purity of the countryside and the simplicity of the ascetic,
Sufi tariqa. 2 He retreated to the remote fortress of Ibn Salama in Algeria to write
his Muqaddimah and attempted to give up on political ambitions and become a
simple Sufi, but to no avail. The city, which he blamed for so much of what went
wrong in history, always drew him back.
The Line
There was both the line and the circle in the writings of Ibn Khaldun. Although
his life was full of disappointments and his search for the meaning of history often
only led to more paradoxes than answers, Ibn Khaldun was not simply a pessimist.
He saw the possibility of a linear past. In particular he cited instances for the
intervention of God in human affairs. Prophecy and prophets, in Ibn Khaldun’s
view, created a way out of the circular inevitabilities. When a dynasty is founded
by a prophet, according to Ibn Khaldun, it can last far longer. Also, there were some
states, such as the Hafsids, that seemed to last, even without the invigoration of new
tribal solidarity or prophecy. In this case, a type of dynastic inertia took over.
A tariqa is a Sufi “path” or “order” usually with a Sufi Sheikh in charge who has
authority over his pupils.

2
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Generally, however, these dynasties, as was the case with the Hafsids, were limited
to constrained geographic boundaries and did not expand outside a defined sphere
of influence for long periods of time. Also, while he denounced the purely
chronological approach to the past employed by some of his predecessors, the linear
progression of one event after another, the traditional narrative history that was the
mainstay of history both before and after him, still characterized the vast majority
of his writing. The Muqaddimah, although a large work, stands out as the exception,
the Introduction to a far larger ambition which was to write a Universal History of
the world as he knew it. In this respect, Ibn Khaldun could be compared to another
universal, world historian who wrote on the other end of the Islamic world in
Ilkhanate Iran, Rashid al-Din Hamadani (d. 1318 CE). While he occasionally
mentioned his historical theories within the body of his history, Ibn Khaldun, like
Rashid al-Din before him, seemed as much caught up in his devotion to the line of
events as the “meaning” or lessons he sought behind them.
Spiral Towards the Future
Although he noted the importance of the new technology of gunpowder, and
he realized the rising power of Italian city-states, and he even sailed on a ship with
a representative of Ottoman sultan Bayezid, little did Ibn Khaldun realize a new era
was about to dawn soon after his death in 1406 CE. The Ottomans took
Constantinople in 1453 and launched a great, diffuse, and cosmopolitan empire that
would last for centuries, successfully fusing diverse geographic zones and putting
down the revolts of tribal solidarity that would have been the seeds of new dynasties
and rulers in the past. In Morocco, the cyclical history of Ibn Khaldun came to an
abrupt end with the rise and fall of the Saadians who were eventually replaced by
the Alaouite Dynasty. The Alaouites used gunpowder technology and elite military
corps of soldiers, often from south of the Sahara, to break the ruler’s previous
dependency on tribal solidarity. Founded in 1631, the Alaouites are still reigning
today as one the longest living dynastic monarchies on earth. Throughout the rest
of North Africa and the Middle East, the Ottomans would create a much larger
“gunpowder empire” that lasted far longer than Ibn Khaldun’s cyclical theories
would have predicted. This did not stop later Ottoman officials from studying Ibn
Khaldun’s work in their search for ways to revitalize the empire (Lewis, 1962).
Was Ibn Khaldun disproven by these dramatic future events? Was he wrong to
think that dynasties would inevitably fall based on their lack of solidarity? Perhaps,
in some ways, he was. At the same time, and as discussed above, Ibn Khaldun did
not view history in a purely linear or circular fashion. He left ample space for change
and for the intervention of unknown forces. Also, the gunpowder empires did last,
many of them well into the 20th century. They were replaced by global, capitalist
cosmopolitanism, which negates the tribal solidarity of the past. However, identity
politics has once again emerged onto the scene. Ibn Khaldun is today, in some ways
suddenly, as valid and relevant as ever. Perhaps what seemed like a line or a circle
was actually a spiral. A spiral allows for change in a way that a circle, as a closed
system does not. It is also not a simple line with completely different and unrelated
events happening one after the other. As the world becomes more interconnected
and as technology advances, inherent risks are emerging, often in the shape of
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peoples trying to assert their identities. It is increasingly possible that there will be
a singular new event, something that changes the world entirely, that seems to wipe
the slate clean, as the Great Plague did for Ibn Khaldun in the 14th century. At that
moment, Ibn Khaldun’s understanding of history and the destiny of humanity will
be more relevant than it has ever been.
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U. S. - Moroccan Relations
in the Context of the Anfa Conference
Karim Bejjit
Abstract

This essay seeks to shed new light on the intricate course of U.S.Moroccan relations following the landing of American troops on the
Atlantic coasts of Morocco. The Anfa Conference and Sultan Mohamed
V’s dinner meeting with President Roosevelt marked an important stage in
the process of Moroccan struggle for independence. Roosevelt’s personal
interest in the Moroccan situation may have accentuated the
inconsistencies in U.S. foreign policy in the 1940s regarding the French
colonial empire and confronted its fundamental idealism with the
exigencies of pragmatic politics. The vicissitudes of the war and America’s
deep commitment to its French ally as well as its efforts to contain the
spreading influence of communism across North Africa compelled the
American administration to generally adopt an ambivalent position vis-àvis Moroccan nationalist movement in its fierce pursuit for independence.
Keywords: U.S.-Moroccan relations, Anfa Conference, FDR, Sultan
Mohamed ben Youssef, Istiqlal Party; Tangier Speech

Introduction

Accounts of Moroccan-American relations have often emphasized the
fortuitous origins of these relations especially in an era marked by limited
diplomatic contact with the burgeoning United States and even by acts of hostility
toward it from the so-called Barbary States (Roberts & Roberts, 2008). What is
more intriguing is the remarkable longevity of these relations despite the lack of
extensive commercial and political interests between the two nations that could
justify such enduring mutual esteem. Historical annals bear witness to a steady and
peaceful course of relations devoid of any dramatic incidents. For over a century,
and aside from the peace treaties of 1786 and 1836, U.S. consuls established in
Tangier had little to report to their home authorities. The Perdicaris affair of 1904
was a peculiar diplomatic oddity that gained momentary attention in the American
press mostly as a campaign slogan (Davis, 1941, p. 517; Hall, 1971, p. 341).
Nevertheless, the enduring value of U.S.-Moroccan relations today is largely
the fruit of this benign legacy. It has become an established custom for government
officials of both countries to indulge in a graceful narrative of how Morocco was
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the first country to recognize the independence of the nascent republic and how
Sultan Mawlay Suleiman made a generous gift of a house in the old medina of
Tangier to Consul John Mullowny in 1822. Although it has ceased to have an
official character, the house is the seat of the American Legation and is still
cherished as the oldest American public property outside the U.S. In recent decades,
Morocco has been viewed in U.S. media and in the official circles as a strategic ally
in the MENA region and a reliable partner in the global war on terrorism. Besides
close security cooperation, Morocco has concluded important military and trade
agreements with the United States and benefited from various aid programs.
Within the Moroccan context, historians have expounded on the decisive
intervention of the United States during World War II and its consequent impact on
the colonial regimes in North Africa. The landing of American troops on the
Moroccan coasts as part of Operation Torch in November 1942 inaugurated a new
phase in modern Moroccan history and helped raise political consciousness among
the Moroccan elite (Baida, 2014). U.S.-Moroccan relations, in particular, gained
momentum following the historic meeting between President Franklin D. Roosevelt
(FDR) and Sultan Mohamed Ben Youssef during the Anfa Conference held in
January 1943. No record has provided more vivid a description of the long and
friendly conversation between the two leaders than the account offered by FDR’s
own son, Elliot in his memoir titled As He Saw it (1946). Elliot Roosevelt (1946),
who served as the president’s military attaché, noted that the dinner meeting was
attended by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill who, seated on the left side
of the president, “grew more and more disgruntled” as the conversation between
FDR and the sultan dwelt on the “wealth of natural resources” in the country (p.
110). The Sultan made no secret of his wish to engage American support in
promoting “modern educational and health standards” (Roosevelt, 1946, p. 110) in
Morocco and shaping the future development plans of the country. On the political
plane, the sultan, it is stated, was particularly elated by FDR’s remark that “the
postwar scene and the pre-war scene would, of course, differ sharply, especially as
they related to the colonial question” (Roosevelt, 1946, p. 111).
Elliot’s account makes frequent reference to Churchill’s sense of malaise as he
listened to the cordial exchange between the sultan and the president. Evidently,
Roosevelt’s critical views of European colonial empires were both vexing and
alarming. In the following years, the substance of Roosevelt’s conversation with the
sultan became the object of ongoing speculation (Sangmuah 1992; Stenner, 2014).
In their correspondence, U.S. officials often denied the claim that FDR promised to
support Moroccan ambitions for independence. This essay looks at the broader
context of U.S.-Moroccan relations in the years that followed the Anfa Conference
and focuses on the impact of that single dinner meeting on the political evolution of
Morocco toward independence. While they did not amount to a formal declaration,
the progressive views voiced by FDR over the meeting emboldened the sultan and
nationalist leaders to embrace a militant agenda and oppose French colonial
policies. For the Moroccan nationalists who took to heart the liberal principles
professed in the Atlantic charter and the four freedoms announced in FDR’s speech
in 1941, the old status quo guaranteed by the Protectorate Treaty of 1912 was
inadmissible. France, after all, was in no measure to honor the terms of the treaty.
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Politically divided, it depended on the Allies for help to liberate its own occupied
territories. A year after the Anfa meeting, Moroccan nationalist leaders would
present a manifesto calling for independence under the sultan. This triggered a new
phase of conflict with the French colonial authorities and plunged the country into
a vicious cycle of violence and repression.

Roosevelt and the Sultan

The specific nature of FDR’s pledges to the sultan has stirred a continuing
controversy among historians. Given that no official record of the dinner meeting
exists other than the personal accounts of some of those who were present notably
FDR’s son, Elliot, and the Crown Prince Hassan, the exchange between the sultan
and the president became a subject of interpretation and contestation. The gist of
this controversy centered on the political significance of the meeting and its
powerful impact on the nationalist agenda in Morocco in the following years.
Several historians have emphasized the relentless efforts of the sultan and
nationalist leaders to enlist American official support for independence and to
engage the figure of FDR in their propaganda war against the French (Rivlin, 1982).
A recent historian has even argued that Moroccan nationalists invented a
“Roosevelt’s myth” “to legitimize their claims in the eyes of Western diplomats and
politicians” (Stenner, 2014, p. 526). The problem with this American-centered
narrative is that it constructs a rigid and quite reductive view of Moroccan anticolonial struggle, which was a multi-faceted and a dynamic process. More
importantly, it makes light of Roosevelt’s political convictions vis-a-vis French
colonial regime in North Africa. FDR’s attitude not only was the outcome of
personal sympathy with an ambitious young sultan, but also rested on a firm belief
in the right of subject peoples to govern themselves and take advantage of their own
natural resources.
There is a substantial amount of archival information that is now available
involving FDR’s subsequent correspondence with the sultan testifying to his keen
interest in the future status of Morocco. What transpires from these letters is that
FDR’s sympathetic views were not fully shared by the members of his own
government for whom the ongoing war-time conditions and the necessity of
safeguarding the interests of such a strategic ally as France formed a more urgent
priority. However, it is important to keep in mind that for the sultan and the
nationalists, FDR and the United States represented a positive force of change that
opened a new frontier for political action against a protecting nation, which seemed
to have betrayed its promises and lost its credibility.
FDR’s letters to the sultan and his exchanged memos with Secretary of State
Cordell Hull and other officials relating to the Moroccan situation are now
accessible online from the State Department. 1 There are numerous records available
at the National Archives website on the Anfa Conference. The Morocco file consists

“Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration (1933–1945).” Retrieved from
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/roosevelt-fd
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of 44 pages of digitized official correspondence organized in a chronological order. 2
The American Legation library in Tangier also holds a file that contains several
records relating to FDR’s visit to Morocco including a four-page typed report on
the events of January 22, 1943, drawn from the notes of Harry Hopkins, FDR’s
close advisor. There is also an excerpt from a log kept during the president’s trip to
Casablanca providing significant details on the visit.
It can be gleaned from these documents that contact between FDR and the
sultan began in November 1942 after the landing of U.S. troops on the Atlantic
coast of Morocco. The purport of this early correspondence bears upon the
immediate war affairs and the long tradition of friendship and respect that united
Morocco and U.S. 3 Other documents offer substantial information on the dinner
meeting on January 22. The sultan, it is stated, arrived at the villa Dar Essaada at
7:40 p.m. accompanied by the Crown Prince, the Grand Vizier, and Chief of
Protocol. They “were magnificently attired in white silk robes and came bearing
several presents – a gold-mounted dagger for the President in a beautiful inlaid
teakwood case, and two golden bracelets and a high golden tiara for Mrs.
Roosevelt” (Hopkins, 1943, p. 531). The presents were duly acknowledged by Mrs.
Roosevelt in a subsequent letter to the sultan. The documents say very little about
the exchange between the sultan and FDR save that the sultan and his delegation
departed at 10:10 p.m. and were followed by Prime Minister Churchill, General
Nogues, the Resident General, and General Patton. De Gaulle was not invited to the
dinner but was received by FDR alone shortly afterwards.
The following day, still motivated by the encouraging words of the president,
the sultan dispatched his Grand Vizier and Chief of Protocol to meet Hopkins. The
minutes of the secret meeting recorded by Brigadier General Wilbur reveal that the
sultan was curious to know American plans for the future of Morocco and
particularly Roosevelt’s position regarding a tentative proposal of an eventual U.S.
takeover of the French and Spanish protectorate mandates. Hopkins’s response was
diplomatic and evasive. 4 His reserved reaction would set a pattern of U.S. political
conduct in subsequent years. A number of American historians (Sangmuah, 1992,
p. 132; Stenner, 2014, p. 526) have characterized the persistent attempts of the
Sultan and the nationalists to elicit from U.S. consuls clear statements as well as
concrete action in support of the Moroccan cause as acts of nuisance and
manipulation resulting in a great deal of embarrassment for the U.S. administration.
In contrast, the sultan’s overtures show the great confidence he placed in
“Morocco: Diplomatic Correspondence, 1933-1945, FDR-FDRPSF.” Retrieved from
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/16618683
3 The sultan’s letter in Arabic (dated 12 Dhul-Qa`dah 1361/ November 21, 1942) is a
response to both a letter and telegram sent by FDR. The French and English translations of
the Arabic version carry an earlier date, which is obviously a mistake. There is also copy of
FDR’s letter to the sultan carrying no date or signature. The heading at the top indicates
that the version was intended for the press and bears a later date (1942, November 23).
Judging from its contents, the letter may be the original one sent to the sultan
acknowledged in his response.
2

Wilbur Notes. (1943). Retrieved from
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1941-43/d382
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Roosevelt’s power to redefine the rules of the game and to enforce a new process
of political change. Above all, they reflect his loss of faith in the ability of the
Franco-Spanish protectorate systems to serve the interests of the Moroccans.
Not discouraged by Hopkins’ circumspect attitude, and wishing to take
advantage of the opportune political conjuncture, the sultan instructed Thami El
Glaoui, then still a close and trusted advisor, to open channels of communication
with the British and American Consuls with the aim of probing their views
regarding the proposition, of establishing a “joint protection” with France over
Morocco. To get around French control of the foreign policy decision-making
imposed by the terms of the treaty, the sultan also solicited the “appointment of
diplomatic representatives who would have direct access to him” (Hull, 1943, p.
738). The instructions of the Department of State to the U.S. consul in Casablanca
echoed the same views expressed by their British counterparts namely that “it would
be both impracticable and impolitic to support any such policies or ambitions as
ascribed to the Sultan” (Hull, 1943, p. 739).
Secretary of State Cordell Hull was the principal architect of the policy of noninterference in French domestic affairs in Morocco. When he reported on his
meeting with the sultan in Oujda on June 24, 1943, Robert D. Murphy, Roosevelt’s
special representative in North Africa, was aware of the policy line adopted by the
State Department. He observed, “I have been careful to avoid several suggestions
emanating from Rabat for a ‘confidential’ discussion with the Sultan, as I feel that
this is a matter in which the Department would desire the greatest prudence
exercised” (Murphy, 1943, p. 743). On the other hand, Hull was concerned about
the repressive measures taken by the French colonial authorities against North
African populations. He accordingly directed U.S. consuls to report on the conduct
of French administration and signify to French officials that Americans “have a
natural interest in the native situation in French North Africa, [...] and that this
interest may be expected to increase in the future” (Stettinius, 1943, p. 746).
The reserved response of U.S. diplomatic agents did not dissuade the sultan or
the nationalists from continuing their campaign. On the morning of January 11,
1944, two nationalist leaders, Mohamed Lyazidi and Idriss Mhamedi (who later
became Minister of Interior in the first cabinet of independent Morocco), paid a
visit to the American consulate in Rabat and were received by the vice consul,
Donald A. Dumont. The purpose of their visit was to submit a copy of the
Independence Manifesto and, interestingly enough, a letter intended for President
Roosevelt. The vice consul, who had no clear instructions as how to deal with such
a situation, could only point out “the impropriety of transmitting communications
from political groups in a foreign country to the President of the United States”
(Dumont, 1944, para 4).
The letter, of which a copy is preserved at the Tangier American Legation
library, reveals the nationalists’ high hopes in the American administration and
especially the president. Addressing President Roosevelt, the signatories stated that,
Knowing your high sense of justice and your great love of liberty, we are
convinced that our movement will find benevolent sympathy not only near
Your Excellency, but also with your government and the great American
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democracy ... You did us the signal honor of coming to our country and
you encouraged U.S. thereby to continue the struggle by the side of the
Allies, for our freedom, the Liberation of France and the Triumph of the
humanitarian principles for which the Allies are making so many sacrifices.
(Abdeljalil, Belafrej, Zeghari, Bahim & Chami, 1944, para 2).
Of particular interest here is the report of U.S. Consul General Frederick Mayer to
the State Department dated January 12, 1944. Mayer expressed strong disinclination
to encourage the nationalists’ activities and even pressed for a firm statement from
his government to this effect:
If Department wants to nip in bud this movement before it could reach
serious proportions, I respectfully suggest desirability of official
pronouncement to the effect that American Government cannot look with
favor upon political movements in areas associated in war effort which
might hamper progress of war. (Mayer, 1944, p. 532)
U.S. records show that this particular letter with its edgy tone caught Roosevelt’s
attention, and he desired to see the State Department’s response before it was
dispatched. Despite the escalation of events and the arrest of nationalist members
by French authorities reported by Mayer in the following weeks, the State
Department’s letter, dated January 31 and approved by FDR, expressed mild
concern. It called for restraint and advised, “the Sultan and the nationalist groups to
avoid challenging the authority of the French and thereby undermining the security
of the zone at this time” (Hull, 1944, p. 537). Mayer’s pleas for a clear U.S. policy
regarding the surging political activities of the nationalists warranted a discreet hint
that the State Department took into account “what appears to be a sympathetic
interest in the native problem of Morocco in the highest quarters” (Murray, 1944,
p. 537).
FDR gave further evidence of his political sentiment when he decided to send
his autographed photograph to Pasha Glaoui later in January. Secretary Hull
signified that given the explosive political situation in Morocco, “it might be
advisable to defer this presentation until such time as the agitation has calmed
down” (Hull, 1944, P.36). FDR replied in a later memo that he did not see how his
photograph could “change the future of history,” and prophesied that “in regard to
Morocco something new is bound to happen in the next ten years, I do not think
that a population, which is ninety per cent Moors, should be run permanently by
France” (Roosevelt, 1944, p. 35).

Post-War American Policies vis-a-vis the Moroccan Question

What was the sultan’s role in this whole process? How much support was he
willing to give to the nationalist movement in particular in the light of the many
constraints imposed on him by the terms of the Protectorate treaty and the repressive
policies of the General Residency? Until then, the margin of maneuver available to
him was limited and discrete action seemed an advisable strategy to avert open
French reprisal. The nationalists’ move in January 1944, however, could not have
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been undertaken without the tacit approval of the Sultan. The published memoirs of
some of these nationalists underline the fact that nationalist activities were planned
in concert with the sultan and his close circle (Al-Wazzānī, 1986, pp. 97-102;
Qādirī, 1997; pp. 174-175). Al-Wazzānī notes in his memoir that on January 13,
1944 following the presentation of the Independence manifesto, the sultan
summoned the Pashas and requested their opinions on the nationalists’ demands.
All but the Pasha of Fes supported the call for independence (Al-Wazzānī, 1982, p.
97).
The death of FDR in April 1945 and the victory of the Allies in the war gave a
real boost to the French colonial authorities to crack down on the burgeoning
independence movement and its representative entity—the Istiqlal Party. While the
Truman administration did not display any interest in supporting Moroccan
nationalists and undermining French interests, U.S. consuls were not blind to the
fast deteriorating situation in North Africa and the rising wave of nationalism across
the region. In the broad geo-political context of the post-war and the settling of the
Cold War era, Morocco’s strategic importance diminished significantly. The
Department of State records related to Morocco in the post-war years focus on U.S.
efforts to restore the international status of Tangier and end Spanish control over
the city. Thus, in August 1945, delegations from France, Britain, the Soviet Union,
and the United States held several meetings in Paris and agreed to a new and
provisional regime for Tangier that guaranteed the international character of the city
and the rights of powers signatories of the 1923 statute. Given American political
ascendancy at the international scene, France and Britain invited the United States
to take part in the administration of the city. In his response to the French
ambassador in Washington, the acting secretary of state stipulated that American
participation in the administration of Tangier shall not cause any modification or
prejudice to the rights and privileges acquired by the United States and enjoyed by
its nationals and ressortissants prior to the introduction of Tangier Statute in 1923. 5
Over the next years, the refusal of the U.S. administration to recognize the specific
terms of the French Protectorate treaty relating to U.S. extra-territorial privileges
ensured by the old treaties of 1786 and 1836 with Morocco proved to be a point of
contention (Azzou, 2005, pp. 110-111). It triggered a long legal dispute with France
that reached the International Court of Justice in 1950. The case was eventually
ruled in favor of the French government in August 1952. 6
The sultan, on his part, saw in the restitution of the international status of
Tangier an opportunity to assert his sovereignty and bring international attention to
the political crisis in Morocco. In an era marked by anti-colonial struggle and the
5 Acheson D. (1945, September 22). The Acting Secretary of State to the French Ambassador
(Bonnet). Retrieved from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d6446
Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of The United States of America in Morocco (France
V. United States of America) (1952, August 27). Retrieved from https://www.icjcij.org/files/case-related/11/011-19520827-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf
6 Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of The United States of America in Morocco (France
V. United States of America) (1952, August 27). Retrieved from https://www.icjcij.org/files/case-related/11/011-19520827-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf
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surge of nationalist movements, political groups and organizations across North
Africa succeeded in establishing contact and securing support from the newly
created Arab League in Cairo and from its first Secretary General Abderahman
Azzam Basha. The declared attachment of Morocco’s political elite to their Arab
and Islamic roots undermined France’s influence and the policies it endeavored to
pursue in Morocco. The sultan’s visit to Tangier in April 1947 was inscribed within
this new post-war dynamic. Though long envisaged, it came at a propitious time
and added new momentum to the active agenda of the nationalists.
The details of this visit were recorded by the historian Abdellah Al-Jirārī, who
served in several capacities in the Royal Court in the 1940s, and the nationalist
leader Allal Al- Fāsī. In his memoir of Sultan Mohamed V, Al-Jirārī notes that the
Tangier journey, which lasted from Wednesday, April 9 to Sunday April, 13, was a
historic event that further demonstrated the unanimous support and loyalty enjoyed
by the sultan in the Spanish and international zone of his kingdom. Arriving in
Tangier by train from Rabat after a ceremonious stopover in Asila, the sultan was
driven to the palace of the Mendoub amid large crowds of cheering bystanders
raising colorful banners. In the evening, the municipality organized a show of
fireworks in celebration of the event. The following day, Thursday April 10, he
received in his Palace at Mendoubiya, representatives of foreign powers, as well as
dignitaries from the Muslim and Jewish communities. The first of these diplomatic
officials was the American Consul General in Tangier, Paul H. Alling who had just
been nominated U.S. ambassador to Syria. The Sultan then received the
representatives of Great Britain, Spain, and France, successively, and made the
following statement:
In this informal meeting, and in the presence of representatives of the
friendly countries, we are pleased to extend our sincere thanks to you for
the affection you have shown us and to the Moroccan people on this
historic occasion, this is not surprising, since the bonds of affection we
have had since ancient times were built by our noble ancestors. …You are
well acquainted that Morocco participated in the last war and contributed
its sons and all its means until the final victory was achieved, and since
nations are now demanding rights that suit the present time, it is only right
for the Moroccan people to obtain their legitimate rights and to achieve
what we hope for and what the Moroccan people yearns to like all other
nations. (Al-Jirārī & Jawharī, 2006, p. 131).
After this reception, the sultan delivered a long and powerful speech to the public
that went down in the annals of history as the speech that launched the sultan’s
formal public engagement to reverse the status quo. The speech laid emphasis on
the Islamic identity of the Moroccan nation and its strong ties with the Arab
countries through their newly established entity the Arab League. It also called
attention to the strong bonds that had united the royal family with the Moroccan
people and made repeated references to the necessity for the Moroccan people to
attain their legitimate rights. More significantly, the speech made no ceremonious
reference to the work of the French colonial authorities, and the omission was
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interpreted as the sultan’s new disposition to resist the imposed policies of the
residency. George Joffé argues that the Tangier speech not only revealed the
sultan’s endorsement of the nationalist agenda, but also paved the way for the
urban-based Istiqlal party to spread its influence in the rural parts of the country
where it lacked grassroots base (Joffé, 1985, pp. 289-290).
The escalating events that followed in the ensuing years and the French
hardline policy to curb the sultan’s ascendant influence and popularity among the
Moroccan population and its political elite only served to radicalize his position visa-vis the French colonial establishment. Beside infusing local domestic public
enthusiasm and confirming his sovereignty over the northern region of the country,
which had been under Spanish control since 1912, the sultan’s visit to Tangier
enabled him to reach out to the international community through its diplomatic
agents represented in Tangier and to receive extensive media coverage both in local
and foreign newspapers. If during the Anfa conference the sultan emerged as a head
of State struggling to secure American recognition and support for his country’s
cause, the Tangier visit acclaimed him as a popular and legitimate sovereign who
inspired hope and confidence among his people in the future. On Friday, the sultan
headed to the great mosque of Tangier and delivered the Khutba (sermon) to the
excited worshippers. While his sermon did not contain any clear political messages
apart from exhortations to hold to the teachings of Islam, it endorsed his image as a
devout and religious leader.
The outcome of this extraordinary royal visit to Tangier for the colonial
authorities in Rabat and the Parisian official circles was extremely disappointing.
By appointing Resident General Eric Labonne in early 1946, French government
had aimed to appease the tense political situation in Morocco and introduce new
reforms commensurate with rising demands of nationalist movements across North
Africa. However, Labonne’s agricultural and educational reform policies as well as
political reconciliation failed to contain the demands of the nationalists for a
political process culminating in Moroccan independence. The apparently lenient
policy and bill of reforms of Labonne did not appeal to the French colonists either.
The tragic incident of the ben M’sik massacre of April 7, 1947 on the eve of the
sultan’s visit to Tangier, reported in international newspapers including the New
York Times, had raised tensions further. Labonne was succeeded by General
Alphonse Juin, a military figure of a less tractable nature whose term would see the
further deterioration of relations with the sultan and the nationalists.
How did the American authorities react to these changes in Morocco?
Contemporary U.S. diplomatic correspondence reveals that the situation in the
country was being watched carefully. The situation of North Africa was far from
reassuring and the policies adopted in Paris and implemented by the colonial
authorities in Tunis, Algiers, and Rabat did not seem to meet the rising demands of
North African peoples whose agitations for better political and social conditions
were now strongly supported by the Arab League. A new agency, the Bureau du
Moghreb Arabe, was established in Cairo, which brought together the major
political parties in the three countries. In July 1947 by instructions from the
nationalist movement and the approval of the sultan, Mahdi Bennouna travelled to
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New York and established an office to lobby for the Moroccan cause among the
members of United Nations (Perkins, 1976, p. 66). The fruit of his efforts and of his
office will begin to show only in the early 1950s when the Moroccan case was
debated in the UN General Assembly sessions.
Meanwhile in light of the activities of French communists in France and
Morocco American officials in Morocco began to sound the alarm, and frequently
advised the Department of State in Washington that although the nationalists had
expressed allegiance to the United States, they may in desperate measures resort to
Soviet political support in the United Nations or even clandestinely to bring the
desired change in their country. What used to be an exclusively French colonial
affair had now become a delicate issue for American government. The currents of
Cold War politics, it seems, had swept over this part of the world too. The American
government was unwilling to allow Soviet influence to penetrate this strategic area.
On June 10, 1947, only two months after the sultan’s visit to Tangier, Secretary
of State George Marshall wrote to the U.S. embassy in Paris outlining his view of
the North African situation. He noted that to avert the risk of the Indo-China
scenario, the solution lies in “leading North Africans [being] approached with some
plan guaranteeing evolution toward self-government while concurrently
safeguarding economic development of country and legitimate French interests in
area by integration into French Union” (Marshall, 1948, p. 686). He urged the
ambassador to summon U.S. agents in North Africa to confer on the situation there
and propose a course of action. The conference indeed took place a week later in
the American embassy in Paris and was attended by representatives of U.S.
missions in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and France. The report of their
findings presented by Ambassador Jefferson Caffery was detailed and contained a
road map to resolve the crisis that was fast developing in North Africa. After
outlining U.S. principles and orientations in taking this initiative, the participants
including Paul H. Alling the Consul-General of Tangier who chaired the meeting,
proposed that the French government be approached and urged to introduce “longrange plans to guide both North African Protectorates (Morocco and Tunisia)
toward dominion status” (Caffery, 1947, p. 693). Such a plan, they pointed out,
should have a definite time-frame and should involve concrete actions to establish
“without delay a solid basis of mutual trust” (Caffery, 1947, p. 693). These actions
include “freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, rapid amplification of the
school program, administrative reforms, initiation to democratic ways through
municipal elections, etc.” (Caffery, 1947, p. 693).
In retrospect, these proposed reforms received little heeding from the French
authorities who preferred to pursue a stick policy in their North African colonies.
The American government on its part continued to ignore the nationalists’ appeals
for support, and often used its political influence to offset the criticism and
condemnation of France in the United Nations. The raging Indochina war and
French grim prospects there compelled the U.S. government to support French
economically, militarily, and politically. The establishment of U.S. air bases in
Morocco in 1951 without prior consultation or consent of the sultan were part of
the broad framework of their collaboration. However, starting from 1953 after the
French had deposed Sultan Mohamed Ben Youssef, the U.S. government was itself
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under pressure from Arab and Asian countries to take a firm position against France
in the United Nations general Assembly. In the end, France had to reverse its
colonial policy and acquiesce to the demands of the nationalist movement by
reinstating the sultan and bringing to end the long protectorate phase.
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Analyzing the Moroccan Artistic Presence
at the Centre Pompidou Collections
Sirine Abdelhedi
Abstract
This article highlights the cultural, economic, historical, and political
criteria that influence the current international policy of the Pompidou
Center, particularly a new interest in non-Western art in Arabic-speaking
countries. It focuses on works produced by Moroccan artists that are part
of the collections of the National Museum of Modern Art - Centre
Pompidou in Paris. It includes a brief introduction to some key milestones
in Moroccan art history that help contextualize the research project.

The Context of the Project: Milestones in Moroccan Art History

At the dawn of the 20th century, the destiny of Morocco, like most African
countries, could not escape Western colonization. The signature of the Treaty of
Fez on March 30, 1912 allowed the establishment of a Franco-Spanish protectorate.
The Spanish dominated the Rif region in the north of Morocco, while the French
exerted their power in the central/southern parts of the country. Two institutions
dedicated to artistic education were created under the colonization system and
which belong today to Moroccan authorities. The Ecole des Beaux-Arts of
Casablanca opened in 1950 and the Ecole des Beaux-Arts of Tetouan created in
1945.
However, as art historian Toni Maraini (2014) has noted, there is a popular
pictorial tradition that did not come to Morocco "in the trunks of colonialism."
Morocco has long been and continues to be at the crossroads of different
civilizations and cultures. Miniatures, illuminations, arabesques, Amazigh signs,
Roman antiquities, and Islamic architecture have inspired generations of
autodidactic artists who employ techniques that belong to these aesthetic registers.
I mention a few: Mohamed Ben Ali Rbati (1861-1939), Mohamed Ben Allal (19241995), Ahmed Ben Driss El Yacoubi (1928-1985), Hassan El Glaoui (1923-2018),
Chaïbia Talal (1929-2004), and Fatima Hassan Farrouj (1945-2011). Their
productions were wrongly so-called “naïve” during the protectorate. But “naïve”
according to whom and in what context? They all started exhibiting from the 1950s
in Morocco and abroad.
The years immediately before and following independence (1956) were
decisive for the future of contemporary art in Morocco. A new generation of artists
benefitted from scholarships to continue their artistic training abroad while others
chose to stay in Morocco. When talking about the birth of abstraction in painting in
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Morocco, the names of Ahmed Cherkaoui (1934-1967) and Jilali Gharbaoui (19301971) are always among the first directly mentioned. Cherkaoui draws on his
heritage to create contemporary work. He uses visual elements (usually inspired
from the Amazigh alphabet or tattoos) and enlarges then so that the shape occupies
the entire space of the canvas. As for Gharbaoui, he chose to express himself
through the pictorial gesture. The imbalance in his private life has influenced him
as his work is characterized by violent and rapid gestures.
In 1962, upon his return to Morocco, Farid Belkahia (1934-2014) took over the
direction of the Ecole des Beaux-Arts of Casablanca. Joined by artists-teachers
Mohamed Melehi (1936-) and Mohamed Chebaa (1935-2013) and historians Toni
Maraini (1941-) and Bert Flint (1931-), they established an artistic education that
takes into account the different aspects of Moroccan culture for the creation of
contemporary works. Like many other artists, they have thought about the future of
Moroccan art by refuting the ideas that reduced it to naïve art during colonial and
post-colonial periods. Their collaboration is at the origin of the artistic movement
known as the “School of Casablanca.” Maraini says (2014), “More than a style,
‘modernity,’ thus understood, was a spirit and an attitude. Far from being
established like an academy of styles, modern art became the space of questioning
and unveiling” (p. 73). They encouraged their students to create outside the
academic space and go to meet the public. To challenge the folklorization of
Moroccan art defended in neo-colonial salons, they created an open-air exhibition
in Jamaa el Fna square (1969) which undoubtedly represents an historical moment
in Moroccan history of art.
During that period, quality art and culture journals were born. Maghreb Art
(1965-1969) was published by the School of Casablanca, Souffles (1966-1973)
initiated by poets Abdellatif Lâabi and Mustapha Nissaboury, and then Integral
(1971-1977). In 1971, Pauline de Mazières founded l’Atelier, the first contemporary
art gallery in Morocco. She was joined by Sylvia Benhassan and for 20 years (until
1991), the gallery was considered as a reference point not only nationally but for
the broader Arab world. In the late 1970s, Mohamed Melehi and Mohamed
Benaissa, both originating from Asilah and elected to the city council, initiated the
Cultural Moussem of Asilah. This festival of art and culture is organized every year
between July and August. Through its programming, the organizers aim to ensure
the social and economic development of the city through culture and arts.
Many companies and patrons supported the artists not only by collecting but
also by supporting and creating places to spread the visual arts. This is the case of
The Office Chérifien des Phosphates, the Foundation Omnium nord-africain (ONA)
and its two art villas based in Casablanca and Rabat: the Attijari Wafabank and its
art space Actua; and the real-estate group Alliances owned by Mohamed Alami
Lazrak and its eponymous foundation which manages the Museum of
Contemporary African Art Al Maaden just to name a few.
In 1993, the artist-teacher Faouzi Laatiris (1958-) set up the “Volume and
Installation” workshop at National Institute of Fine Arts of Tetouan. He contributed
to the training of the most remarkable artists of a generation – the “Tetouan
generation” which included Batoul S'Himi (1974-), Younes Rahmoun (1975-),
Safaa Erruas (1976-), Mohssin Harraki (1981-), Mustapha Akrim (1981-), etc.
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A lot of artists and curators have also created venues for the dissemination of
contemporary art and culture. This is the case of Yto Barrada (1971-), who took
over the Cinémathèque de Tanger and saved it from collapse; Hassan Darsi (1961) founded the research center The Source of the Lion (1995) in Casablanca;
Mohamed Mourabiti (1968-) initiated Al Maqam, an artist's residence located in the
Amazigh village Tahannaout not far from Marrakech; Abdallah Karroum founded
in 2002 L'appartement 22, an artist's residence in Rabat; Younes Rahmoun
cofounded in 2013 with Berénice Saliou Trankat, a space of residence and creation
in the medina of Tetouan.
In 2002, Hicham Daoudi founded the Compagnie Marocaine des Œuvres et
Objets d’Art, an auction house based in Casablanca and renamed in 2008 as the Art
Holding Morocco. Its area of specialization extends to cultural management. Thus,
Daoudi created in 2009 Diptyk, an art magazine published in Casablanca and
directed by Myriam Sebti and in 2016 the Comptoir des Mines, a contemporary art
gallery in the heart of Marrakech. In 2004, Vanessa Branson initiated the cultural
event Art Marrakech, which was named The Marrakech Biennale in 2012. Due to
lack of funding, its sixth and last event took place in 2016.
At the initiative of His Majesty Mohamed VI, the National Foundation of
Museums was created in 2011, and chaired by the artist Mehdi Qotbi (1951-) to
manage the 14 national museums of the kingdom including the Museum of Modern
and Contemporary Art Mohamed VI, which was inaugurated in 2014 in Rabat. In
February 2018, 1:54, the contemporary African art fair founded in 2013 by Touria
El Glaoui, took place for the first time in Marrakech at the Mamounia. These are a
few of the important milestones that set the stage for a discussion of Moroccan
artwork as represented through the Centre Pompidou collections that is the focus of
this article. A non-exhaustive list of Moroccan artists can be found in the appendix
to this article.

The Research Project

Aware of the Euro-American focus of the collections that they manage, the
curators in modern and contemporary art museums have been interested in nonWestern artists since the late 1980s. The French National Museum of Modern Art
(Musée National d’Art Moderne), created in 1947 in Paris, was born from the
merger of the collections of the Museum of Living Artists (Musée des Artistes
Vivants) and the Museum of Contemporary Foreign Schools of the Jeu de Paume
(Musée des Écoles Étrangères Contemporaines du Jeu de Paume). It is, since 1977,
established at the Centre Pompidou and considered as the first institution dedicated
to promoting contemporary art in France (Quemin, 2007, p. 527).
The Centre Pompidou is a multidisciplinary cultural institution initiated by the
French President Georges Pompidou and opened on January 31, 1977. The building
was designed by Renzo Piano and Richard Rogers. The Center houses different
cultural structures including the National Museum of Modern Art, which gathered
together the third most important collection of modern and contemporary art in the
world. More than 120,000 works of art are classified within seven departments:
photography, graphic art, fine arts, architecture, design, cinema, and new media.
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The first director of the museum, Pontus Hulten, made the international exhibition
a contribution to the art world (Dufrêne, 2007, p. 509). Early exhibitions marked
the beginnings of the museum within the Pompidou Center by tracing the links
between Paris and the art capitals of the avant-gardes: Paris-New York (1977),
Paris-Berlin (1978), and Paris-Moscow (1979). With shows like Magiciens de la
terre (1989), “What About China? (2003), or Africa Remix (2005), the institution
attests to an interest in the art worlds of the former colonies, as seen through the
prism of multiculturalism and diplomatic agreements.
In this regard Catherine Grenier, the former deputy director of the museum,
initiated in 2009 the scientific program titled “research and globalization.” The first
result of this program consisted of a new display of the permanent collection entitled
Plural Modernities: 1905-1970 (Modernités Plurielles: 1905-1970). She announced,
This manifest exhibition, the fruit of research conducted by a large team
of curators and young university researchers, is a first proposal for the
renewal of the conventional discourse on modern art. It breaks with long
years of consensus around a unified narrative, linear and progressive,
proposed with slight national variants by all Western museums. This
consensus, now in crisis, needs to be updated and re-established on a new
basis. (Grenier, 2013, p. 15)
This semi-permanent exhibition—which aims to decolonize art history—is the
guiding thread of my study.
In addition to the linearity of the discourse, which is focused on Western and
North American art scenes, different observations brought me to think about the
topic and to focus on Moroccan artists who are represented in the collection of the
museum. First, an increased interest in non-Western artists is accompanied by
participation in group exhibitions and acquisitions of their works. Second, the
Friends of the Centre Pompidou is a nonprofit organization that aims to enrich the
collection of the museum by supporting new acquisitions. An International Circle
of patrons was created in 2013 and is organized according to geopolitical areas. It
includes a Middle Eastern group (2013) and an African section (2019). Third, on
the other side of the Mediterranean, particularly in Morocco, we notice a vibrant,
emerging art world as well as the establishment of new institutions that aim to
spread contemporary art, such as the Marrakech Biennale (2004-2016), the National
Foundation of Museums (2011), the Museum of Contemporary African Art Al
Maaden (2016), and 1:54 Contemporary African Art Fair (2018), etc. And finally,
a partnership agreement recently signed between the Centre Pompidou and the
Moroccan National Foundation of Museums.

Methodology

The main subject of this research project is to determine if the Moroccan artistic
presence in the collections of the Centre Pompidou signifies a decolonization of the
gaze and of the conventional discourse of art history. As a first step, I identified the
role that Morocco plays in the museum’s collection through an inventory derived
from the online catalog of the collection. In addition to asking, what were the criteria
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set up by the museum staff to complete the collection, especially in a difficult
economic context affected by budgetary restrictions, I also studied the
dissemination vectors set up by the institution to share its collections with the
audience. I then situated the corpus on a timeline and correlated it with historical
events and with the development of the art market over the last two decades. This
work allows me to analyze how the interest in Moroccan artists is generated and
changes. The below inventory compiled in 2018 as part of this study includes the
identification of the artists and their works, the acquisition methods, and whether it
is a purchase, a donation, or a deposit.
Artists

Title

Created Technique

Mehdi
Qotbi
Majida
Khattari

Small
symphony
Fashion
show/perfor
mance
Dreams of
young girls
The
magician
Untitled
(From the
series The
Strait, notes
on a useless
country)
Untitled
(From the
series The
Strait, notes
on a useless
country)
Untitled
(From the
series The
Strait, notes
on a useless
country)
Untitled
(From the
series The
Strait, notes
on a useless
country)

1980

Acquired Acquisition
Method
Lithography 1980
Purchase

1998

Video

1999

Purchase

2001

Video
installation
Video

2001

Purchase

2005

Purchase

Yto
Barrada

2003
1998

Chromogeni 2006
c print stuck
on
aluminum

Donation from
the Caisse des
dépôts
et consignations

1998

Chromogeni
c print stuck
on
aluminum

Donation from
the Caisse des
dépôts
et consignations

1998

Chromogeni
c print stuck
on
aluminum

Donation from
the Caisse des
dépôts
et consignations

1998

Chromogeni
c print stuck
on
aluminum

Donation from
the Caisse des
dépôts
et consignations
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Untitled
(From the
series The
Strait, notes
on a useless
country)
Hill of the
Charf Tangier
(Tomb of
Ante)
From the
series Gran
Royal
Turismo
Municipal
Stadium Tangier
From the
series Gran
Royal
Turismo
Ba-Youssef
and the
yellow
tomatoes

1998

Chromogeni
c print stuck
on
aluminum

Donation from
the Caisse des
dépôts
et consignations

2001

Chromogeni
c print

Donation from
the Caisse des
dépôts
et consignations

2002

Chromogeni
c print

Donation from
the Caisse des
dépôts
et consignations

2011

Chromogeni 2012
c print

Donation from
the Friends of
the Centre
Pompidou
Project for
contemporary art
2011
Donation from
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Figure 1. Table of the works produced by Moroccan artists and belonging to the
National Museum of Modern Art – Pompidou Center Collections.
Data collection was followed by an interview survey with the involved
stakeholders: artists, curators, gallerists, etc. I thus identified three groups of works
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based on the museum’s criteria 1: “Abstraction as an artistic language” (Farid
Belkahia, Mohamed Melehi, Hicham Berrada, Achraf Touloub, Mehdi Qotbi, Najia
Mehadji, and Ahmed Cherkaoui); “Islam as a source of inspiration” (Majida
Khattari, Mohssin Harraki, and Younes Rahmoun); and “Rethinking the
environment” (Yto Barrada and Hassan Darsi). In the following pages, I explore the
paths of three artists, one from each category, Farid Belkahia, Younes Rahmoun,
and Yto Barrada.

The Abstraction as an Artistic Language:
Select Works of Farid Belkahia

Born in 1934 in Marrakech, Farid Belkahia has produced a contemporary work
closely linked to Moroccan heritage and local craft. At the dawn of the
independence of Morocco, he travelled, like many artists of his generation, to study
abroad at the Ecole des Beaux-Arts in Paris (France), at the National Theater in
Prague (Hungary), and at the Brera Academy of Fine Arts in Milan (Italy). In 1962,
he returned to Morocco to take charge of the Ecole des Beaux-Arts of Casablanca.
He held this position until 1974. Belkahia and the artist-teachers, including
Mohamed Melehi and Mohamed Chebaa, abandoned the established conventions
and teaching methods spread during the French protectorate in favor of research and
practices that take into account the different facets of Moroccan culture. Their
collaboration was at the origin of the artistic movement known as the “School of
Casablanca.”
From the 1960s, Belkahia's personal approach is a continuation of the reflection
initiated with the Casablanca group. He explored local heritage to identify different
elements such as forms, signs, symbols, and substances that will be the raw material
of his visual language. The painter abandoned canvas, easel, and chemical paints in
favor of local materials such as animal skin, copper, henna, saffron, etc. The skin
became his favorite material for nearly 40 years. Each work is a sensory
composition imagined like a puzzle. In order to create a dialogue between the form
and purpose of the artwork, Belkahia has visually translated several themes such as
the Melhoun (Amazigh poetry), Lalla Mira (an Amazigh queen celebrated by the
Gnawa music), the Trance, Jerusalem, the Hand, and also paid tribute to intellectual
personalities such as Ibn Battoûta, Antoni Tapiés, René Char, and Gaston
Bachelard, among others.

1

In the online catalog of the collection, each work of art has its own descriptive form. I
identified the museum's selection criteria through the comparison of the keywords associated
to each work mentioned in its descriptive form on the one hand and the study of the artists'
body of works on the other. The comparison and analysis of these information allows me to
identify the three main groups mentioned above. The online collection is available through
this link: https://collection.centrepompidou.fr/#/artworks
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Figure 2: Farid Belkahia, Tribute to Gaston Bachelard, (1986), 320 x 296 x 4 cm,
Dye on skin. © Hassan Nadim and Fouad Maazouz, Courtesy Fondation Farid
Belkahia, Marrakech*
The work, Tribute to Gaston Bachelard (1984), was purchased by the National
Museum of Modern Art in 2013. As part of this study I met with the curator Michel
Gauthier, to learn more about the acquisition process. He recalled, “I knew his work
a bit and when we started working on the hanging of the permanent collection Plural
Modernities, I wanted to meet him. It seemed to me that, apart from Plural
Modernities, it was a pity that there is no works created by Belkahia in the
collection” (M. Gauthier, personal communication, June 2016). The idea of
acquiring his work was set up in 2011 when Gauthier went to Marrakech to meet
the artist and see the available pieces. He reflected:
Finally, we focused on this work, because Belkahia, moreover, thought it
was a tribute to Gaston Bachelard so there was a kind of logic that this
work that evokes a French thinker belongs to France. (...) And it seemed
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to me extremely interesting by its colors, the fact that it is composed by
several elements and that there are signs and arrows on the clouds. The
piece is truly representative of the artistic work of Belkahia. ” (M.
Gauthier, personal communication, June 2016)
Farid Belkahia passed away in Marrakech in 2014. His reflection on the
collective memory and his non-traditional analysis of tradition allowed him to
bequeath to humanity a work of universal significance confirmed by the words of
Toni Maraini (2014), “In fact, the work of Farid Belkahia—who is one of the
leading artists of contemporary Moroccan painting—is there to remind us that
creation rises outside or beyond the limits of time, that modernity is multiple and
that art is imbued with immemorial symbols” (p. 148).
Islam as a Source of Inspiration: Select Works of Younes Rahmoun
Graduated in 1998 from the National Institute of Fine Arts of Tetouan in
Morocco, Younes Rahmoun, born in 1975 in Tetouan where he lives and works,
combines artistic practice with a spiritual one. According to Roxana Azimi, “Raised
within the Muslim religion, which he rarely sees as a weight or a hindrance, this
true believer searches through all the key spiritualties in order to understand the
world” (Azimi & Saliou, 2012, p. 2). His work is shown in France from 1999
following his participation in the exhibition: The disoriented object, organized at
the Museum of Decorative Arts in Paris (France) under the direction of Jean-Louis
Froment and Regards Nomades, which took place in Museum of Fine Arts in Dole
(France).
About Rahmoun’s approach, Frédéric Bouglé (1999) says,
Sawdust, paper, rope, stone, sand, jute fabric, studs, gravel, the materials
used by Younes Rahmoun in his installations decline and are repeated like
the strident rhaïtas of a jajouka melody. Poor materials but rich in meaning
and memory. They secretly reveal magical rituals under the obvious
evidence of everyday life. They show the life of the souk, of the medina
and of the lonely villages of his native country. (p. 25)
A multidisciplinary artist, Rahmoun explores various media: installation, video,
animation, photography, performance, and drawing. His minimalistic work invites
a meditation and reflection on the unfolding of life. He translates his everyday
experience through simple elements. In his language, universality is perceived
through simple geometric shapes, flowers, and natural elements such as small
stones. In his work there is a strong presence of architecture and a spiritual reading
of spaces of habitation from an individual and collective perspective. Hence, he
creates a connection between the external world and the introspective experience in
order to communicate a universal message.
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Figure 3. Younes Rahmoun, Manzil-Janna (Paradise-House), (2015), 30x30x225
cm (x7), resin. © Younès Rahmoun, Courtesy of the artist and Galerie Imane Farès,
Paris*
The installation Manzil Janna (2015), whose title is translated from Arabic to
English by Manzil as “house and Janna = paradise,” entered in 2016 the Centre
Pompidou’s collections thanks to a donation from the International Circle—Middle
East group of the Friends of the Centre Pompidou. Composed of seven small white
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houses, whose shape is inspired by birdhouses, each is more than two meters high
on thin stilts and represents a minimalist intimate space and a high refuge of the
soul. The choice to repeat the structure seven times is not trivial. The number seven
carries an important significance in Islam on the one hand and the repetition
accentuates the meditative action on the other hand. The white color is used to
enhance purity. Each house is painted inside in multicolored uniqueness. According
to the artist, the spectrum of colors represents the infinity of possibilities,
interpretations, etc. Perhaps, the installation invites his audience to an elevation of
the soul beyond the seventh heaven, to paradise.

Rethinking the Environment: Select Works of Yto Barrada

The Franco-Moroccan artist Yto Barrada was born in Paris in 1971 and
graduated from the Sorbonne in History and Political Science and the International
Center of Photography in New York. Since the beginning of the 2000s, she has been
conducting a reflection on post-colonial history and the challenges of globalization
through a critical look at the Moroccan context. She was working between Tangier
and New York before settling in the American city. In 2003, she co-founded the
Cinémathèque de Tanger, to which she gave her studio which will serve as artistic
residency. Primarily a photographer, Barrada also produces films, installations and
sculptures.
In 2006, a set of seven photographic images were donated to the Centre
Pompidou museum from the Caisse des dépôts et consignations, consisting of five
photographic clichés from the series The strait, notes on a useless country and two
from the Gran Royal Turismo series. Through a photographic survey, Barrada
paints a portrait of Tangier. The city is located on the Strait of Gibraltar and it
represents a strategic point between Africa and Europe. Barrada confronts different
elements that reflect the demographic transformation of Tangier. She documents
the local environment and reveals a fragile ecosystem threatened by the increasing
urbanization. The emptiness, the abandoned nature or the human presence brings
fiction to her visual narratives.
Photography allows Barrada to represent the tragic reality of the world from an
artistic point of view and to invite the viewer not only to contemplation but also to
reflection (B. Utudjian, personal communication, May 2018). Through her
iconographic exploration, she emphasizes the colonization effects in the
postcolonial era. In an interview with Sina Najafi, the artist declares: “Morocco is
a place where history has been confiscated and replaced by propaganda and
repression. The ‘sharing of Africa’ is still a reality; sixty years after independence,
we still cannot impose our ideas” (Najafi, 2013, p. 147).
By her documentary approach, Barrada draws up an inventory of the city and
tries as much to alert the observer to the fragility of the inhabitants in Tangier and
to their environment as she does to raise broader awareness, in the absence of a
political strategy that faces the dangers of globalization, of the effects on
environmental and cultural ecosystems designed to meet the needs of the dominant
West.
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Results of the Study

The inventory of the collection shows that the Arab artistic representation
within the collection of the National Museum of Modern Art – Centre Pompidou
does not exceed 0.5%. 2 The selected artists are mostly from the Moroccan diaspora.
For most, they have studied in Western art schools, they are represented by Western
galleries, and they are exhibiting abroad.
Once the works produced by Moroccan artists are identified, we notice that the
Centre Pompidou curators are focusing more on the new generation, as if the art
history in the kingdom of Morocco is being written right now. The majority of the
works do not reflect the traditional art of the country.
The thirty-one pieces acquired are as follows: twenty-three donations, seven
purchases, and one deposit of the National Center of Contemporary Art. These data
show the important role patrons are playing in the contemporary art ecosystem in
France, a country traditionally focused on public funding which is increasingly
reduced. In addition to the quality of the artists' work, it seems that the networks
and the actors behind many artists play an important role for their recognition and
the establishment of their professional careers.
The study of the dissemination vectors set up by the museum to enlarge public
knowledge about the richness of the art history shows that: artists from Morocco
and the Arab region are not well represented through the temporary exhibitions, the
permanent hanging of the collection, the Massive Open Online Course, the mobile
app, and the catalogs edited by the institution. It also reveals a confusion in the use
of concepts; for example, the historiographies of art combine sometimes Moroccan
creation with that of the Middle East and with that of Africa. It should be noted that
Morocco is a country of the Arab world but not of the Middle East geographical
space. In this regard, there is a lot more work that should be done to clarify the use
of different political concepts that impact cultural context.
Regarding the partnership between the National Foundation of Museums and
the Centre Pompidou, it involves exchanging expertise “hopefully in both
directions.” A turnkey exhibition of works from the Pompidou Collection was
organized at the Mohamed VI museum in Rabat during the summer of 2018. Its
curator Christian Briend said,
At the end of the proposed itinerary, the visitor may regret not finding
artists from other geographical areas than those represented here, starting
with the Maghreb countries. (...) It is enough to say how the exhibition
This result is obtained following the inventory study I conducted in May 2018. The number
of works available in the online catalog at the time of the study was 106,947. At first, I tried
to identify the artists (79) who represent the Arab scene and their works (365), and then to
focus on those who represent the Moroccan artistic scene. The figures obtained indicate that
the works produced by artists belonging to the countries of the Arab world represent only
0.3% of the totality of the collection. However, I estimate 0.5% because the entire collection
is not available online. The number will evolve according to the site's feed with further
digitization of new acquisitions. The scanning process is long and is subject to certain
restrictions.

2
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“The Mediterranean and Modern Art” remains dependent on a heritage,
that of a collection conveying a European vision of the history of art, that
the institution is working today to question by a policy of exhibitions ever
more attentive to "plural modernities." (Briend, 2018, p. 21)
It seems that the economic crisis has modified power relations and accelerated the
transition to another world relatively not affected by the economic catastrophe. The
emergence of new cities as center of the world (Hong Kong, Singapore, Dubai, etc.),
the evolution of the art market Christie’s (2006) and Bonhams (2007) in Dubai,
United Arab Emirates, Sotheby’s (2007) in Doha, Qatar, local art fairs like Art
Dubai (2007), the newly rich art collectors, and the establishment of new cultural
institutions all serve to improve the visibility and presence of non-Western artists
within the global art scene. That’s why the reduction of the public budget in France
(and elsewhere) encourages art institutions to diversify their economic sources and
to look for diverse private support. In this way, the interest seems to be not only
intellectual but especially economic.
On the other side of the Mediterranean Sea, the civil society and the Moroccan
government are involved in the promotion and the development of the artistic scene.
However, many actions, frameworks, and responsibilities still need to be defined.
Moroccans who are engaged in the artistic domain need to establish a long term
efficient work strategy that reviews art education at all levels, establishes art
disciplines as a research field in higher education, organizes art institutions, works
hand in hand with local partners, refrains from buying turnkey exhibitions from
abroad which are very expensive, and instead encourages local Moroccan curators
and artists to create more local exhibits, and to think about new teaching methods
and dissemination tools adapted to the local context in order to reach a wider
audience. Such changes are needed if Moroccan artists are to reach their full
potential and deserved recognition. Unfortunately, according to artist Younes
Rahmoun, it is largely still the case that “By exhibiting abroad, we are better
recognized and more valued at home. It's sad but it's like that” (Gabsi, 2015, p. 545).

Call to Action

Recent progress of museum research based on issues such as acquisition,
dissemination, and display are the result of bilateral actions among artistic networks
and collaborators on the one hand and the evolution of cultural policies in Morocco
as well as in the majority of Arab countries on the other. However, the options taken
in Morocco must no longer consider art based solely on Western references, rather
it must develop local sponsorship and greater institutional support. In the absence
of a cultural management strategy accompanied by a structured education, the
Western model and its actors seem to remain, today, the dominant world reference
in the art field. While Morocco’s recent efforts to define and develop its modern art
practices are a step in the right direction, there is greater need for institutional
direction from within Morocco (as well as the Middle East and North Africa region)
to determine how best to represent itself on the world stage.
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APPENDIX: A non-exhaustive list of Moroccan artists
ABOUZID SOUALI,
Mariam
AFIFI, Saïd
AGUEZNAY, Amina
AGUEZNAY, Malika
AKRIM, Mustapha
ALAOUI, Leila
ALAOUI, Rita
ALAOUI ,Yasmina
ANDALIBE, Zainab
AREJDAL, Mohamed
ATBANE, Younes
AZEROUAL, Mustapha
BAALA, Mo
BABA-ALI, Younes
BAKHTI, Mohamed
BALBZIOUI, Yassine
BARRADA, Yto
BATTAL, Rim
BELKAHIA, Farid
BELLAMINE, Fouad
BELMAACHI, Ghany
BEN ALLAL, Mohamed
BENBOUCHTA, Amina
BEN CHEFFAJ, Saad
BENITAH, Carolle
BEN LAHCEN, Morran
BENOHOUD, Hicham
BENZAQUEN, Deborah
BERHISS, Abdelmalek
BERRADA, Hicham
BINEBINE, Mahi
BOUHCHICHI, M’barek
BOURKIA, Hassan
CHAIR, Mohamed Said
CHARRAT, Mounat
CHEBAA, Mohamed
CHERKAOUI, Ahmed
CHERKAOUI, Larbi
DAIFALLAH,
Noureddine
DARSI, Hassan

DOUKKANE,
Abderrahmane
DRISSI, Mohamed
DRISSI, Moulay Ahmed
ECHAKHCH, Latifa
ECHAIR, Hassan
EL BAZ, Mohamed
EL GHRIB, Khalil
EL GLAOUI, Hassan
EL GOTAIBI, Amine
EL MAKHLOUFI, Nabil
ENNADARE, Touhami
ERRUAS, Saffa
ESSAYDI, Lalla
FAKHIR, Ymane
FARIJI, Mohamed
FATIMI, Mounir
FETTAKA,
Simohammed
GHARBAOUI, Jilali
HAJJAJ, Hassan
HAMIDI, Mohamed
HARRAKI, Mohssin
HASSAN FARROUJ,
Fatima
HASSANI, Saad
HATIMI, Yasmine
HRIECH, Chourouk
JOUAL, Soukaina
KABBAJ, Houda
KABBAJ, Ikram
KACIMI, Mohamed
KHALILI, Bouchra
KHATTARI, Majida
KOURKOUNI, Adil
LAATIRIS, Faouzi
LABIED, Miloud
LAHLOU, MehdiGeorges
LAKHDAR, Boujemaa
LEKLETI, Mohamed
MAAZOUZ, Fouad
MAIMOUN, Ali

MARFOUK, Walid
MAZIRH, Safaa
MAZMOUZ, Fatima
MEHADJI, Najia
MELEHI, Mohamed
MEGARA, Meki
MEZIAN, Meriem
MILOUDI, Houssein
MOURABITI, Mohamed
NABILI, Mohamed
NAJI, Lamia
NEJMI, Malik
NEMMAOUI, Khalil
OUAZZANI, Abdelkrim
OUCHRA, Youssef
OUHADDOU, Sara
QOTBI, Mehdi
RABI’, Abdelkebir
RACHDI, Mohamed
RAHMOUN, Younes
RAHOULE,
Abderrahmane
RBATI, Mohamed Ben
Ali
SAHLI, Ghizlane
SALADI, Abbes
SHIMI, Batoul
SLAOUI, Hassan
TABAL, Mohamed
TALLAL, Chaibia
TALLAL, Hossein
TIBARI, Kantour
TILSAGHANI, Nour
Eddine
WAKRIM, Zakaria
YACOUBI, Ahmed
YAMOU YORIYAS
ZEMMOURI, Fatiha
ZIYAT, Yasmina
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The Changing Roles of Female
Visual Artists in Morocco
Samir El Azhar
Abstract

Female artists are actively participating in the development and
growth of visual arts in Morocco. This article seeks to highlight
their important contribution in the Moroccan visual arts. It deals
with the access of women to the field of visual art, delineates
successive categories for understanding the types of work female
artists have engaged in since the independence of the country in
1956, and the challenges that these artists have been facing. It
focuses on the artistic experiences of specific artists, believed to
be, representative of some historical era or artistic trend.
Moreover, it tries to put these artists into a cultural and historical
framework to contextualize their artistic production.
Keywords: Female artists, gender equality, visual arts, contemporary art.
Today, the number of female artists in the Moroccan art scene is increasing.
They are actively participating in the development and growth of visual arts in
Morocco. From different cultural backgrounds, intellectual levels, and social strata,
they have campaigned through pictorial expression for environmental causes and
for the emancipation of women overcoming a long repressed and ignored freedom
of speech. This article seeks to highlight the important contribution of female artists
in Moroccan visual arts. In this respect, it deals with the access of women to the
visual art, the successive groups of female artists since the independence of the
country in 1956, and the challenges that these artists have been facing. However,
this article neither claims to provide a comprehensive anthological study of female
artists in Morocco nor does it aim at outlining an aesthetic or art history. Rather, it
discusses the artistic experiences of some artists, whom I believe to be
representatives of some historical era or artistic trend. Moreover, it tries to put these
artists into a cultural and historical framework to contextualize their artistic
production.

Creative Yearning in the Harem

In the Arab Muslim worlds, women were historically associated with the
privacy of the harem. 1 More for cultural than religious considerations, women were
1

The separate part of a Muslim household reserved for wives, daughters, sisters and female
servants, etc.
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compelled to spend their lives secluded within the protective walls of the harem.
Regardless of their family positions (wives, daughters, mothers, or servants), they
had to perform household duties that often seemed like drudgery. However, despite
their Sisyphean housework, they managed to transcend their restricted lives by
indulging in more refined artistic productions. They took refuge in some artistic
activities that allowed them (figuratively) to go beyond the walls of the harem and
enjoy freedom. Habiba, in Fatima Mernissi’s autobiographical book Women’s
Dreams, expresses this yearning for freedom in 1940s:
Aunt Habiba was certain that each of us had in herself a kind of magic,
hidden in her most intimate dreams. "When you're imprisoned, without
defense, behind the walls, stuck in a harem, she said, you dream of
escape." … Liberation begins when the images are a dance in your head
and you start to translate them into words. The words don't cost
anything!" She kept telling us that we all had this inner power. (Mernissi,
1997, pp. 147-148)

Figure 1. Samir El Azhar's photograph of Lalla Essaydi: “Harem #14,” used by
permission from the Museum Mohamed VI of Modern and Contemporary Art.
When they finished their tedious work, they indulged in some activities that were
believed to be far more positive in nature and often more agreeable to do because
they were - according to those women who have written about these experiences a source of revelation and creation. In a mystical way, they focused their creation
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on embroidery patterns, henna 2 shapes, silk decorations on caftans 3 and sherbils, 4
and carpet (rug) designs. These creative works enabled them to escape the rigid
social code that imprisoned them within confined walls. They created their own
symbols and motifs that transcended their limited space. In Women’s Dreams,
Fatima Mernissi (1997) highlights this point:
That day Aunt Habiba was trying to embroider a green bird with wings of
gold. This kind of bird, aggressively spreading its wings, was not part of
classical designs. … Of course, birds existed in traditional embroidery
designs, but they were tiny, and often completely paralyzed, stuck between
giant plants and large bushy flowers. Because of Lalla Mani, Aunt Habiba
always embroidered classical patterns when she was in the yard, and kept
for herself her bird with wings deployed, in the privacy of her chamber.
(pp. 193-194)
In the first half of the 20th century Morocco witnessed important social changes
that shaped its future. One major leap towards the future was allowing girls to
pursue secondary and university education. Young girls were formerly allowed to
go to primary school but had to leave school as soon as they got their elementary
certificate. In the 1930s, leaders of the Nationalist Movement, 5 who were religious
scholars in the University of Al Quaraouiyine, 6 allowed their daughters to leave the
harem for high school. This brought about dress changes that allowed young girls
to walk easily in the street. About this change, Fatima Mernissi (1997) wrote,
My mother also wanted to replace the traditional haik of women
by the djellaba, the male mantle, which many women of
nationalists had adopted. The haik was made of seven meters of
heavy white cotton in which her body was enveloped. … When
the nationalists started to send their daughters to school, they also
2 Henna is a plant that has been used since antiquity to dye skin, hair, and fingernails, as
well as fabrics including silk, wool, and leather.
3 Caftan is a loose female garment that can be made of wool, cashmere, silk, or cotton, and
may be worn with a sash. The word is ultimately from old Turkish "kap ton," meaning
"covering garment."
4 Sherbils are female shoes of Andalusian origin that are embroidered with silk and gold
threads to fit the rest of women garments.
5 The Istiqlal (Independence) Party, which provided most of the leadership for the
nationalist movement, released in 1944 a manifesto demanding full independence, national
reunification, and a democratic constitution. King Muhammad V (1927–1961) had
approved the manifesto before its submission to the French authorities, who answered that
no basic change in the protectorate status was being considered. The Nationalist Movement
continued its political and military struggle until Morocco gained its independence in 1956.
6 University Al Quaraouiyine is the oldest university in the world. It was founded by
Fatima Al-Fihria in 859. It became one of the leading spiritual and educational centers of
the historic Muslim world. It was incorporated into Morocco's modern state university
system in 1963.
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allowed them to wear a djellaba, much lighter and convenient
than the haik in order to do four times a day the journey from
home to school. The girls therefore wore djellabas of men and,
soon, their mothers imitated them. (pp. 153-154)
Another step of equal importance was late King Mohamed V’s decision to allow
girls to study at Al Quaraouiyine University in 1948. This opened the doors of
modernity to Moroccan women and paved the way for an era that called for gender
equality. King Mohamed V made another symbolic act to show Moroccans his firm
support of the education of women. He sent his daughter Lalla Aicha, wearing
modern Western clothes, to deliver an important political speech in Tangier in 1947.
In Shahrazad is not Moroccan, Fatima Mernissi, the Moroccan sociologist, argues
that the decades of the 30s, 40s, and 50s in the 20th century brought about enormous
achievements that changed completely the ideological and economic structure of
society, particularly regarding outer places, especially important places: the school
(as a place of knowledge) and the labor market (as an economic location) (Mernissi,
2010, pp. 72-73).
These first steps towards modernization initiated a process of struggling for
equality in social, economic, judicial, and political domains. Women played a
crucial role in building a modern society based on the ideal of equality of
opportunities between the genders. According to scholar Moulim El Aroussi,
Moroccan women made major contributions in building a free and modern Morocco
(El Aroussi, 2017, p. 185). Thus, women have become active members of modern
Moroccan society. Their presence in both the public and private sectors is striking.
They do widely varied jobs: teachers; university professors; deans and presidents
of universities; doctors; engineers; CEOs of companies; bus, taxi, and tram drivers;
policewomen; judges and lawyers; and members of parliament and government, to
name only a few. It is not surprising then to see the strong presence of women in
the artistic world as a logical outcome of their struggle to win their place in the
public sphere which was, until the mid-1900s, the domain of men.

From Utilitarian Production to Artistic Culture

Throughout Morocco’s history, Moroccan women have preserved a rich,
tangible cultural heritage. They have woven carpets (rugs), embroidered silk and
cotton fabric, decorated pottery and leather products, manufactured jewelry,
embellished the skin with tattoos and henna designs, and designed and embellished
clothes. For women who had mastered these skills and techniques, the transition
from the creation of utilitarian material culture to producing artwork was relatively
easy and smooth. Instead of working on objects for everyday use, they created
works for artistic contemplation. From mere women performing ephemeral
utilitarian activities, they became artists who produced inspirational works of art.
Some Moroccan women artists have turned traditional symbols, colors, and
forms into aesthetic productions that reveal the depth of human experiences. In this
respect, Rita El Khayat (2011) argues that “[a]n artist learns and masters an art and,
for this, he or she is creative. He or she is close to the craftsman because he or she
makes material objects, but unlike the latter, most of his or her work is to create

Samir El Azhar 69

works that constitute new sources of emotion and reflection” (p. 17). In this sense,
women, as artists, started to produce art (in the fullest sense of the word) when they
created artworks intended for aesthetic enjoyment in and of themselves. According
to Moulim El Aroussi, the transition of painting from a traditional craft industry to
modern artistic production has relied on objects produced by both women and men.
Woodwork, plaster, mosaics, and metal were traditionally made by men while quite
a number of products and handicrafts were produced by women. For example, in
fabric, leather, embroidery, and sewing, women played a significant role that in
many cases exceeded that of men (El Aroussi, 2017, p. 184).
Out of this social, political, and cultural context the first women artists
emerged. In the 1960s, women rarely engaged in artistic pursuits. Not well
acquainted with art culture, only a handful of women used visual art to express
themselves professionally. According to Farid Zahi (2007), a Moroccan art critic,
these pioneers were either wives of painters (Fatima Hassan), mothers of painters
(Chabia, the mother of the painter Talal or Radia, the mother of the painter Miloud),
or daughters of painters (Fatima El Ouardiri). Other pioneers were in one way or
another in contact with European culture and were encouraged by Europeans to use
the brush, paint, and the table easel, which was a quite new experience for women
used to producing utilitarian crafts in the domestic sphere. 7 A prominent figure of
this period is Meriem Meziane.
Meriem Meziane was born in 1930 in Mellilia, a city in the north of Morocco
that is still colonized by Spain. 8 She attended the elementary school in Larache, a
small Atlantic town in the north of Morocco. With her father, an officer in the
Spanish army, she migrated to Spain. She held her first exhibition in 1953 in
Malaga. She then entered the school of fine arts of San Fernando in Madrid. In 1959,
she received a degree that allowed her to teach visual art. She organized numerous
exhibitions in Morocco, Tunisia, Spain, France, the United States, and Canada. She
passed away in Casablanca on March 29, 2009.
Although Meriem Meziane spent a long period of her life in Spain, she never
forgot her native country, which was omnipresent in her paintings. She borrowed
her subjects, colors, and forms from her home in the Rif Mountains. She was
inspired by the beauty of the landscape, and the generosity of the people and their
ancestral traditions. She painted Moroccans, especially Moroccan women,
performing social, ritual, and festive activities. Mohamed Adib Slaoui believes that
her realistic paintings were concerned with Amazigh (Berber), Saharan, Fassi, and
Tetouani women with their costumes, jewelry, and social traditions, which granted
her works a special ethnographic and cultural vision (Adib Slaoui, 2012, p. 54).
For more information, please, see, Samir El Azhar, Visual Arts in the Kingdom of
Morocco, a book-review:
http://www.thirdtext.org/domains/thirdtext.com/local/media/images/medium/Azhar___Visu
al_Art_in_Morocco.pdf
8 Morocco was colonized by two colonial powers: Spain in the north and south of the
country and France in central Morocco. In 1956, Morocco gained independence from
France and Spain but two cities in the north, Ceuta and Mellilia, are still under Spanish
rule.
7
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Figure 2. Samir El Azhar's photograph of Meriem Meziane: without a title, 1950,
by permission from the Museum Mohamed VI of Modern and Contemporary Art.
Another pioneer is Chems Eddoha Ataa Allah who was the first Moroccan
female artist to graduate from a Moroccan School “des Beaux Arts” in Tetouan in
1960. In the same year, she organized her first exhibition. Following the Agadir
earthquake in February 1960, which destroyed the whole city killing 15,000 and
injuring more than 25,000, she generously offered to donate the profits from sales
of her paintings to the victims of this earthquake. Since then, she has devoted her
art to helping some associations such as those of cancer and brain surgery who need
financial support (Ezzakari, 2016).
Chems Eddoha paints Moroccan faces and portraits with a special interest in
Moroccan women, Moroccan weddings, women working in the countryside and
their hard everyday life, etc. She has organized exhibitions in Morocco and abroad.
About her artistic beginnings, she stated,
… at the beginning of independence women were not allowed to practice
any artistic activity. Art was believed to be dishonorable and disrespectful
to traditions. … Many believed that women had to stay at home and raise
children. But I joined the field of art, thanks to my mother, Malika El
Merini, an open-minded woman who believed in change and had
revolutionary ideas … After Morocco got its independence in 1956…
there were many education opportunities for Moroccan women to fill in
the gap left by the colonial administration. I was among the students who
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benefited from this situation as I did a training of six months to get a job
in education. Afterwards, I joined the Tetouan school of “des Beaux Arts”
as the first Moroccan woman, in 1957. (Ezzakari, 2016)

Figure 3. Samir El Azhar's photograph of a poster advertising Chems Eddoha Ataa
Allah’s exhibition in Rabat; June 4-30, 2015.
Both Meriem Meziane and Chems Eddoha Ataa Allah belonged to the group of
female artistic pioneers that included Fatima Hassan, Chaibia Talal, Malika
Agueznay, and Latifa Tijani. Chronologically, the second generation of Moroccan
female painters includes the following artists: Khadija Tanana, Noufissa
Benjalloun, Benhila Regraguia, Fouzia Guessouss, Nadia Boulaich, and Najat Al
Khatib, to name only a few. The third generation is comprised of the following
names: Ikram Al Kabaj, Reem Al Laabi, Nawal Sakkat, Mahacine Al Ahrach,
Maryam Al Alj, Asmae Alamy, Kenza Benjalloun, Mounat Charrat, and many
others.
To discuss the artistic experiences of these female artists, I have thought it
convenient to classify these generations into four distinct groups: naïve painters,
secondary career artists, those who have received an academic artistic education,
and those who have rebelled against formal scholastic artistic conventions.
Naïve art, a controversial term due to its negative connotations, has been
described as simple, unaffected, and unsophisticated art made by artists who have
had no formal training in an art school or academy. In addition to this, naïve works,
according to Encyclopaedia Britanica, “are often extremely detailed, and there is a
tendency toward the use of brilliant, saturated colours rather than more subtle
mixtures and tones. There is also a characteristic absence of perspective, which
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creates the illusion that figures are anchored in the space, with the result that figures
in naïve paintings are often ‘floating’” (Rimsa, 2008, p. 1). Among the naïve artists
are Chaibia Talal, Fatima Hassan, Benhila Regraguia, Fatima Najm, Fatima Al
Bakouri, and Kenza Al Mukdassni. To deal with the major characteristics of this
trend, I have chosen Chaibia Talal as a representative of this group because, I
believe, any discussion of naïve art in Morocco without a reference to Chaibia Talal
would be shallow and superficial.
Chaibia Talal was unquestionably the most famous Moroccan painter of the
20th century. She is the only Moroccan painter whose works are listed on the stock
exchange. Her paintings can sell for more than $100,000. Born in 1929 in a village
near El Jadida, a coastal town on the Atlantic, Chaibia’s childhood was cut short by
an early marriage when she was 13 years old. At the age of 15, the young woman
was already a widow and mother of a child. To make a living, she worked as a
housemaid in several French households. She experienced harsh living conditions
to raise her child. When Fatima Mernissi interviewed her in 1985 and asked her
how she earned her living before she discovered painting, Chaibia answered, “What
do you want me to do? What can an illiterate woman like myself do? I cleaned,
washed and swept houses. I did what I had to do earnestly. But I had a feeling that
I had to go somewhere and put an end to all that” (Mernissi, 2010, p. 113). Her son,
Al Houssine Talal, left Morocco for France where he studied visual art. He returned
to Morocco and became a painter.
Two important events changed Chaibia’s life. According to her, in 1963, when
she was 25 years old, she had a dream: someone offered her some paint, papers, and
brushes and asked her to paint. Another event that was a turning point in her life
was her encounter with Pierre Gaudibert, the French art curator and critic. Her son,
Al Houssine Talal, invited Pierre Gaudibert, to have lunch at home to show him
some of his paintings. Chaibia told the French critic that she also painted. When he
saw her drawings and paintings, he was more interested in her works than in those
of her son (Al Muntassir, 2016, pp. 58-59).
From 1966 until her death, Chaibia exhibited in Paris, Copenhagen, Ibiza,
Rotterdam, New York, Tokyo, and many other capitals. In 2003, she was awarded
a Gold Medal from the French Academic Society for Education and
Encouragement. She died in Casablanca in 2004 at the age of 75 years.
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Figure 4. Samir El Azhar's photograph of Chaibia Talal: “Fishermen,” 1979, used
by permission from the Museum Mohamed VI of Modern and Contemporary Art.
Chaibia Talal was inspired by her childhood and her rural environment,
creating daring, innocent, and childlike paintings. Her work is characterized by the
use of colors in their original state. Her sincerity, boldness, and spontaneity earned
her the appreciation and respect of the leader of the Cobra movement, 9 Pierre
Alechinsky, international critics, and even heads of states. To quote Lahsen
Bougdal,
Chaibia Talal, this “paysante des arts” as nicknamed by the sociologist
Fatima Mernissi, is probably the one that managed to give her letters of
nobility to this raw art. Her spontaneity combined with her simplicity
gratified us with compositions where the power of graphism and the
harmony of the fresh colours forced the admiration of many specialists
around the world. Brilliant and recognized, the painting of these three
pioneers [Radia Bent Al Hussein, Fatima Hassan Al Farouj and Chaibia],
established itself in a male environment where it was hard to exist.
(Bougdal, 2016, p. 15)
The second group is that of secondary career artists. Unlike the first group
whose members have not received any schooling, secondary career artists are
9

The Cobra movement was a European avant-garde movement that believed in spontaneity
and drew their inspiration in particular from children’s drawings and from primitive art
forms.
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cultivated women who have worked either as doctors, architects, civil servants, etc.,
but have left their jobs and become artists. This group comprises Aicha Ahardan,
Aziza Jamal, Laila Cherkawi, Rajaa Al Atlassi, Noufissa Benjalloun, Nadia
Khayali, Jamila Al Araychi, Asmae Alamy, Fatiha Tahiri, etc. These painters did
not have any formal art education. Of different ages and horizons, they started
painting and improved themselves throughout their careers by attending art training,
workshops, and Biennales. According to Moulim El Aroussi, most female painters
in the early post-colonial period did not attend any art schools. With the exception
of Meriem Meziane and Malika Agueznay, there were no female painters with
academic art education (El Aroussi, 2017, p. 186). As an example of this set, I have
selected the experience of Rajae Al Atlassi.
Rajae Al Atlassi was born in 1965 in Casablanca. After university studies in
French literature, she had created theatrical sets before she moved to painting. She
was spotted at an exhibition titled "Screens of Contemporary Artists” organized by
the collector and gallery owner Daniel Couturier, at Forney Library in Paris. She
exhibited in Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, Netherlands and France.

Figure 5. Rajae Al Atlassi: “Lumières d’automne,” 2012. [digital image]
Retrieved from https://darzampa.wordpress.com/2012/10/28/lumieres-dautomnelexposition-de-la-rentree-au-musee-de-la-palmeraie/
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The path undertaken by Rajae Al Atlassi in Moroccan visual art is remarkable.
With literary education, she embarked on an artistic career. In her paintings, women
are a recurring and iconic theme, in the guise of enigmatic and closed faces. The
huge chunks of bright colors and the discontinuous and unpredictable movements
alongside the traditional caftans overlays are reinterpreted with mastery; mystery of
life, in this colorful bubbling of swirls, strips, circles, and stars (Benqassem, 2010,
p. 38). She also uses Arabic calligraphy in her paintings.
The third group includes an array of artists that had a formal academic artistic
education either in Morocco or abroad. This group includes Mahacine Al Ahrash,
Ahlam Lemssefer, Laila Sherkaoui, Jamila Al Arayshi, Maryam Al Alj, Amina
Benboushta, Malika Agueznay, Maryam Asharaibi, Asmae Alamy, Nawal Assakat,
Nadia Khayali, Halima Hadoush, Aziza Jamal, Saadia Pirou, Maryam Belmkadem,
Fouzia Guessouss, Fatima Al Alaoui, and many others. These artists paint according
to the scientific rules and academic techniques they acquired at art schools. Malika
Agueznay highlights the experiences of artists who have received academic artistic
schooling.

Figure 6. Samir El Azhar's photograph of Malika Agueznay: “Regard,” 2013,
used by permission from the Museum Mohamed VI of Modern and Contemporary
Art.
Malika Agueznay was born in Marrakech. She had studied sociology before
she entered the “Ecole des Beaux Arts” of Casablanca from which she graduated in
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1970. In 1978, she was invited to the International Festival of Assilah, where she
learned the art of engraving, encountering printmakers and professors such as
Mohamed Omar Khalil and Robert Blackburn. From there, she traveled to New
York to study engraving in the workshop of Mohamed Omar Khalil and Robert
Blackburn. She also attended the "Counterpoint" workshop in Paris conducted by
the artists Hector Saunier and Juan Valladores (Chaouat, 2017, p. 2).
Malika Agueznay was a member of the “Casablanca Movement” (Chaouat,
2017, p. 3). 10 She uses blue color in her paintings to evoke the blue of the sky, the
blue of the sea, and the blue of the eyes of women. For her, colors are full of life
and meaning. They take different forms and shapes and thus acquire different
significance. Her paintings feature intricate interweaving and overlapping organic
forms which she calls “algae,” meaning seaweed. “Her work is often abstract,
sometimes representational, but always full of movement” (The Culture Mobile,
2010, p. 1). Throughout her career, she has developed an original aesthetic by
exploring new techniques in painting as well as in engraving. By using two media,
she seeks to express different facets of her sensitiveness. When asked about what
kind of mission a female artist has, she answered,
Being a female artist is not a simple thing. … art requires a deep
investment of oneself, a large concentration. The mission is to convey,
bequeath and share with others one’s knowledge, one’s experience. To this
end, one has to be truthful, believing in what one does and leaves traces.
(Chaouat, 2017, p. 3)
Female artists who rebel against artistic academic techniques define the fourth
group. This group includes Ikram Al Kabbaj, Kenza Benjelloun, Reem Alaabi,
Mounat Acharrat, Fatiha Tahiri, and many others. In the 1990s, another era began:
a new king (Mohamed VI), a new family code (Al Mudawana), a new concept of
power (more freedom of expression), new technologies (computer and internet),
and new means of communication (social media). Like in other sectors of life, artists
in general and female artists in particular responded to these changes and adopted
new ways to express themselves. Hence, a new trend named “contemporary art”
emerged.
About her artistic experience, she states: “I attended the school of des Beaux Arts in
Casablanca during the years 1966-70. It was the "Moroccan Bauhaus", where the birth of
the "movement of Casablanca" took place: contemporary orientation of art directed towards
observation, research and innovation. … The training of students was not only academic
but oriented to the exploration, research, creativity, and the inspiration from our cultural
heritage of a great diversity and wealth. This strengthened our action and our legitimacy in
abstraction, geometric shapes, the notion of the essence of this contemporary art (very rich
heritage such as arabesque forms, calligraphy, colour, material, carpets, embroidery,
ceilings of the South painted with plant colours, brass, skin, tattoos etc...). All this is a great
source of inspiration and continuity in the search for our identity in universal art.”
Interview with Malika Agueznay in Visages du Maroc,
http://visagedumaroc.org/visage/malika-agueznay/. (Accessed October 24, 2017).
Translation the author.
10
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Diverse and eclectic, contemporary art is a rebellion against the academic
techniques of the third group. It is an art that requires “a dynamic combination of
materials, methods, concepts, and subjects that challenge traditional boundaries and
defy easy definition” (Silka, 2016, p. 6). It is much more socially conscious than
any previous era in art has been and is increasingly global and diverse in its themes.
“In its most basic sense, the term contemporary art refers to art—namely, painting,
sculpture, photography, installation, performance, and video art—
produced today. Though seemingly simple, the details surrounding this definition
are often a bit fuzzy, as different individuals' interpretations of ‘today’ may widely
and wildly vary” (Kelly Richman-Abdou, 2019, p. 2). When asked to define
contemporary art, Professor Terry Smith, author of What Is Contemporary
Art? (2009), answered: “it is a bit like trying to describe time: we all know what it
is, and that we are in it, but we find it hard to say what it is” (Jackson, 2019, p.7).
Visitors to contemporary art institutions, he added,
would notice that there are fewer paintings and sculptures than in the
“modern” rooms. Instead, there are many texts, videos, photo series,
installations, performances, and objects that don’t look like art at all. Yet
these are only the tip of the iceberg. Most contemporary art is being made
outside of museums, in public spaces, for temporary exhibitions such as
biennials, or is being shown online. (Jackson, 2019, p. 7)
Contemporary art marks a break with modern art. It is a rebellion against the spatial
frontiers. While modern art is related to indoor spaces, contemporary art is related
to outdoor spaces. In essence, modern artists create their works in their work-places
and display them in galleries and museums. Many contemporary artists, however,
create their artistic works in factories, streets and markets and exhibit them in open
public spaces (El Aroussi, 2017, p. 207).
In Morocco, a new group of contemporary male and female artists emerged
between 1990 and 2013. They were brought together by their sharp criticism of
political and social institutions. For instance, Hassan Eddarssi devoted his energy
to drawing people and the authorities’ attentions to taking care of one of the
Kingdom’s ancient zoos. Fouzi Laatiriss was interested in the social and intellectual
environment from an anthropological standpoint. With the rise of conservatism and
the risk of suppressing individual freedoms, Kenza Benjelloun devoted all her
works to advocating for greater freedoms (El Azhar, 2016, p. 5).
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Figure 7. Samir El Azhar's photograph of Kenza Benjelloun: "La liberte guidant la
femme," 2015, used by permission from the Museum Mohamed VI of Modern and
Contemporary Art.
Kenza Benjelloun is indeed a good example to illustrate this contemporary
tendency that abolishes spatial as well as artistic frontiers. Born in 1966 in
Casablanca, Kenza Benjelloun graduated from the Ecole des Beaux Arts of
Casablanca in 1992 and from the Ecole des Beaux Arts of Aix-en-Provence, France,
in 1995. She organized her first exhibition in 2000, the year she was awarded the
second prize of Pensar con las manos organized by the Cervantes Institute of
Casablanca. Since then, she has organized several exhibitions in Morocco, France,
Spain, Italy, and the United States.
After the Arab Spring, the growth of fundamentalism and the expansion of
radicalism, Kenza Benjelloun has devoted her art to advocating human rights in
general and particularly to freedom of expression and women’s rights which seemed
to be threatened with the rise to power of conservative movements and parties. She
therefore criticizes polygamy, sexual harassment, sexual abuse, teenage marriage,
and any forms of social injustice to which women are still subjected.
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Figure 8. Samir El Azhar's photograph of Kenza Benjelloun: "Le Cadi de la
Moudouana," 2015, used by permission from the Museum Mohamed VI of
Modern and Contemporary Art.
In her last exhibition, Le Cadi de la Moudouana, Kenza Benjelloun tackled
these social issues in a satirical way. The title of this exhibition was highly
symbolic. She has used the Arabic word “Cadi” as a pun. The word “Caddy” in
French means a trolley of a supermarket and in Arabic the word “cadi” means a
judge. Because the issue motivating the work is teenage marriage, she criticizes the
new family code (Al Mudawana) that gives the judge the right to accept such a
marriage. He is considered the only authority empowered to permit or deny this
marriage. When he consents to such a marriage, the “cadi,” judge, according to her,
becomes a “caddy,” a trolley that delivers fresh meat as it is seen in her artistic
work.
Le Cadi de la Moudouana is a multidimensional and innovative event that
includes digital creations, installations, performances, and videos. This exhibition
reveals an artist who, faithful to her artistic conviction, deliberately opts for an art
of protest. Her social criticism of the status of women in Moroccan society focuses
on the female body. She represents how this female body is seen by men and also
by laws, traditions, and social representations. She satirizes and ridicules the
attitudes and social representations of this patriarchal society.
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Challenges

The status of women has evolved since the beginning of the 20th century.
Social, legal, economic, and cultural changes have occurred, allowing women to
play active roles in society. The 2011 Constitution explicitly calls for gender
equality: “The man and the woman enjoy, in equality, the rights and freedoms of
civil, political, economic, social, cultural and environmental character, enounced in
this Title and in the other provisions of the Constitution. … The State works for the
realization of parity between men and women” (Morocco’s Constitution of 2011,
2011, p. 8). The implementation of this gender equality is, however, very slow,
especially in the artistic world.
Female artists struggle to become artists, to work as artists, to exhibit their
work, and to assert themselves in the art scene. They face many challenges that
hinder their creativity or even compel some to leave art. 11 With an experience of
more than 50 years, Shems Adha Ataa Allah, the first Moroccan woman to graduate
from a Moroccan School of des Beaux Arts in Tetouan in 1960, believes that she
did not get the recognition she deserves. She blames the media, art galleries, and art
critics who devote more attention and space to male than to female artists. She was
obliged to stop her artistic career for some time because of family responsibilities.
In this respect, she stated,
I have decided to go back to painting which I had left because of my family
… [A]fter the death of my husband and the social stability of my three
sons, I began to spend more time in my studio at home and take care of my
garden … I don't care about fame as much as I care about satisfying a
psychological desire to reconcile myself with my talent and my work that
I learned more than 50 years ago in the School of “des Beaux Arts” in
Tetouan. (Ezzakaki, 2016, p. 3)
Amina Ben Bouchta, another Moroccan female artist, believes that parity has not
yet been achieved in the Moroccan art scene. When interviewed about the obstacles
she faces, she answered,
… If you analyze how much people are ready to invest, you will find that
they are ready to invest a great deal of money on male artists. Many
wonderful talented women are completely forgotten from the art scene
because the world market is really hard. … They face difficult choices of
family life. To be an artist means a full time job so it is difficult to handle
a family at the same time. I was personally unable to attend a lot of
residencies and to get awards because I have a family that I have to take
care of. … Moroccan female artists need to go out of Morocco in order to
study, to see museums, and to attend residencies, which is not easy for the

In the academic year 2016-2017, I conducted a seminar on “Art Galleries in Morocco”
and I asked my B.A. students to interview some female artists about challenges. The
subsequent quotes are part of this assignment.
11

Samir El Azhar 81

young artists who very often do not have the means for that. (Amina Ben
Bouchta interviewed by Mouna Bazzi on May 9, 2017)
Reem Battal, another Moroccan artist, shares her colleagues’ point of view and
refers to other issues such as sexual harassment and daily sexism:
I do not think Moroccan female artists get equal credit as men in the art
world but it is not something specific to the art world. It is a general thing
that women suffer from and if you happen to be an artist and a woman, of
course you are not heard the same way. Women have many barriers to
overcome such as ordinary sexism and harassment. Moreover, there are
three main obstacles that Moroccan female artists face in the field: social
pressure, sexual harassment and daily sexism. (Reem Battal interviewed
by Mouna Bazzi on May 18, 2017)
Although Amina Charrat shares the same ideas with our two aforementioned
artists, she believes that she was lucky. Her father was a lawyer and was fond of
painting. He encouraged her despite his worries about her future on the grounds that
one cannot make a living from art. She believes,
Like in other fields, we have some challenges. We do not have a law that
really protects us. Also in terms of prices, the price of a man’s work is
higher than that of a woman. Same thing is true for exhibitions. Men
dominate exhibitions more than women. I have also noticed that female
artists are not free to express their thoughts and ideas because we are
conservative and we exist in men’s society. …Discrimination exists but it
is not shown. It is always hidden. People think that art world is men’s
world that is why they invest their money in male artists more than in
females. (Amina Charrat interviewed by Mouna Bazzi on May 12, 2017)
On the other hand, Kenza Benjelloun points out that artists, whether women or
men, face the same challenges. When I asked her about the kinds of difficulties
Moroccan female artists face and about their relationships with art galleries, she
answered:
Personally, I have not had any problem in this regard. What bothers me
sometimes is to display women just for the sake to encourage female
creation as if creation were a matter of women or men. … I have never had
any problems with galleries. If there is any problem, it is not because I’m
a woman but because of my opinions in my current exhibitions
(installations, video, performance...) that are a little too frontal. "Le Cadi
de la Moudouana" is an eloquent example. No Gallery has agreed to
display it with the exception of the Museum of Mohamed VI at the
exhibition Moroccan Female Artists of Modernity curated by Reem Laabi.
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Galleries try to sell. They do not care about sex or gender. (Kenza
Benjelloun interviewed by Samir El Azhar on November 5, 2017)
The Museum Mohamed VI of Modern and Contemporary Art (MMVI) hosted, from
November 23, 2016 to March 8, 2017, the exhibition Moroccan Female Artists of
Modernity, 2016-1960. To pay tribute to Moroccan female artists, the MMVI
displayed more than 100 works of 26 women artists. This event, unprecedented in
the MMVI, raised issues of integration and the contribution of Moroccan women
artists in the history of art by offering a space for reflection on this plastic creation.
To quote Reem Laabi, curator of this exhibition,
It is an exhibition that explores a specific attitude in the history of art, in
this case, a distinct modernity of Moroccan women artists. In fact, they are
modern because they have a view of the plural Morocco and the world. It
is a voluntary choice and finally a way to look, to feel and to act …. (Laabi,
2016, p. 8)
I have found it necessary to quote at some length these artists to objectively
report their struggle to overcome prejudices, correct misconceptions, and transgress
taboos. Thanks to their sacrifice and perseverance, they have succeeded in asserting
themselves in the art scene and have thus contributed in the richness and diversity
of visual arts in Morocco. Soumaya Naamane (2016), the Moroccan sociologist and
writer, believes that Moroccan female artists,
have released the female imagination and freed feminine body, portrayed
with a chaste sensuality. Wise transgressors, they have overcome taboos,
celebrating love, romance, sensuality, eroticism, sometimes with poetry,
tenderness, sweetness and passion, sometimes with anger and severity. All
the women's work is a giant fresco, which captures the history and
evolution of our culture. (p. 27)
This article provides a glimpse of the contribution of female artists in Moroccan
visual arts over the last 60 years. Talented, motivated, and dedicated, they have
devoted their time and energy to representing, from their perspective, Moroccan
social and cultural realities through their paintings. To avoid any exclusive
interpretation, it is important to note that Moroccan artistic production is
characterized by its diversity in techniques, trends, and contents. The Moroccan art
scene includes, regardless of their gender, artists of different political convictions,
plastic genres, and artistic movements, which has made Moroccan artistic
experience rich and varied. Art is a human experience that transcends the limiting
considerations of gender and frontiers.
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“Your Chance to Make Your Voice Heard”:
Akaliyat Magazine and the Creation of a Queer
Community in Morocco
Benjamin Ale-Ebrahim
Abstract

Publicly claiming an LGBTQ identity in Morocco can place a young
person under the threat of violence, both on the part of the state, which
criminalizes homosexuality under Article 489 of the Penal Code, and from
actors within Moroccan society who wish to uphold a heteronormative
conception of Moroccan national identity. The internet, with its potential
for anonymous communication, serves as a relatively free and safe space
for young queer Moroccans to explore their sexuality and gender identity.
Akaliyat Magazine, an internet-based publication founded in 2015, serves
as one of the only Arabic-language media outlets in Morocco that focuses
on providing a space for queer youth to “express themselves” and to hear
each other’s stories. In this paper, I develop a brief history of Akaliyat
Magazine, drawing on content from the five issues published to date as
well as a 2018 interview I conducted with the magazine’s editor and
founder. Drawing on the work of Mikhail Bakhtin and Richard Bauman to
investigate the question of genre and its orientation to specific
communities and ideologies, I argue that Akaliyat Magazine uses specific
forms of address and genres of writing that work to create a community of
queer youth in Morocco.

Introduction

In this paper, I investigate Akaliyat magazine, an internet-based publication
founded in 2015 that is one of the only Arabic-language media outlets in Morocco
that provides a space for queer youth to express themselves and to hear each other’s
stories. I develop a brief history of Akaliyat magazine, drawing on content from the
five issues published to date as well as a 2018 interview I conducted with the
magazine’s editor and founder. I argue that Akaliyat magazine uses specific forms
of address and genres of writing that work to create a community of queer youth in
Morocco. I draw on the work of Mikhail Bakhtin (1994), Karin Barber (1997), and
Richard Bauman (2004) to investigate the question of genre and its orientation to
specific communities and ideologies. I also discuss what types of discourse Akaliyat
employs to address its audience: are they addressed as Moroccan national subjects?
As religious or irreligious individuals? As minorities living in a hostile
environment? As oppressed people in need of liberation? I argue that Akaliyat
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invites its readers to think of themselves as a community of listeners to each other’s
stories, a community held together by public intimacy and affective ties of
belonging (Kunreuther, 2010). By providing a space that affirms queer sexualities
and gender identities, encourages debate about controversial topics such as politics
and religion, and - most importantly - invites its readers to listen to each other’s
stories, Akaliyat serves a critical role in the creation of queer community in
Morocco.

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

In his discussion of the many different types of discourse present in the novel,
Russian literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin provides a useful analytic for
understanding how people use language in conversation with others. He presents
his readers with the concept of “double-voiced discourse,” defined as language that
is “directed both toward the referential object of the speech, as in ordinary
discourse, and toward another’s discourse, toward someone else’s speech”
(Bakhtin, 1994, p. 105, italics in original). Double-voiced discourse exists in
anticipation of its reception by an audience; it is spoken with the understanding that
it will be heard by others. This consciousness of the presence of an audience
determines which words a speaker will choose to use and how they will choose to
present them, or, to use Bakhtin’s (1994) words, “the individual manner in which a
person structures his own speech is determined to a significant degree by his
peculiar awareness of another’s words, and by his means for reacting to them” (p.
108). Double-voiced discourse speaks to its immediate audience—to the task at
hand—at the same time as it imagines and anticipates a future response—a moment
of audience talk-back. Although Bakhtin was primarily concerned with analyzing
discourse in the analog genre of the novel, I find that this concept is particularly
well-suited to understanding how communication happens in online platforms that
support feedback and dialogue, such as the digitally published magazine that I
discuss below.
Building off the work of Bakhtin and his concept of double-voiced discourse,
Richard Bauman (2004) describes a number of different ethnographic examples
from around the world of “how speakers may align their words to the words of
others” (p. 128), from Irish poets to Fijian spirit mediums to Akan chiefs. He argues
that genres come into being when the “mode[s] of regimenting the circulation of
discourse” become standardized and formalized (Bauman, 2004, p. 158); that is,
when the speaker first imagines a specific and defined audience and then associates
a particular way of speaking as the appropriate way to address that audience. One
must address the appropriate audience using the appropriate linguistic conventions
in order to be understood as a particular kind of speaker, such as a lyrical poet, a
novelist, a radio announcer, or, in this case, a member of the queer community in
Morocco.
Karin Barber (1997) takes a slightly different analytical emphasis in her
discussion of audiences in Africa. Rather than focusing on the choices that a speaker
makes in addressing an imagined and standardized audience, as Bakhtin and
Bauman do, she focuses on the productive nature of speaking in the creation of
audiences, arguing that:
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Performances do not just play to ready-made congregations of spectators
which are out there awaiting address; they convene those congregations
and by their mode of address assign them a certain position from which to
receive the address. Thus performances, in the act of addressing audiences,
constitute those audiences as a particular form of collectivity. (Barber,
1997, pp. 353-354)
In other words, collectively listening to others speak teaches us how to think of
ourselves as an audience. We learn to understand ourselves as a collectivity on the
basis of our use of shared linguistic conventions and our collective status as the
intended audience of a genre. Genres and audiences are co-constitutive of each
other, taking shape in tandem as specific ways of speaking and listening in
relationships formalize over time.
Another way to think about this process is through the analytic of voice and
voicing, as Laura Kunreuther (2010) discusses in her study of youth-focused radio
programs in neoliberalizing Nepal. She argues that these programs encourage their
listeners to use a “direct voice” (p. 335) in speaking about their feelings and intimate
relationships when they call in to these radio shows; that is, they encourage young
people in Nepal to use a voice which expresses agency over one’s feelings and
which indexes a modern, urban, neoliberal self (Kunreuther, 2010, pp. 335-336).
Through continued exposure to the radio programs, and from feedback given by the
show’s host and from other listeners, young people in Nepal begin to adopt the
linguistic features of this direct voice, coming to understand themselves and their
identities in a new way: as neoliberal subjects responsible for the cultivation of
marketable skills and their own individual economic success (Kunreuther, 2010, p.
343).
We can see, then, that the way in which we choose to speak in public affects
how we think of ourselves as individuals and as communities. Our imagination of
an audience that we hope to engage with through the use of standardized genres
does more than orient our speech to an appropriate group of listeners, it actually
works to bring this audience into being, shaping the members of this audience into
a collectivity that starts to think of itself as sharing collective feelings, desires, and
identities. Through continued exposure to certain genres and ways of speaking, we
learn how to think about ourselves in new ways and begin to develop affective ties
with others who are the fellow addressees of these genres. It is this complex, coconstitutive matrix of genre, audience, and voice that I wish to investigate in this
paper, focusing on how Akaliyat magazine uses specific linguistic and rhetorical
features to teach its audience, spread throughout the country of Morocco and
beyond, and how they think of themselves as a cohesive queer community.

Queer Activism in Morocco and in the Broader Arab Context:
Legal Regimes and the Role of Social Media

In order to understand how Akaliyat works to create queer community in
Morocco, we must first understand some of the social and legal background
surrounding LGBTQ activism in the country. According to Article 489 of the
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Moroccan Penal Code, “‘unlawful or unnatural acts with an individual of the same
sex’” are criminalized with the potential for punishment of up to “six months to
three years in prison and a fine of 120 to 1,200 dirhams ($13-130)” (Fanack, 2018).
In recent years, a number of incidents where individuals have been arrested in
accordance with Article 489 have prompted public debate in Morocco, including an
incident in 2004 where over 43 people in the northern city of Tetouan were arrested
and charged with “‘engaging in homosexual activity’” (Fanack, 2018). This
incident sparked the creation of Kif-Kif, an organization founded in 2005 by
Moroccan LGBTQ activists with the goal of advocating on behalf of queer people
living in Morocco. Kif-Kif was prevented from legally registering itself as a
nonprofit organization in Morocco and is currently based in nearby Spain (Fanack,
2018). In April 2010, with funding from the European Union, Kif-Kif launched the
first LGBTQ-focused magazine in Morocco with the publication of Mithly (Arabic
for “homosexual” or, literally, “like me”) (IRBC, 2013). Over 200 print copies of
the magazine were distributed in Morocco in 2010 and an online version was also
published (Pfeiffer & Abdennebi, 2010). Mithly is currently out of print, however,
and appears to have been inactive for some years now. According to Kif-Kif’s
website, the organization has shifted its focus and now works primarily to serve the
needs of LGBTQ immigrants and asylum seekers in Madrid (Kif-Kif, 2018).
Although the U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2012 contends that Article 489 is “‘infrequently enforced’” (IRBC,
2013), queer people continue to be arrested in Morocco, especially in cases where
their sexuality is made public on social media. For example, in 2014 a 69-year-old
British man and his Moroccan partner were arrested by Moroccan police for
violating Article 489. The police used “images on both the men’s phones as
evidence” for their arrest (Fanack, 2018). This case attracted attention from the
British media and Members of Parliament and the British man was allowed to
“return to the UK pending an appeal” while the Moroccan man involved in this case
remained in prison (Fanack, 2018). Later, in 2016, after footage of a brutal
homophobic attack in the city of Beni Mellal went viral on social media in Morocco,
the victims of this attack were arrested and imprisoned before being released 26
days later. Two of the four attackers were sentenced to between “four and six
months in prison” while the other two were released (Fanack, 2018). Also in 2016,
after being filmed kissing each other on a Marrakech rooftop, two Moroccan
teenage girls were arrested under Article 489 and were later acquitted following an
international social media campaign using the hashtag #FreeTheGirls (# طﻠﻘﻮ_ﻟﺒﻨﺎتin
Moroccan Arabic) (Lutkin, 2016; Morgan, 2016). According to Kif-Kif, “more than
5,000 homosexuals, mostly men, have been tried by the courts for violating Article
489” since Moroccan independence in 1956 while statistics from the Moroccan
Ministry of Justice indicate that “there were 81 trials involving charges of
homosexuality in 2011” alone (IRBC, 2013).
Although social media platforms are used to incite the arrest of LGBTQ people
in Morocco, they also serve an important role for LGBTQ activists based in the
country. In addition to Kif-Kif and its now defunct magazine, a number of other
queer-focused organizations have emerged to argue for the decriminalization of
homosexuality in Morocco and to speak out on behalf of LGBTQ Moroccans on
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digital media platforms. For example, the Aswat Collective (2018a) (aswat being
the Arabic term for “voices”) describes itself as an organization founded in order to
lead “the fight against discrimination based on sexuality and gender” (“la lutte
contre la discrimination fondée sur la sexualité et le genre”) . Aswat operates
Facebook and Twitter accounts as well as publishing its own “queer, libertarian
magazine” online (Aswat, 2018). MALI (Mouvement Alternatif pour les Libertés
Individuelles) is another organization based in Morocco that describes itself as a
“universalist, feminist, secular movement of civil disobedience and in defense of
sexual and reproductive rights” (“un mouvement de désobéissance civile,
universaliste, féministe, laïque et de défense des droits sexuels et reproductifs”) that
advocates on behalf of women and LGBTQ people living in Morocco (MALI,
2017). In May 2018, on the International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia,
and Biphobia both of these organizations used their Facebook pages to publish
information in support of queer Moroccans and against Article 489 (Figures 1, 2).

Figure 1. Image from Aswat Collective’s (2018) Facebook page depicting two
young Moroccans holding up handwritten signs saying, “I am not an abomination
(shaadh) or a faggot (luti) / dyke (sehaaqia), I am a homosexual (mithly).”

90 Journal of Global Initiatives

Figure 2. Image shared on MALI’s Facebook page saying “NO to Article 489 of
the Moroccan Penal Code. Homophobia is the crime, not homosexuality.”
Of course, Morocco is not the only Arab-majority country where queer activists
are working to create change. With the exception of Jordan and Iraq, homosexuality
remains criminalized in most Arab countries, with legal institutions either explicitly
banning consensual same-sex activity (as in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) or
using broader morality laws that are consistently interpreted to prohibit same-sex
sexualities (as in Lebanon, Egypt, and Bahrain) (Ghoshal, 2018). While there are
queer activist movements in most Arab countries, movements in Jordan, Tunisia,
and Lebanon have been among the most successful in campaigning for change. For
example, over 10 years ago in Jordan, Khaled Abdel-Hadi worked to found
My.Kali, one of the Arab world’s first LGBT-focused magazines that is still in
publication to this day (Ghoshal, 2018). In addition, in Tunisia, former President
Beji Caid Essebsi recently tasked a government commission, the Individual
Freedoms and Equality Committee, with drafting new recommendations on how to
improve the human rights situation in the country, and among the recommendations
submitted by the commission was the legalization of homosexuality (Fitzsimons,
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2018). Tunisian queer organization Mawjoudin has sponsored the region’s first
queer film festival for the past two years in 2018 and 2019 (Schnall, 2019) while
Association Shams, another queer activist group based in the Tunisian capital,
launched the Arab world’s first LGBTQ-focused radio station in 2017 (Ghanemi,
2017). More recently, Shams’ chairman Mounir Baatour announced a long-shot bid
for Tunisia’s presidency in the 2019 election, campaigning on a platform of
legalizing homosexuality and promoting more expansive individual and civil rights
(Knipp, 2019).
Despite progress being made in places like Jordan and Tunisia, Lebanon, and
more specifically the city of Beirut, remains the Arab world’s queer capital, at least
in terms of its high concentration of queer-friendly social spaces and wellestablished activist organizations. Two of the region’s oldest and most well-known
queer organizations were founded in the Lebanese capital: Helem, founded in 2004,
is a public-facing NGO that was the region’s first “above-ground” LGBT
organization, and Meem, founded in 2007, is a smaller, underground group that
broke away from Helem to focus more on queer women’s issues and the trans
community (Moussawi, 2015). A number of gay-friendly bars, cafés, and beaches
exist in Beirut that, according to anthropologist Sofian Merabet (2014), do not
exactly allow for the formation of a cohesive “gay community”–since many
Lebanese queer people deny such a thing exists–but rather allow for the existence
of a “homosexual sphere,” “a realm that consists primarily of gendered as well as
sexual symbols in relation to which queer space is perpetually produced” (p. 112).
Helem and Meem, along with Beirut’s gay bars, cafés, and mediated spaces like the
dating app GayRomeo (Gagné, 2012) make up the “homosexual sphere” in which
queer Lebanese individuals shape their identities and form social connections with
each other. Beirut’s comparatively robust queer social infrastructure serves as a
useful comparative lens through which we can better understand Akaliyat in
Morocco.

Genre, Audience, and Voice in Akaliyat Magazine

With this social, political, and regional context in mind, let us turn our attention
to Akaliyat. Founded in 2015 by a single activist with the goal of “releasing a free
electronic magazine concerned with the affairs of sexual and religious minorities
[aqaliyat jinsiya wa diniya] in Morocco, North Africa, and the Middle East,”
Akaliyat is an LGBTQ-focused organization based in Morocco that began as a
magazine (majalla), became a “collective” (majmu’a) and now describes itself as
an “association” (jam’ia) (Akaliyat, 2018). 1 Akaliyat maintains a Facebook page
and a YouTube channel as well its own website (www.akaliyatmag.org) where it
publishes Akaliyat magazine in free downloadable PDF format. 2 It is clear from our
discussion above that Akaliyat is not alone in advocating for the rights of queer
1 For the rest of this paper, I distinguish between Akaliyat magazine (in italics) and Akaliyat
the organization (unitalicized).
2 Due to financial constraints, Akaliyat’s website, where they publish Akaliyat magazine, is
only intermittently active. At the time of publication, Akaliyat’s website is inactive.
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Moroccans nor is it unique in using the internet and social media to do so; what
makes it stand out is its emphasis on inviting its readers to think of themselves as a
community of people held together by certain narratives, framing both LGBTQ
people and non-Muslims (here meaning primarily ex-Muslim atheists and converts
to Christianity) as fellow marginalized “minorities” (aqaliyat in Arabic, the basis
for the organization’s name) within Moroccan society.
According to Akaliyat’s founder and editor-in-chief, whom I had the chance to
interview in Rabat in 2018, the organization envisions its audience as Moroccan
society as a whole, not just LGBTQ-identified individuals or non-Muslims. The
magazine is open to submissions from anyone living in Morocco or abroad who can
write well in Modern Standard Arabic or Moroccan Arabic (darija), with the goal
of framing itself as a locally-facing organization. Akaliyat prefers not to use French
or other European languages in its materials in order to remain focused on its local
Moroccan public. It sees its mission as advocating for freedom of expression and
individual freedom for all Moroccans, not just queer people, seeking to create a
space where all of those without a voice or visibility in mainstream Moroccan
society can speak and share their stories. In other words, it is not just an LGBTQ
organization but an organization which sees LGBTQ rights as one aspect of the
broader right to freedom of expression. For example, one of the organization’s first
activist campaigns was organized in opposition not to Article 489 but to Article 222
of the Moroccan Penal Code, which criminalizes the public consumption of food
and drink during the holy month of Ramadan, when Muslims are expected to fast
during daylight hours. Akaliyat works together with other feminist, secularist, and
LGBTQ activist organizations based in Morocco, North Africa, and the broader
Arab world to achieve its goals. Akaliyat aspires to be a public, officially recognized
NGO, having unsuccessfully attempted to register themselves as an official
organization with Moroccan authorities in 2016 (Ghoshal, 2018). Akaliyat occupies
a similar position in relation to the Moroccan state as Helem in Lebanon, existing
as a public-facing, rights-focused organization that is “ambiguously accepted
without any official recognition” (Moussawi, 2015 p. 601).
When I asked Akaliyat’s editor about why the organization publishes content
exclusively online, he told me that publishing physical copies of the magazine
would put its readers in danger because the public sphere is not a safe space for
LGBTQ Moroccans to be open about their identities. Until they can achieve legal
protection as an officially recognized organization, Akaliyat prefers to restrict the
bulk of their activity to the digital media sphere, where there is relatively more
freedom of expression. Digital media platforms like Akaliyat, although they present
the possibility of being “outed” to undesirable audiences like the state or
homophobic members of one’s community, are the only viable tool that many queer
Moroccans can use to talk with each other, to read affirming information about
queer sexualities and gender identities, and to realize that there are other queer
Moroccans who are facing many of the same challenges they face in their daily
lives. Unlike GayRomeo in Beirut (Gagné, 2012), however, Akaliyat magazine is
not a platform in which users primarily attempt to arrange in-person encounters –
the focus is much more on attempting to build networks of community across the
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country of Morocco and its diaspora, developing a sense of queer consciousness
that is specific to the local social context.
Akaliyat is an organization that does far more than just publish a magazine.
Akaliyat’s editor told me that he receives dozens of emails every week from
LGBTQ Moroccans around the country asking him to help them find safe places to
stay after being abused or kicked out of their homes because of their sexuality or
gender expression. He told me that if a queer person experiences violence,
especially in rural areas of the country, it is not safe for them to go to the police and
they must rely on friends or activist networks like Akaliyat to receive support. There
is a severe lack of resources that Akaliyat has at its disposal to help its readers if
they find themselves in a dire situation, with the editor devoting a significant
amount of his own personal time, energy, and money at his own risk to help those
in need who contact him. Although the magazine was originally intended to be
published monthly, these significant personal and financial constraints have
resulted in the magazine publishing only five issues in its run time to date: Issue 1
in January 2015, Issue 2 in February 2015, Issue 3 in April 2015, Issue 4 in August
2015, and Issue 5 in February 2018. 3 The magazine itself is read by people from
across the country of Morocco and abroad. While the editor could not give me
statistics on precisely where the magazine’s readers were located, he did tell me that
the first issue of the magazine was downloaded over 15,000 times, the second issue
was downloaded over 18,000 times, and the organization’s website receives over
10,000 visitors per day as of July 2018.
What types of discourse does Akaliyat magazine use in addressing its readers?
Within each issue of the magazine, there are a number of different types of articles
and genres of writing, including: interviews with prominent activists of Moroccan
descent who serve as “guest of the issue” (daif al-’adad) and who appear on the
cover, such as a feminist activist affiliated with MALI and an evangelical Moroccan
Christian pastor based in Europe (Figure 3); conversations (hiwar khas) with
anonymous queer and trans Moroccans who do not wish to share their name or a
photo of themselves; news about LGBTQ issues and religious minorities around the
world, with a focus on Arabic-speaking countries, framed as “our news”
(akhbarna); articles on subjects like the possibility of same-sex marriage in
Morocco and how to observe Ramadan as a gay Muslim written by Akaliyat’s editor
as well as guest contributors; a question-and-answer section devoted to addressing
common questions from readers and social media followers like “Are gay men
always feminine?” and “Are lesbians just women who have had bad experiences
with men and do they hate men?”; poetry and romantic short stories about samesex relationships; a section written in Moroccan Arabic (darija), discussing
different relevant political or social issues; recommendations on quality queer films
available for free on the internet; a section entitled “what happened?” (matha
hasala?) where readers describe difficult moments from their past and how they
overcame them; and an open space called “my life” (hayati) where contributors are
given space to write a short autobiography.
3

The three year gap in publication is due to the organization’s financial constraints.
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Figure 3. “Guests of the issue” (duyuf al-’adad) from Akaliyat Issue 1 (left), a
feminist lawyer and activist affiliated with MALI, and Issue 5 (right), a Moroccan
Christian pastor based in Europe.
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In all of these different sub-genres within the magazine, Akaliyat models for its
readers how to talk about queer identities from a specifically Moroccan perspective.
For example, in Issue 1, in the interview with the MALI-affiliated feminist activist
“guest of the issue,” the editor of the magazine asks her the following question:
Q: Whenever we talk about minorities and their rights in Morocco, we
come up against a great deal of ignorance (jahl kabir) about the subject
and confusion in understanding. Our “Arab” society specifically singles
out sexual and religious minorities (aqaliyat jinsiya wa diniya) [for
persecution]. What is your comment on this proposal, if I am correct in
saying so?
A: I use the word “minorities” with caution because there are no statistics
that we can use to determine the majority or the minority, and freedom of
expression does not exist in Morocco that would allow each person to
express their religious beliefs or sexual orientation in order for us to have
access to these numbers. I also use the term “our Arab society” with
caution because we do not live in an Arab society but rather a mix between
many different cultures and the use of this term (“Arab”) shows
persecution that is not the persecution that sexual and religious
“minorities” suffer from but rather the cultural persecution and
marginalization that the Amazigh have suffered for example. (Akaliyat,
2015, my translation)
In other words, she argues that sexual and religious minorities are marginalized
communities like the Amazigh (Berber) population of Morocco, the indigenous
people of North Africa to whom most Moroccans can trace some degree of ancestry
and who were recently given official recognition of their language and cultural
rights after a long history of persecution and struggle (Fanack, 2017; Hoffman &
Miller, 2010). Like the Amazigh, she argues, so-called “sexual and religious
minorities” may in fact make up the majority of the Moroccan population—there
are simply no statistics out there that prove that LGBTQ people or supporters of
secularism are not the majority because no Moroccan has the right to freely express
their religious beliefs or their sexuality in public, Muslim or non-Muslim, straight
or queer. This is a strategic mode of coalition building, encouraging LGBTQ people
to think of themselves as allied to other marginalized groups who in fact make up
the majority of Morocco’s population; although they may feel small and alone, there
are feminists, secularists, Amazigh activists, and other groups fighting for greater
freedom of expression who would be natural allies of the Moroccan LGBTQ
community. Queer people, ex-Muslims, and secularists may be minorities if they
seem themselves as individual communities, but taken together, they form the
majority. Speaking with this sort of voice (Kunreuther, 2010), from the perspective
of a minority community allied to other minorities, allows queer Moroccans to think
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of themselves not as uniquely marginalized and alone but as integral members of
their local communities and a diverse national public.
In another example, from the “conversation” (hiwar khas) section of Issue 3,
Akaliyat speaks with a gay Moroccan police officer in his thirties who goes by the
pseudonym “Rachid” (Figure 4). After describing how he realized he was gay
around the age of 15, his decision to join the police force in order to evade financial
hardship, and the personal conflicts he faces in being responsible for enforcing a
legal system that criminalizes his sexuality, he concludes his discussion by saying:
I wish all homosexuals (mithliyin) a happy and normal life, just like anyone
else, and I also hope that there will come a day when society will change
its opinion of homosexuality. I think this will happen through the work of
your magazine and the rest of the free media outlets that are trying to
improve the situation of homosexuals in our Arab nations (dakhil awtanina
al-’arabiya). I also hope that your magazine continues to exist because it
shines a light on an anxious class of people that, if the magazine didn’t
exist, would face increasing and deepening oppression. (Akaliyat, 2015b,
my translation)
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Figure 4. Conversation (hiwar khas) with gay Moroccan police officer “Rachid”
from Akaliyat Issue 3.
We can see in this conversation an example of how Akaliyat invites its readers
to understand their sexuality as well as how they should understand their
relationship to the magazine. One “discovers” that they are a homosexual at a young
age, as evidenced by the editor’s question to Rachid, “when did you discover that
you were a homosexual?” at the beginning of the conversation (mata iktashafta
annaka mithly an-jins?). One’s sexual orientation is understood to be an internal
state that is an integral aspect of one’s individual identity that begins to manifest
itself in childhood and adolescence, an idea which is reflective of the magazine’s
reliance upon understandings of gender and sexuality based in the physiological and
psychological sciences rather than on traditional Moroccan-Islamic notions of
gender and sexuality that presume a socially-imbricated heterosexual subject. This
question is a good example of double-voiced discourse (Bakhtin, 1994), with
Akaliyat employing terms drawn from medical and psychological traditions in order
to teach both Rachid and its readers how they should understand their sexuality and
its implications for their identity.
Furthermore, it is assumed that telling others about one’s sexuality is something
that one should do after “accepting” (taqabala) and becoming “convinced”
(iqtana’a) of one’s “being” (kawn) a homosexual, with the editor asking Rachid,
“You are convinced of being [a homosexual] and you’ve accepted your sexual
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orientation - hasn’t that convinced you to tell your family and friends about your
homosexuality?” (kawnak iqtana’ta wa taqabalta mayulak al-jinsy, alam
yushaja’ka hatha ‘an i’lan mithliyatak al-jinsiya li-usratak wa asdiqa’ik?). Rachid
responds to this question by saying that he has only confided in his identity with
one or two other gay friends because they are the only people he can trust with this
potentially career-destroying information, with the implication being that he feels
safe confiding in them because they could also face serious ramifications if their
sexuality was made public to the wrong audience. Readers of this exchange will
implicitly understand that knowledge of their homosexuality is deeply powerful and
it should be revealed only to those whom they can trust completely – probably only
to other queer Moroccans who also have a lot to lose and therefore understand the
heavy weight of this information. While voicing one’s homosexuality is an essential
aspect of coming to terms with one’s identity as a queer person, one must be very
careful in deciding with whom they share this information.
Also in this exchange, Rachid (and, through his voice, Akaliyat) invites readers
to be affectively invested in the success of the magazine as one of the few “free
media outlets” fighting on behalf of LGBTQ people in the Arab world. Akaliyat
wants its readers to be aware of the precarious financial and legal status that the
magazine finds itself in and that it seeks their support. If it can show that it serves
as a platform dedicated to “shining a light” upon the untold stories of oppressed
people living in Morocco and the broader Arab-majority region, it can stake out a
claim for itself and its mission, hopefully encouraging other queer people in its
audience to share their stories as well, thereby increasing the magazine’s audience
and prolonging its viability. This stance is also reflected on the magazine’s website,
where a button on the sidebar announces that Akaliyat provides “your chance to
make your voice heard by over 10,000 visitors a day … click here to share”
(forsatak li-isma’ sawtak li-azid min 10000 za’ir yawmian … inqar hona lilmosharika) (Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Sidebar on Akaliyat’s website announcing, “your chance to make your
voice heard” (forsatak li-isma’ sawtak).
In the third substantive textual example that I would like to address in this
paper, Akaliyat includes a conversation with a young gay Moroccan man from the
coastal city of Agadir who was blackmailed by one of his neighbors threatening to
make his homosexuality public. This conversation was published in the section
entitled “what happened?” (matha hasala?) in Issue 4 (Figure 6). The young man
describes how photos showing him “in very intimate states with his ex-boyfriend
‘R’” were sent to a neighbor after he lost his cell phone one day. Three days after
he lost his phone, a neighbor contacted him and told him that he had “something to
return to him”: “personal photos” of himself. After agreeing to meet, the neighbor
then told him “you’re really handsome” and that he would “publish the photos on
the internet” if the young man did not do what he asked. Scared, the young man
asked what the neighbor wanted from him and the neighbor responded by saying
that he wanted him to have sex with him. Despite protesting and suggesting “other
solutions,” including payment of “a sum of money,” the neighbor refused to delete
the photos unless the man had sex with him. Feeling as if he had no other choice,
the young man reluctantly agreed. After this incident, in which he was raped
violently, he describes feeling scared, hopeless, and unable to speak. A few days
later, the neighbor contacts him again and demands the same thing. Again, feeling
trapped, the young man is forced to agree to sex for a second time. After being
blackmailed and violently raped twice in one week, the young man reports
attempting suicide three times. Akaliyat’s editor then asks:
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Q: How were you able to escape from this state of mind?
A: After my suicide attempts, I told my friends about what happened and
they helped me a lot in getting out of this state of mind. One of my
friends advised me to move to a different city, and with his help I moved
to that city where I still live today. (Akaliyat, 2015c, my translation)

Figure 6. Conversation with young gay man from Agadir who was blackmailed
by a neighbor. From “What happened?” subsection of Akaliyat Issue 4.
In this exchange, we see Akaliyat teaching its readers how to process incidents
of violence that could occur to them if their sexuality is made public against their
wishes. Although one could feel desperate and alone after experiencing something
as horrible as what this young man went through, Akaliyat tells its readers that is
important to reach out to friends one can trust and tell them what happened – it is
critical to voice these experiences, to put them in words. Developing and relying on
this network of close friends is an important strategy that queer Moroccans must
use to prevent them from feeling depressed, hopeless, and suicidal. Because the
state and legal institutions do not support victims of rape or sexual violence in
Morocco, especially if they are queer, relying on help from friends and activist
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networks like Akaliyat is vital to one’s survival as well as one’s physical and
emotional wellbeing. The conversation ends on a distinctly empowering note, with
the young man speaking directly to “decision makers in Morocco,” asking them,
“How long will the state keep attacking homosexuals in one form or another?” “We
just want to live peacefully in this country,” he says, and “we deserve protection
from the state … I want to say to that neighbor [who raped me] that today I
discovered that the sickness that must be cured as soon as possible is not me [as a
homosexual] but you [as a rapist]” (Akaliyat 2015c, p. 23).

Conclusion

As we can see through these examples, Akaliyat magazine invites its readers to
imagine themselves as a diverse community of “minorities” held together by shared
political aspirations as well as affective connections. Addressing both LGBTQ
people and ex-Muslims living in Morocco, Akaliyat focuses on “shedding light”
upon some of the most controversial and taboo topics in Moroccan society—
homosexuality and the decision not to practice Islam—that remain criminalized in
the Moroccan Penal Code. Akaliyat argues that these practices are not abnormal
social ills, as the Moroccan state and much of the public sees them, but rather they
should be accepted and legalized in Morocco under the rubric of expanding
individual freedom and freedom of expression. Although Akaliyat as an
organization has distinctly secularist political leanings, it takes a neutral stance with
regards to its individual readers’ relationships to Islam by publishing stories that
feature the voices of both queer and trans Muslims as well as ex-Muslims of all
sexual orientations and gender identities.
The many different types of interview that Akaliyat publishes function as
“double-voiced discourse” (Bakhtin, 1994), allowing the magazine’s readers to hear
the stories of individuals who have overcome challenges in their own personal lives
regarding their sexuality, gender identity, and religious beliefs at the same as giving
them discursive tools for thinking about how they can address similar challenges
that they may be facing in their own lives. In the absence of an official statesponsored regime of support for “sexual and religious minorities,” these somewhat
informal and network-based practices, such as building coalitions with secularleaning institutions and relying on trusted friends for support in difficult times,
represent best practices for survival in an oppressive socio-political environment.
The genre of the interview in its various forms (the “guest of the issue” [daif al’adad], “conversation” [hiwar khass], and “what happened?” [matha hasala?]) is
the most important and powerful “mode of regimenting the circulation of discourse”
(Bauman, 2004) that Akaliyat employs in helping its readers develop practical
strategies for dealing with their sexuality, gender identity, and religious affiliation
in their own lives.
In addition, by describing its readers as “sexual and religious minorities,”
Akaliyat works to create a collectivity of queer people in Morocco by “assign[ing]
them a certain position from which to receive [the magazine’s] address” (Barber,
1997). This framing allows LGBTQ individuals to think of themselves alongside
ex-Muslims, secularists, feminists, Amazigh activists, and others who support
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individual freedoms and freedom of expression as co-minorities who, when taken
together, actually make up the majority of Morocco’s population. Whether or not
this is true, this framing allows queer people to imagine themselves in solidarity
with others and helps them think of themselves not as marginalized and hopeless
individuals but rather as empowered members of a wide-ranging community.
Akaliyat attempts to create a cohesive “gay community” out of the more loosely
organized “homosexual sphere” that exists in Morocco (Merabet, 2014), of which
Akaliyat forms one part along with groups like Aswat and MALI. Akaliyat
encourages queer Moroccans to think of themselves as a community of individuals
who must rely on each other for support, an interdependent network of speakers and
listeners, and a minority population deserving of political rights and freedom of
expression within a legal framework.
Finally, by encouraging its readers to voice their sexuality and gender identity
in a public space like the magazine (Kunreuther, 2010), or at least with a trusted
group of close friends, Akaliyat encourages its readers to think about their identities
from a specifically queer-affirming and localized Moroccan perspective. Using the
language of sexuality and gender identity borrowed from secular physiological and
psychological sciences, the magazine tells its readers that sexuality is an internal
and natural aspect of one’s identity that is “discovered” in one’s youth. Coming out,
or “telling one’s friends and family about one’s homosexuality,” is considered an
important part of one’s journey toward “acceptance” of “being” a homosexual,
mirroring the predominant narrative within Western queer communities
surrounding “being out” (Duggan, 2002). Akaliyat also highly encourages its
readers to share their voice by contributing an article or interview to the magazine
as a way to support one of the only “free media outlets” advocating for the rights of
LGBTQ people in the Arab world. It frames itself as part of a vanguard of queer
organizations and media outlets, such as My.Kali in Jordan, Shams and Mawjoudin
in Tunisia, and Helem and Meem in Lebanon, that are working toward greater
acceptance of LGBTQ issues in Arab-majority societies across the Middle East and
North Africa region.
Akaliyat magazine works to create queer community in Morocco by invoking
a coalition of minorities framed as interdependent co-listeners to each other’s
voices. The magazine models a supportive and affirming approach to queer
identities in the absence of support from the state, Moroccan medical or legal
institutions, Islamic religious organizations, and many families and communities
throughout the country and in the Moroccan diaspora. By sharing intimate stories
about their own journeys to self-acceptance as queer people, about how they
overcame difficult challenges in their lives, and about how LGBTQ people can
work together alongside other “minority” communities to achieve a political system
that respects individual freedoms and freedom of expression, Akaliyat magazine
and its readers serve a critical role in the emergence of queer community in
Morocco.
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The Vernacular Literacy Practices of a
Newly Literate Moroccan Woman:
An Ethnographic Study
Reddad Erguig
Abstract

This paper offers a discussion of the literacy practices of a newly literate
Moroccan woman. I draw on the social practice theory of literacy and I use
ethnographic methods to explore the participant’s life history and offer an
account of her family-related literacy practices within the framework of
gender studies. In-depth interviews, informal discussion, participant
observation, visual ethnography, and documentary photography were
employed to collect data over one year. Literacy events were used as the
basic unit of analysis and patterns were identified through coding and
theme analysis. The findings indicate that the family is a strong impetus
for the participant’s literacy acquisition and a major context where she uses
the literacy skills she has developed in an adult literacy class. Literacy for
this participant is an empowering tool because she has become able to
carry out many of the outdoor tasks that were formerly exclusive to men.
However, literacy has extended rather than reversed Imane’s home-based
roles within her family. These results corroborate the findings of previous
research on the embedded nature of literacy practice and illustrate the
numerous ways in which the vernacular literacy practices of a participant
from Morocco is embedded in a strong gender-based division of labor.
Keywords: literacy practices, emergent literacy, adult literacy, gender,
ethnography

Introduction

This article offers insights into the literacy practices of a newly literate
Moroccan woman. It reports the findings of a year-long ethnographic study of the
literacy practices of a woman adult literacy student. Strong emphasis is laid on the
opportunities and challenges she faces in relation to the literacy activities she
engages in within the family domain. More specifically, the aim is to (i) examine
this newly literate woman’s beliefs about and attitudes toward literacy, (ii)
document and analyze her literacy practices as they take place in specific real-life
contexts, and (iii) investigate how her literacy practices are part of her personal
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and/or social life as a daughter, mother, and wife (this is the status of a large segment
of participant in adult literacy programs in Morocco). Emphasis is laid on the degree
to which the literacy skills she has developed in the adult literacy class either
empower or disempower her. This study therefore addresses the following
questions: how does this newly literate woman utilize her newly acquired literacy
skills in the family context? In what ways is her literacy practices embedded in
socio-cultural structures and in different contexts, and how is this literacy practices
shaped by gender relations in her family context? What strategies does she employ
to deal with the literacy problems she encounters and to learn new literacy skills?
The present study is informed by the social practice theory of literacy and
presents a case study from the Moroccan context of the embedded nature of the
literacy practices of an adult literacy student. As Purcell-Gates (2007) notes, “[i]t is
now generally recognized that literacy is multiple and woven within the
sociocultural lives of communities, but what is not yet fully understood is how it is
multiple – how this multiplicity plays out across and within differing sociocultural
contexts” (p. 2). Second, previous studies on adult literacy in Morocco (see review
below) focused on the results of surveys and quantified achievements, but they did
not fully explore the ways students use literacy in everyday life; conversely, the
present article aims to cover the gap in this literature through bringing in an
ethnographic perspective. Indeed, an ethnographic study of the everyday life
literacy practices of an adult literacy student that stresses her own beliefs,
perspectives, and voice is likely to yield results that can inform adult literacy policy,
research, and instruction in Morocco.
This article is organized along the following lines. In section one, details about
the context of the study are presented. The second and third sections offer an
account of the theoretical framework adopted as well as the methods utilized to
address the objectives of the study. After laying out the findings in section four, a
discussion ensues aiming to analyze them in the light of the findings of previous
research. The paper concludes with several implications.

Context

Since Morocco gained Independence in 1956, literacy has been a fundamental
component of national policy. Successive governments have adopted different
policies and various measures to eradicate illiteracy. These ranged from
generalizing access to schooling among school-age children, including the
encouragement of the schooling of girls in rural areas, to the organization of largescale literacy programs targeting adults who either had never joined school or who
had dropped out (Agnaou, 2002). The civil society has played a crucial role in these
“illiteracy-eradication programs.” The International Literacy Year in 1990,
however, marked a turning point in the national policy in matters related to adult
literacy dissemination. The focus shifted from simply encouraging enrollment and
increasing the number of the participants in adult literacy programs across different
social groups, to place more emphasis on the quality of learning within these
programs. Consequently, the priority of the department of adult literacy consisted
in considering adult literacy students’ specificities and using pedagogy suitable for
adults’ literacy needs (Direction de la Lutte, 2003). The National Charter of
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Education and Training, which was adopted in 2000 and which outlines the national
policy in education, made education and adult literacy a national priority. As the
charter stipulates, education is the social duty of the State and literacy training is a
prerequisite for socioeconomic development (Charte nationale de l’éducation,
2001; Direction de la Lutte, 2003; Secrétariat d’Etat chargé, 2006). However,
statistics relative to the literacy situation in Morocco do not align with the
government’s claims and goals. In point of fact, in spite of the enormous literacy
efforts invested since 1956, statistics show that illiteracy and school drop-out rates
are still high especially among women and girls (see table 1).
Table 1
Breakdown of literacy, school enrollment and drop-out rates in Morocco in 2006
by sex
Men
Women Total
Source
(Haut-Commissariat
Literacy rates
70.2% 47.3%
58.7% au Plan, 2007)
(people aged 10 and up)
School enrollment rates
(2006)

90.8%

86.4%

85.4%

School dropout rates
(children aged 6 and up)

7.72%

10.33

8.90%

(World Bank Report,
2009)
(Haut-Commissariat
au Plan, 2007)

In addition to being a priority in the national policy of the Kingdom of
Morocco, literacy has also been the object of research in academia. A seminal
literacy research project was conducted by Wagner and his colleagues between
1980 and 1986. The objective of their Moroccan Literacy Project was to study the
impact of socio-cultural factors such as language, family background, preschool
experience, and socioeconomic status on literacy acquisition and retention among
Arabic- and Amazigh-speaking children (Wagner, 1993; Wagner, Messik, & Spratt,
1986; Ezzaki, Spratt, & Wagner, 1987). In similar terms, Afkir (2001) investigated
the ways Moroccan children’s socioeconomic background shapes their socialization
into a literate environment. However, one area that remains to be researched is the
literacy experience and practices of Moroccan adults.
The research on adult basic education in Morocco is of two types. The first is
concerned with the Moroccan government’s efforts to fight illiteracy, the obstacles
that face literacy provision, and the various strategies to fight illiteracy (Essaknaoui,
1998; Maddi, 1999; Qabaj, 1998). The second type of research is based in fieldwork
and is concerned with the adult students’ demographic characteristics, the reasons
why they did not attend school, their motivations to enroll in literacy programs, and
the literacy difficulties they face (Secrétariat d’Etat chargé, 2006). Other studies
within this line of research offer an assessment of the adult students’ literacy
achievements, the correspondence between the participants’ needs, and the program
objectives as well as the portrayal of women in adult literacy textbooks (Aganou,
2002; Agnaou & Boukous, 2001; Ibaaquil, 2001).
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These studies, however, have methodological limitations: they either rely on
self-reported data collected through quantitative data collection instruments and
analyzed through statistical measures (Secrétariat d’Etat chargé, 2006), or they
measure the participants’ literacy achievements using school-based tests (Agnaou,
2002; 1Boukous & Agnaou, 2001). Literacy programs in Morocco, however, have
not been studied ethnographically in terms of the participants’ actual literacy uses.
The present article, which is part of a larger study, aims to fill this gap in the
literature and thus contribute to scholarship on the social nature of literacy.

Theoretical Framework

The present ethnographic study of the literacy practices of a newly literate
Moroccan woman is couched within research tradition commonly known as the
New Literacy Studies (NLS) and is informed by the social practice theory of
literacy, which posits that literacy is a social practice embedded in social
relationships and institutions, historically situated and informally learnt. As
Baynham (2004) argues, emphasis is placed on,
the social meaning of literacy: that is, the roles these abilities [reading and
writing] play in social life; the varieties of reading and writing available
for choice; the contexts of their performance; and the manner in which they
are interpreted and tested, not by experts, but by ordinary people in
ordinary activities. (p. 285)
The springboards for the present study include four seminal studies that
highlight the social nature of literacy (Barton & Hamilton, 1998, p. 160; Heath,
1983, p. 196; Scribner & Cole, 1981; Street, 1984). These researchers have
examined the “‘vernacular’ or non-dominant literacy practices . . . that are
overlooked and ignored by the constructions of literacy elaborated by and within
dominant institutions” (Barton, Hamilton, & Ivanič, 2000, p. 3). They are concerned
with the ways “literacies are positioned in relation to the social institutions and
power relations which sustain them” (Prinsloo & Breire, 1996, p.15).
Within the NLS scholarship, a significant body of research has been concerned
with emergent literacy and has focused on exploring the outcomes of adult
education in different communities. Within this line of research, simplistic claims
of governments and development agencies that literacy alone leads to
socioeconomic development and to women’s empowerment are questioned. Papen
(2005), for example, notes that the Namibian and South African participants in the
adult literacy programs she researched ignore the everyday life literacy skills they
are taught in the adult literacy classes and express instead a need for a school-based
curriculum because they were formerly excluded from formal education. Prinslo
and Breire (1996), by contrast, argue that South-African paticipants in adult literacy
programs make limited use of the literacy skills they learn because they are exposed
to school-based literacy practices which are unrelated to the everyday life literacy
demands. Again by contrast, Betts’s (2003) concludes that, based on ethnographic
study in El Salvador, participants’ low-attendance of literacy classes does not
indicate their lack of motivation to acquire literacy but rather the existence of
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literacy mediators who offer literacy help to the community and make literacy
acquisition unnecessary. Even more interestingly, Ahearn’s ethnographic work in
Nepal reveals that adult literacy acquisition has negative repercussions; that is,
newly literate women engage in love-letter writing and decide to elope with their
lovers, but they become powerless and cut off in cases where the marriage fails.
Finally, Erguig (2017) examines the ideological nature of the national adult literacy
program in Morocco, and stresses the crucial role of a strong political will in the
status the mosque-based literacy program currently enjoys as the predominant
“literacy sponsor.” He argues that the mosque is no longer an “ideology-free” site
for the delivery of the adult literacy of reading, writing, and math to the
predominantly women participants, but it has rather become a site where a moderate
view of Islam is promoted and where “balanced” ideological beliefs and values are
inculcated as part of a larger state policy that seeks to preserve the “spiritual
security” of the nation. The present study contributes to this literature by presenting
an ethnographic case study from the Moroccan context that foregrounds the
multiple ways in which a newly literate woman’s literacy practices is “located in
the broader patterning of social activities” (Barton & Hamilton, 1998, p. 160).
In addition, this study is framed by gender theories, namely scholarship, which
is concerned with the connection between adult literacy and gender equality
(Molyneux, 1987; Stromquist, 1987). Molyneux (1987) made a distinction in
gender interests in terms of whether they are (i) practical and lead to women’s
access to and use of literacy to serve practical functions or whether they are (ii)
strategic and enable women to claim their place in the world and to participate in
the social-cultural, economic, and political activities on an equal footing with their
male counterparts (p. 260). Robinson-Pant’s (2005) research in Nepal is another
case study concerned with the processes involved in Nepalese women’s literacy
acquisition and the literacy practices in which they engage. She views the link
between women’s literacy, gender, and development as a dynamic process and
demonstrates that literacy planners often introduce theoretical approaches to the
design and implementation of literacy programs which take little account of the
local teaching situations and the local participants’ beliefs about adult education.
As Robinson-Pant (2000) contends, the “relationship between objectives and
outcomes of a programme, between teaching methods and learning outcomes,
should therefore not be seen as a simple equation to be balanced” (p. 159).

Design and Context

Method

The present study is ethnographic in nature: a multi-method approach,
consisting of interviews, informal discussion, participant observation, photographs,
and artifact collection, was used. These methods were deployed to gain an emic
perspective and to capture the entirety of the participant’s literacy experience in
order to ultimately provide a detailed, in-depth description of her everyday life
literacy practices within the family domain. The approach is holistic and
interpretive, and it aims to highlight the participant’s lived experience and give
space for her voice.
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The participant in this ethnographic study, Imane, a pseudonym, is aged 47 and
lives in a popular and relatively old neighborhood of a growing urban center,
Temara, which is about 7.5 miles south of Rabat, the capital city of Morocco. She
is married to a military serviceman who makes around 2,500 dirhams ($280) a
month, which means they are a low-income family. She is mother to three
daughters: Sanaa, Nawal, and Noura aged 11, 8, and 2, respectively. Sanaa is in 5th
grade and Nawal is in 2nd grade.
Imane lives in an old apartment in the same neighborhood as that of her
parents’. Her nuclear family is characterized by a clear gender-based division of
labor: the husband is the breadwinner and Imane is in charge of domestic chores,
including the literacy-related ones. She does the housework, attends to the needs of
the daughters, prepares food, and also does the shopping. Her father runs a small
local business for making women’s traditional clothing, and her mother is a
housewife who also works as an occasional cook. Her two brothers, 40 and 35, work
as teachers of English in state-sponsored schools, and her 16-year-old sister is a
high school student. She spends part of her day time in her parents’ apartment,
helping her mother with the housework. To earn some money to cover her personal
needs, she occasionally helps make cakes for her mother’s clients.
Along the lines of purposeful sampling (see Patton, 1990, p. 169), I selected
Imane because she represents an “information-rich case . . . for study in-depth.”
Although the insights the present case study offers can by no means be generalized
to all newly literate women, Imane is a woman Moroccan adult literacy student
who, unlike her brothers, who continued their education until they got jobs as
teachers, willingly dropped out of a nearby school when she was in 4th grade against
her father’s will (Imane’s father, personal communication, November 10, 2017). By
her father’s account, he did not put much pressure on her to return to school (see
subsection “Ruling Passions” below for a discussion of the reasons why she
returned to attend an adult literacy class). In this respect, it is important to cite the
national survey conducted by the Ministry of Education to explore adult basic
education students’ characteristics and their motivations to enroll in adult literacy
classes; the results showed that 16.4% of the adult literacy students in Morocco left
school when they were either 4th or 5th graders (Secrétariat d’Etat chargé, 2006, p.
22).
Second, Imane is like thousands of women adult literacy students who attend
literacy classes in addition to their family responsibilities. Interestingly, she is
indeed highly motivated to improve her literacy skills as attested by her non-stop
literacy learning pursuits. She attended an evening state-sponsored literacy class
offered in a near-by public school in 1994 over a period of two years to learn how
to read and write in Arabic, but she had to quit upon suspension of the program.
When she got married in 1996, she moved to a small town where no literacy class
was available. In 2004, she came back to live in Temara when her eldest daughter
had reached 11 years old and was able to attend a literacy class for another year.
However, she had to leave it again for family reasons. She said, “I was often
disturbed because I used to take my elder daughter with me to the literacy class.
When I gave birth to my second daughter, I had to leave the literacy program in
order to attend to her needs” (Imane, personal communication, September 5, 2017).
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Third, I have been a long-term friend of Imane’s family and regularly visited
them for over 20 years; her two brothers have been long-time friends and
colleagues. Such a background has indeed led to the development of a brother-sister
type relationship between us. My position as a friend of the family enabled me to
gain genuine access to her reading and writing practices. This social relationship
with Imane was also vital in the sense that the researcher as a man could not have
conducted this ethnographic study with her given the gender components in the
analysis of study. However, thanks to these social ties and to the close personal
relationship to her, I managed to have easy access to her day-to-day reading and
writing practices. In short, despite the existence of a potential researcher bias and
the fact that much of the evidence comes from the participant’s self-reported
experiences, both of which should be acknowledged as a possible limitation of the
study, Imane’s confidence that her collaboration is for research purposes to promote
the cause of millions of Moroccan women who are eager to learn literacy resulted
in an anxiety-free atmosphere wherein she willingly shared her stories about her
literacy acquisition journey.

The Ethnographic Research Process

This ethnographic study aims to provide a detailed, in-depth description of a
woman’s everyday life literacy practice based on field work that spans over one
year. Its guiding principle was an exploration of a Moroccan woman adult literacy
student’s literacy beliefs, attitudes, and practices in their entirety, with a particular
emphasis on the intersection of these factors. This research experience was
characterized by the author’s participant observation of aspects of the life of this
woman made possible by the relationship he had developed with the participant’s
family and her husband. The variety of ethnographic research methods discussed
below was used to represent the participant’s perspectives and to highlight “the
centrality of literacy in the patterning of contemporary everyday activities and how
people act within a textually mediated social world” [emphasis in original] (Barton
& Hamilton, 1998, p. 196; see also Barton, Ivanič, Appleby, Hodge, & Tusting,
2007).
In-depth interviews were conducted to collect demographic data about Imane
and to explore her literacy history and former schooling experience. I also
continually interviewed her (in Moroccan Arabic) to uncover the ways in which the
observed and reported literacy events fit into her personal and/or social life (the
interview transcripts in this article are translations from Moroccan Arabic). The
interviews centered on her daily literacy practices with a special focus on the
functions in which she put reading and writing to use, her roles and attitudes in the
literacy events in which she engaged, and the literacy difficulties she faced.
Informal conversation with her family members also helped collect additional
background information about her.
I also observed Imane in real-life settings (i.e., the contexts where she interacts
with written text) as she engaged in some literacy events using visual ethnography,
and photographs were taken while she was involved in literacy events. I additionally
asked her to report the day-to-day occasions when reading and writing were part of
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her social interactions. Finally, I used documentary photography, photographing the
literacy artifacts in her apartment in order to provide a vivid picture of the ecology
of writing in her home. Throughout this process, I used field notes to record my
observations and comments.

Data Collection and Analysis Process

The grounded theory approach, “a qualitative research method that uses a
systematic set of procedures to develop an inductively derived grounded theory
about a phenomenon” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 23), was used to generate themes.
I continuously interviewed Imane and analyzed data to inform the following process
of data collection; data were coded and themes were generated and enriched until
theoretical saturation was achieved. In this process, which took place from August
2017 through July 2018, the three ethical considerations of the participant’s
informed consent, right to privacy and protection from harm were observed and
explicitly shared with the participant in the study.
The basic units of analysis are “literacy events” which refer to “the occasions
in which written language is integral to the nature of participants’ interactions and
their interpretive processes and strategies” (Heath, 1983, p. 196). Emphasis in the
analysis focused on the following five elements: (i) Imane, the participant, (ii) the
activities performed by participants (i.e., Imane and the people involved in the
literacy events in which she engaged), (iii) the settings in which the interaction takes
place, (iv) the domains within which literacy events take place (i.e., the areas within
which her reading and writing activities can be categorized), and (v) the resources,
or the material artifacts and non-material values involved in the interaction. Literacy
events were the springboard for the study of the literacy practices, which Street
(2003) describes as “the broader cultural conception of particular ways of thinking
about and doing reading and writing in cultural contexts” (p. 82).
I analyzed the ethnographic data to generate categories and identify the
prominent literacy domains. The themes that emerged from the data were then
identified, combined, and further analyzed with reference to the research questions
raised initially. I placed Imane’s literacy practices within a gender framework, and
I explored the implications of her status as a newly literate woman for her roles
within a gender-based family structure.

Findings

In the present article, I examine the participant’s literacy practices within the
family domain and analyze the ways she uses literacy in connection with the
following categories: her children’s schoolwork and their health needs, shopping,
having home appliances repaired, cooking, withdrawing money from the post
office, checking documents, and reading mail. Before I provide a discussion of
Imane’s day-to-day literacy practices, a review of her motives to return to an adult
literacy class after having dropped out of school when she was in primary school is
in order.
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“Ruling Passions”

In my different interviews and informal discussions with Imane, religion, her
children, and the daily literacy demands were her “ruling passions.” She often
turned the conversation round to these topics as major reasons behind her decision
to attend an adult literacy class after having dropped out of school when she was in
primary school. She said, “To be frank, I attended the literacy class primarily to be
able to read the Quran and for my daughters’ sake” (Imane, personal
communication, September 9, 2017).
Therefore, religion is a major impetus for her decision to attend a literacy class
and to recall the literacy skills she had lost after she had left school. Although the
Quran and other religious information are nowadays accessible to the illiterate via
audiovisual media (CDs, TV channels, and social media), Imane insisted that she
wanted to be able to read the Quran as a book and to understand the teachings of
Islam. she said, “I can now read short Sourates easily” (Imane, personal
communication, August 8, 2017). Nonetheless, her biggest dream is to manage to
read the Quran in its entirety: “I want to be able to read Al Baqara Sourate,
especially the Al Kursi verses, which are posted on the wall in my sitting room in
my flat” (Imane, personal communication, September 1, 2017). The second motive
behind her enrollment in an adult literacy class consists of her intention to develop
the literacy skill she needs to be able to help her daughters with their schoolwork.
Like many parents who may be unsatisfied about the quality of education offered
in some state-sponsored schools and who may be unable to hire a private tutor,
Imane is intent on offering her daughters the literacy support they need to achieve
school success.

Children's Schoolwork

The participant’s major family-related literacy use consists of helping her 2nd
and 5th 5 grade children with their schoolwork (see image 1). As a matter of fact,
22% of the adult literacy students surveyed in 2006 stated they joined a literacy
program to better educate their children (Secrétariat d’Etat chargé, 2006, p. 17).
Indeed, in the different interviews I had with her, she consistently affirmed that she
helps her daughters learn the letters of the alphabet, read the Quran, and memorize
and recite excerpts from it. In spite of being a newly literate woman equipped with
only basic literacy skills, she manages to provide useful literacy help to her children
because they are primary school pupils who do not yet necessitate that she should
have advanced literacy skills. Thus, literacy was an enabling tool to help meet a
family need. Such literacy help is part of the domestic chores she performs in a
family structure characterized by a strong gender-based division of labor: “I help
my daughters mainly with the Quran and math. I am also the first to read their
transcripts; my husband doesn’t often read the children’s school grades because
when he does, he keeps scolding them” (Imane, personal communication,
September 6, 2017). In this family task, however, she at times receives help from
her siblings:
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My sister and brothers occasionally help my children with their
schoolwork. My husband can read and write, but he doesn’t help the kids
with their school tasks. He comes back from work and then he lies down .
. . he watches TV and sport, that’s all . . . He has a busy schedule; he leaves
home early in the morning and comes back late in the afternoon. (Imane,
personal communication, May 15, 2018)
Second, Imane helps her daughters with mathematics:
Imane happily related how she was very delighted when she once managed
to understand and explain to her eldest daughter the difference between the
mathematical symbols of less than (<) and greater than (>). She managed
to distinguish one from the other using her prior knowledge of numbers 4
and 7. She said that for her the symbol (<) looks like a “4” and (>) looks
like a “7.” (Imane, field-note, February 27, 2009)
This vignette illustrates that, in addition to literacy, Imane’s numeracy practices
are also embedded in her gender-based roles. Drawing on the skills she has learned
at school and which she managed to remember in the literacy class, she handles
the family-related numeracy tasks and helps her daughters with their math
exercises.

Image 1. The participant is at home helping her daughter with a school task.
A third kind of literacy event associated with Imane’s use of literacy to help
her children with their schoolwork is her practice of reading an easy reader which
she performed at the request of her eldest daughter. She reported, “Yesterday, Sanaa
[her eldest daughter] asked me ‘Please, mum, read this story! I want you to improve
your literacy skills and to be like my classmate’s mum, who helps her daughter with
schoolwork’” (Imane, personal communication, September 6, 2017). In this literacy
event, Imane is invited by her daughter to read the easy reader in the aim of
improving her own reading skills, and this in turn will enable her to better help her
children with their school-based literacy tasks.
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The literacy help that Imane offers her children is a common literacy practice
in the Moroccan family in which the wife is literate. There is a remarkably strong
interest in children’s schooling even among the most low-income families. Some
families even take bank loans or sell real estate and other property to ensure an
adequate and modern education for their children. The concern for the children’s
education is also manifest in the literacy help parents offer their children and/or the
evening classes’ fees they pay for them.
In terms of the social theory of literacy, Imane’s literacy uses are consistent
with previous research which shows that literacy practices are purposeful and that
they “are already embedded in an ideology and cannot be isolated or treated as
‘neutral’ or merely technical” (see Barton & Hamilton, 1998; Street, 1984). From a
gender perspective, these examples align with the findings of previous research on
the gendering of literacy: they support the view that literacy tasks within the
household are seen as the woman’s task and that women tend to help their children
with schoolwork and to respond to the family literacy demands more often than men
(Rockhill, 1993, p. 160; see also Barton & Hamilton, 1998). The examples also
show that while literacy enables her to engage in some activities formerly
customarily carried out by males, it also entails more family responsibilities for her.

Children’s Health Needs

Imane also engages in literacy practices when attending to her children’s health
needs. She reported, “My husband doesn’t interfere with anything. It is I who have
to attend to the needs of my daughters when they are ill” (Imane, personal
communication, December 23, 2017). Drawing on her knowledge that every
medical box bears an expiration date, she reads labels on medical boxes to check
the expiration date of the medicine she wants to give her daughters:
My daughter was sick a couple of days ago; she had fever. I wanted to give
her fever syrup, and I asked my eldest daughter to re-check the expiration
date. I learned that the medicine had expired, so I bought her another bottle
of the syrup at the pharmacy. (Imane, personal communication, August 1,
2017)
Imane also read directions and signposts when she was taking her sick daughter to
the doctor’s office:
My mother and I took my daughter to the pediatrician because she was ill.
We found ourselves in front of a building where there were many doctors’
offices. I was glad when I managed to recognize all by myself the name of
the “pediatrician” I was looking for. (Imane, personal communication,
September 17, 2008)
These examples illustrate Imane’s gender roles enactment. As a mother
administering a medicine to her daughter or taking her to the pediatrician, literacy
and numeracy enabled her to accomplish her tasks and be autonomous. From a
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gender perspective, also, these instances lend support to the claim that, through her
literacy skills, Imane managed to fulfill her domestic obligations. From an
empowerment perspective, however, literacy did not lead to a radical change in
household gender roles, nor did it entitle her to perform tasks formerly performed
by males only.

Shopping

Within the family domain, the participant also writes shopping lists at home
before going shopping at “lahri,” a nearby non-self-service wholesale shop where
she buys groceries and dairy:
Interviewer: Who does the shopping at home?
It’s me of course. You see, brother [being a long-time
friend of her brothers’ entitled me to the status of an almost
family member], I have to attend to all the domestic chores.
Interviewer: Do you use a shopping list?
I don’t use a shopping list for produce and meats. But as I
buy everything else [grocery and dairy] at “lahri, ” I have to
use a shopping list. Without a shopping list, I would buy
some items and forget others. I sometimes ask my daughter
to check the shopping receipt for me.
(Imane, personal communication, September 2, 2017)

Getting Home Appliances Repaired

Imane’s literacy practice as embedded in her gender-based family structure is
also evident in her completion of another family task: getting the home appliances
repaired. For example, “when her fridge broke down, she was looking for a person
to repair it for her. She went to his shop and read a note posted on the door saying
that he does not work on Sunday so that people would not knock on his house door
and disturb him” (Imane, field-note, September 17, 2017). This vignette illustrates
the way Imane uses literacy to perform a family duty related to her current status as
a newly literate wife. This is an opportunity for her to engage in social activities
beyond the borders of her home and to practice her literacy skills; however, it also
shows that literacy is used to serve the traditional gender-based family role and not
necessarily to challenge the domination of the male in the life of the family.
Imane views the act of taking the fridge to have it repaired as a family duty
assigned to her because she because she does not work outside the home. However,
although she does not now aspire to be a working woman, she believes her husband
would help with the housework if she had a job. As she reported, “My husband
doesn’t help me with the domestic chores . . . . If I were a working woman, he would
help me with the housework and would take the fridge to have it repaired” (Imane,
personal communication, December 23, 2017).

At the Post Office: Mail and Documents

Imane’s literacy activity at the post office further exemplifies the embedded
nature of literacy. She often goes to the post office to cash a check for her husband
or withdraw money from his account. Such a family task usually begins as a literacy
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practice in which she draws on her own literacy skills, but it turns into a mediated
literacy practice when she turns to a man who assists people with form filling
usually for a three to 10 dirhams fee ($0.25 to $1.15). She needs his help especially
with the fields to be completed in French thanks to his knowledge of French; she
also solicits his expertise in handling the post office paperwork. She said, “If I were
literate, I would rely on myself and not ask for . . . [this man’s] help” (Imane,
personal communication, February 30, 2017). Such a literacy event reveals overlap
of two languages (Arabic and French) and two alphabets (Roman and Arabic), and
highlights the idea that part of being literate in Morocco is to be able to use both
languages and writing systems fluidly. More importantly, although it is primarily a
family duty in which she serves a function traditionally assigned to a woman, the
post office vignette indicates that Imane unintentionally interacts across gender
boundaries and language/literacy resources. Because of her status as a newly literate
woman and because she is not literate in French, she enters a realm formerly a male
domain and interacts with a man she does not know to obtain information and solicit
his literacy help.
In addition, Imane engages in reading the mail she finds in the mail-box in both
her apartment and her parents’ apartment. She related to me how she had read a
letter from her sister’s school about the school final examination. She said,
“Yesterday, I found a letter in my parents’ mail-box and I read the name of the
person to whom it was destined. I read the address too and I knew it was destined
to my sister” (Imane, personal communication, September 9, 2017). Imane also
related having read the cover to a letter mailed to her brother which stated:
I met Imane in her parents’ flat this morning. She happily related how she
had been so delighted a few days before when she managed to decode the
letters of the Roman alphabet and to read what was written on the cover of
a letter (bank statement), which was destined to her younger brother.
Although this was a rudimentary skill, it was for her a moment of victory
and self-fulfillment. (Imane, field-note, February 27, 2018)
This literacy practice illustrates how Imane’s literacy practices are centered on her
nuclear and/or extended family. Reading the cover of the mail and passing it over
to the right person illustrates how literacy fits into her management of the domestic
chores as a wife (within her apartment) and as a daughter and sister (within her
parents’ apartment).
Finally, Imane occasionally reads documents she comes across while she is
doing the housework. She related how, out of curiosity, she once read her husband’s
salary statement, which she came across when she was doing the laundry:
I was about to wash my husband’s pants at home this morning when I came
across a document in his pocket. It was a salary statement, and the total
was in Moroccan dirhams. I knew how to read it, but I didn’t know how to
convert the sum into riial (cents). I asked a neighbor’s help on how to
convert it. After all, I knew how much my husband earned, but I wanted
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to know for sure how much he made. (Imane, personal communication,
February 30, 2018)
This literacy activity features overlap of two monetary systems that exist together
in Morocco (dirham and riial). As is the case in several other literacy events, Imane
is autonomous at the beginning and draws on her literacy skills and reads the
document by herself, but this turns into a mediated literacy practice when she asks
for her neighbor’s help. This literacy event reflects a gender-based division of labor
because such a reading act was embedded within the task of her housework duties,
namely the laundry. This gendered literacy practice also reflects Imane’s exclusion
from detailed knowledge of her husband’s salary based on gender; because he is the
breadwinner in the family where a strong labor division is predominant, he is the
type of husband who does not want his wife to know details about his salary.
A second type of document Imane read at home is her marriage contract, which
she came across while doing the housework:
I didn’t know what the document was about at first. It was thrown among
some papers. But after reading a few lines, I recognized it as my marriage
contract. I knew it when I read my parents’ and grandparent’s names on it.
(Imane, personal communication, September 6, 2008)
Unlike many other occasions in which Imane faces literacy difficulties and seeks
help from her daughter or neighbors, in this literacy event she manages to
understand the content of the document relying on her own knowledge and literacy
skills. This vignette further highlights the fact that, through literacy and her reading
of the marriage contract, Imane manages to reduce her exclusion from the
documentary circumstances of her marriage. This is an additional example of a
literacy activity which is embedded within a domestic chore and which is strongly
related to her gender-based family tasks and to her status as a housewife.

Discussion

In line with the assumptions of the social theory of literacy, Imane’s literacy
practices demonstrates the multiple ways in which her literacy practices are
embedded in gender roles and as such “are patterned by social institutions and
power relationships” (Barton & Hamilton, 1998, p. 160; see also Hamilton, 1998;
Barton & Hamilton, 2000). The literacy help she provides to her children with their
school assignments, and her reading of shopping lists and directions highlight the
centrality of literacy in her management of the household affairs. They demonstrate
the ways her literacy practices are gendered and the ways they fit into her world as
a wife and mother who uses literacy to maintain her traditional roles and carry out
family responsibilities. These literacy practices are an assertion of her position as a
person who has acquired enough skills to be autonomous when meeting the daily
literacy demands and also a translation of her desire to achieve more autonomy
regarding these literacy tasks. In fact, Imane constantly evaluates her social position
in terms of self-worth, and she feels a positive change in her social status because
she successfully meets her family literacy demands.
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These findings are consistent with the results of previous research within NLS
on the embedded nature of literacy. They support Rockhill’s (1993) findings that
Hispanic women in Los Angeles “conducted most of the literacy work of the
household, and that associated with the purchase of goods, interface with public
services and their children’s schooling” (p. 139). They equally corroborate the view
that the literacy tasks within the family are assigned to the mother and that “part of
being a good mother is to be a literate mother” (Barton & Hamilton, 1998, pp. 1723). Smythe (2006) similarly concludes in a study of American women’s domestic
literacy work that “women’s domestic literacy work had become invisible as ‘real
work’ in the home” (p. 294). Furthermore, the results obtained align with Kulick
and Stroud’s (1993) contention that newly literate people “far from being passively
transformed by literacy, instead actively and creatively apply literate skills to suit
their own purposes and needs” (p. 31). However, it is noteworthy to know that these
findings deviate from Rockhill’s (1991) observation regarding the violent conflicts
women in her study experienced as their husbands opposed the shifting power
dynamics resulting from the former’s decision to improve their literacy skills.
Imane’s husband seems to welcome her new status and appreciate her new skills,
probably because they at least extend the duties she performs for the family.
A second characteristic of Imane’s literacy practices is that they are historically
situated and they reflect changes within her family roles. As a newly literate wife
and mother, she still conducts domestic chores, but these roles have been extended
to include literacy-based tasks beyond the borders of the family. At the post office,
for instance, Imane is an example of the traditional Moroccan housewife who,
besides the domestic chores of doing the housework and cooking food for the
family, now engages in outdoor literacy-based activities. This supports my central
claim in the present article that, far from empowering her to claim her place in the
world and play leading roles in the family life, literacy places new family demands
on her.
Multimodality is a third characteristic of Imane’s literacy practice. At the post
office, Imane engages in a multimodal literacy practice in which two languages
(Arabic and French) and two orthographic systems (the Roman and Arabic
alphabets) are used. This event also draws attention to the idea of multiliteracies,
the recognition that the skills and competencies required to be “literate” in
contemporary culture are no longer limited to the traditional tasks of reading and
writing but are extended to knowledge of how to complete forms and handle
paperwork. Other literacy practices such as the reading and/or writing of shopping
lists and medical labels also involve overlap of different semiotic systems: literacy
and numeracy. A fourth characteristic of some of Imane’s literacy practices is that
they are mediated (for the concept of literacy mediation see Baynham, 1993;
Wagner, Messik, & Spratt, 1986). At the post office, she initially draws on her own
literacy skills, but she later seeks a literacy mediator’s help with form filling.
Finally, to handle the everyday literacy problems and/or learn new literacy
skills, Imane uses informal strategies. At the post office, she turned to the man who
fills forms for people for literacy help. This example underscores the situated nature
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of learning and illustrates the strategic use of “informal responses to dominant
practices” in cases of difficulties (Barton & Hamilton, 2005, p. 21).
In short, from a gender perspective and within the broader social and cultural
context of Morocco, the results of the present study demonstrate that literacy can
be both enabling and constraining. On the one hand, literacy is enabling for Imane
since it allows her to position herself as an autonomous person who can handle the
outdoor everyday life family-related literacy tasks by herself. She can now check
her own shopping receipt and also help her children with their schoolwork. Her
gender roles also advance as she now engages in literacy-based family tasks beyond
the borders of her home, including the management of the family money, which
were formerly assumed by males. However, literacy does not play a liberating role
in the life of Imane, who, despite her status as a newly literate woman, does not
perform tasks which were formerly exclusive to males such as using her literacy to
engage in income-generating activities. Thus, literacy has indeed extended rather
than reversed Imane’s home-based roles within her family.
Indeed, literacy does not enable the participant to challenge the male
domination of the family life or to perform tasks which are similar to her husband’s.
Rather, literacy places new demands on the participant. Because she can now meet
many of the everyday life literacy demands, she is expected to carry out additional
family duties. Literacy therefore helps her serve her practical rather than strategic
needs (Molyneux, 1987; Robinson-Pant, 2005). In short, and in line with Scribner
and Cole’s (1981) argument about the use of the Vai script to serve the Vai people’s
practical or pragmatic needs, the ways Imane engages with the written word shows
that literacy serves as a practical response to social changes and family demands
rather than a revolutionary act against the gender-based division of labor within her
family.
The findings of the present study have several implications. In terms of policy,
the day-to-day family-based literacy practices discussed above should be
considered when implementing and evaluating adult literacy programs in Morocco.
Since Imane uses literacy to respond to her children’s school-based literacy
demands, adult literacy classes designed for middle-aged women should be focused,
among other things, on their family-based literacy needs. These classes can be
useful even if they adopt a school-like curriculum, in which case they will provide
literacy instruction that may not be closely linked to the participants’ daily literacy
needs but will still help them satisfy their children’s school literacy needs. Further,
when designing and implementing literacy classes, the needs and constraints of
participants who have to leave out their literacy classes must be taken into account.
The results obtained also have implications for adult literacy evaluation and
research. While the previous studies in Morocco reviewed above (Agnaou, 2002;
Boukous & Agnaou, 2001) claim that literacy classes have limited outcomes, the
results of the present study suggest that they may have overstated the case, since the
participant under study, for instance, manages to handle the everyday life literacy
demands. Methodologically, these results also show the value of an ethnographic
approach to the study of everyday life literacy practice. Instead of measuring
literacy outcomes, such an approach enabled me to provide an account of a newly
literate woman’s literacy practices which differs from the findings of large-scale
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quantitative studies which rely on pre-designed tools and take little account of the
socio-cultural context in which literacy is acquired and practiced. Further
ethnographic research needs to be conducted on newly literate Moroccan women’s
literacy practices across domains of literacy use and age groups and from different
regions and linguistic backgrounds because studies of this nature can deepen our
theoretical understanding of literacy as social practice, enrich our knowledge of
their literacy use, and have implications for the design and implementation of
literacy classes.

Conclusion

This article has offered an examination of the literacy practices of a newly
literate Moroccan woman and demonstrated the complex ways in which literacy is
dynamic, purposeful, and embedded within her gender-based family roles. For
Imane, literacy is an enabling tool that allows her to perform additional literacyrelated tasks for her family. Her identity as a wife and mother is evident in the
literacy practices which she engages in, and such practices fit within her traditional
roles in the family. Her gendered literacy practice thus aligns with findings of a
body of literature within NSL, which shows how newly literate people appropriate
literacy and adapt it to meet their own needs, hence the emphasis on human activity
and agency (Ahearn, 2004; Kulick & Stroud, 1993). However, literacy does not
empower the participant in the sense that it does not allow her to play roles that
were previously the exclusive privilege of males such as establishing her own
business, or engaging in income-generating activities, or shouldering
responsibilities within the community, nor does it lead to a significant change in her
family roles or relationships.
The variety of Imane’s family-related literacy practices reflects how the family
is both an impetus for her literacy acquisition plans and a major locus for her literacy
practice. The ways she draws on her recently acquired/recalled literacy skills show
that her family needs are a strong factor for her decision to enroll in the literacy
program and a major site and source of support for her literacy practice. The family
domain is indeed a significant domain in which she continues to practice and
“scaffold” her literacy skills and also informally learn more literacy skills (Bruner,
1985). However, her family is at times a handicap for her literacy learning pursuits
as her domestic obligations are a reason why she had to drop out of the literacy class
(see Tighe, Barnes, Connor, Steadman, & Steadman, 2013).
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Language Debates and the Changing Context
of Educational Policy in Morocco
Taoufik Jaafari
Abstract

Language is a critical basis of local identity and a vital tool for global
communication. In multilingual Morocco, the issue of language instruction
has been highly politicized, a factor that has contributed to poor
educational practice. This article aims at providing a brief description of
Morocco’s linguistic landscape together with the language policies first
established in Morocco by the French colonizer. It goes on to further assess
the evolution of language education policy and makes recommendations
for strengthening Morocco’s multilingualism.
Keywords: Language debate, Morocco, Amazigh, Arabic, French

Introduction

Morocco, a strategically located North African country, is situated beside the
Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean at the geographical intersection between
Europe and the rest of Africa. This rather unique geographical location has given
the country its genuine multilingual character and diverse population of European,
African, Arab, and Imazighen (Singular Amazigh, plural Imazighen, a word which
means “free people” and is preferred over the term Berber) who have cohabited
with one another for many centuries. Morocco has always prided itself on the
stability of its society, where multilingualism, multiculturalism, and multi-ethnicity
have been instrumental to national and cultural identity. However, this linguistic
situation which has been characterized by its richness, diversity, and complexity
hides various ideological and sociopolitical conflicts. In fact, this linguistic
pluralism has been a source of contention that has contributed to failing educational
policies implemented ever since the political independence of the country.
There are six languages which shape the linguistic landscape in Morocco:
Classical Arabic with its two varieties Modern Standard Arabic and the local Darija
(Moroccan Arabic); and Imazighen languages with its variants – Tamazight,
Tashelhit (Tashelhiyt, Tashelhait, Shilha) and Tarifit; and finally French, English,
and Spanish.

Under French Colonization

During the French colonization of Morocco (1912-1956), France imposed
French as the official language of education and administration and tried to
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marginalize the two already existing languages, (Moroccan) Arabic and Amazigh
varieties, which were peacefully existing side by side. In fact, among the policies
that the French colonizer usually relied on to spread their hegemony and to
disseminate the French language was through building modern schools. Gordon
(1962) quotes a well-known French saying which claims that “when the Portuguese
colonized, they built churches; when the British colonized, they built trading
stations; when the French colonized, they built schools” (p. 7). That is why French
was enforced in all walks of life (especially the economic and the political domains)
and it even replaced the Arabic language whose status was relegated to that of a
secondary language to be used only in the traditional educational system.
Furthermore, the French colonizer adopted a discriminatory "divide and rule" policy
through the 1930 Berber Decree to make a clear-cut segregation between the Arabs
and the Berbers. This enabled them to set up a different type of school called the
Franco-Berber Schools especially in the middle Atlas Mountains where they started
teaching French as a first language and Tamazight as a second language to the
exclusion of Arabic. Among the most famous schools they built in the middle Atlas
is Tarik Ibnou Zayyad high school in the town of Azrou. El Aissati (2005) wrote:
During the protectorate period, an event of paramount importance in the
modem history of Morocco, which was to be exploited by the nationalist
movement of this country, is the elaboration of a decree in 1930. This
decree, signed by the then king of Morocco, Mohamed V, stipulated that
the areas with Berber as the dominant language -mostly rural areas- were
entitled to carry on their tribal law system (droit coutumier), which had
been die practice among the Berber tribes for centuries. What the French
did was simply formalize these practices by law. This decree was seen by
the pan-Arab nationalists as the ultimate attempt by France to separate
Berbers from Arabs. (p. 61)
Surprisingly, this French policy backfired on the French colonizer because instead
of the intended segregation and the desired destruction of national unity, the Arabs
and the Imazighen woke up to this danger and consolidated their unification by
emphasizing their common faith of “Sunni Islam” (Etheredge, 2010, p. 147) in
addition to a “unified cultural identity” (Crawford, 2005, p. 172). The French aimed
at “civilizing” the Imazighen through “civilizing missions” (Zouhir, 2013, p. 274)
under which the Imazighen found themselves “in the cross-hairs of these recurrent
European anxieties” (Silverstein, 2010, p. 14). Aitsiselmi and Marley (2008)
summarize these missions on the ground that “the French belief in the mission
civilisatrice ‘civilizing mission’ of their language led to a desire to create an elite
who would think and act like them, whilst keeping the mass of the population
illiterate” (p. 193).
In addition to these schools, the French established special schools that were
devoted to the European community and to certain rich families which sided with
the colonizer who promised to protect their wealth and their estates and who were
made to believe that everything European in language, tradition, literature, or even
people, is superior to the local one viewed as ancient, archaic, and backward. The
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French did not open schools for the middle- and lower-class Moroccans, thus
reinforcing and exaggerating class divides within society.
As a reaction to the newly-imposed colonial presence and introduction of
French schools, the educated patriotic nationalists took the lead and founded the
free schools. These schools were private and free from colonial government control
rather than free of tuition. Their mission was to combat the spread of French and to
retain Arabic’s cultural, national, and sacred status and identity. These schools,
many of which are affiliated to the government nowadays, were mainly sponsored
by militant founding fathers whose main concern was to defend the Arabic language
and Islam. These schools were also used by the nationalists to inculcate in the youth
a national spirit and to disseminate the ideological, religious, and cultural values
integral to “Moroccan identity.” Also, through these schools, the nationalists tried
to reveal the colonizer's hidden agendas and to awaken Moroccans to the fact that
their identity and culture were being threatened. Moreover, the nationalists
managed to raise Francophobia and succeeded in making people aware that the
French presence and settlement in Morocco was not to achieve Marechal Lyautey's
"mission civilisatrice" but rather to exploit the natural resources and to strengthen
their hegemony over North Africa after colonizing Algeria in 1830 and Tunisia in
1881.

Arabic

Classical Arabic is the sacred language which derives its power and authority
from God. In addition, Classical Arabic is highly esteemed although it is not spoken
anywhere in all the 23 Arab countries. Classical Arabic together with Hebrew and
Latin, are referred to by Anderson (1983) as classical truth languages. Classical
Arabic, empowered by the existence of a great literary heritage, has a special status
in Morocco and as a high variety in a diglossic situation, according to Ferguson
(1959), cannot devolve into an everyday vernacular. Its usage is mainly restricted
to high functions like religious sermons, literature, and academic writings. Modern
Standard Arabic (MSA) as a simplified variety derived from Classical Arabic was
designed to serve mostly in administrations and in the media in addition to its being
the first language that pupils learn in their first year of primary education. Talking
about this diglossic situation, Ferguson (1959) says,
DIGLOSSIA is a relatively stable language situation in which, in addition
to the primary dialects of the language (which may include a standard or
regional standards), there is a very divergent, highly codified (often
grammatically more complex) superposed variety, the vehicle of a large
and respected body of written literature, either of an earlier period or in
another speech community, which is learned largely by formal education
and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by
any sector of the community for ordinary conversation. (p. 325)
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Traditionally, both Classical Arabic and MSA are considered to be the languages
of prestige in Morocco. However, nowadays, it seems that French and English are
considered high prestige languages in Morocco.

Mother Tongues and Language Attitudes

Unlike Classical Arabic and Modern Standard Arabic, Moroccan Arabic or
Darija is the native language and the mother tongue of the majority of the populace.
It is the non-standardized spoken form of Arabic. According to the latest census in
2014 from the High Commission for planning, more than 89.42% of Moroccans
communicate in Moroccan Arabic. Moroccan Arabic dialect or Darija is gaining
ground and is being used nowadays in the media and in everyday business
transactions. Previous research, however, (Boukous, 1995; Bullock, 2014;
Ferguson, 1959) has shown that Moroccans hold negative attitudes towards their
mother tongues (Darija and Tamazight) because of the low status that these
languages have in the linguistic market. In recent research on a subset of the
Moroccan population, Et-tahiri (2019) investigated the attitudes of Moroccan
university students towards the various varieties which shape the linguistic market,
and the 520 respondents who participated in this research also confirmed this claim.
The study was carried out in Casablanca (Morocco) and the respondents included a
sample of university students from two faculties (Ben Msik Faculty of Art and Ben
Msik Faculty of Science); both faculties belong to the Hassan II university. On a
five-point Likert scale (Not at all important (1)-Very important (5)), the following
table shows the low share that Tamazight and Darija (6.4% and 19.9%) occupy
compared to French (33.1%), Standard Arabic (46.1%), and English (74.5%).
Table 1
Attitudes of Moroccan university students towards languages in Morocco.
Language

Not at all
important
20.9%
0.6%

Not
important
18.7%
0.9%

Tamazight
Arabic
(Fusha)
French
3.7%
6.4%
Spanish
14.4%
20.9%
Darija
6.7%
14.7%
English
0.6%
0.3%
Source: Et-tahiri (2019, p. 70).

Somewhat
important
39.3%
10.7%

Important
14.7%
23.6%

Very
important
6.4%
64.1%

22.1%
39%
30.4%
6.4%

34.7%
18.1%
28.2%
18.1%

33.1%
7.7%
19.9%
74.5%

Et-tahiri’s (2019) findings support previous research on language stratification
in Morocco. Chakrani (2010), for example, uses a Language Attitudes
Questionnaire to research how language attitudes affect linguistic stratification and
practices among Moroccan youth. The study examined H (High) codes (Standard
Arabic and French) and an L (Low) code (Moroccan Arabic) using different focus
group participants. This analysis of covert attitudes shows that these languages are
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not uniformly distributed along the poles of status and identity but rather are
competing for both (Chakrani, 2010, p. ii).
When describing a similar linguistic situation in Egypt, Haeri (2003) noticed
during her stay in Egypt that the Egyptians speak a language they do not respect
and respect a language they do not speak referring, of course, to Classical Arabic
(pp. x-xi). Here, Haeri (2003)’s observation can be cautiously generalized to most
if not to all the other Arab countries where the modern dialects are regarded as
“deviant” varieties of Classical or Standard Arabic (Alajmi, 2014; Alghamdi &
Petraki, 2018), or, as Bentahila and Stevens (1985) put it, “corrupt languages” (p.
34).

Tamazight

Imazighen are the indigenous population of Morocco. According to El Kirat
(2008) they are “the oldest known inhabitants of Morocco and their language is the
most ancient language in the Maghreb” (p. 126). Although there are many
hypotheses about the origin of the Amazigh language, its origin has not been clearly
traced because of the lack or the absence of a written literature. The Imazighen
speak three main dialects: Tamazight is spoken in the Middle Atlas Mountains;
Tarifit in the Rif Mountains; and Tashelhit in the Anti-Atlas Souss Mountains.
These three dialects are generally mutually incomprehensible and differ noticeably
especially in their lexicon and their phonetic inventory.
Scholars, government officials, and associations and NGOs do not agree on the
exact number of Imazighen in Morocco; for example, Boukous (1995) and Zouhir
(2008) estimate the number of native Tamazight speakers in Morocco to range from
40% to 45% of the population. In this respect, Brett and Fentress (1997) in their
book The Berbers state that it is difficult to estimate the numbers of Imazighen in
North Africa because they say that it all depends on who is counting and who is
counted (p. 5). El Kirat (2008) explains that “it is hard to give any exact estimation
of the number and percentage of the Imazighen in Morocco, especially in the urban
centers, for no census has ever taken this variable into consideration” (p. 127).
Ever since the independence of Morocco and after officializing Arabic in the
constitution, Imazighen felt marginalized and they started a campaign to gain
recognition of their culture and of their language. In fact, the Amazigh activists
crowned their nearly five-decade struggle by having their language proclaimed as
an official language next to Arabic in the 2011 amended constitution. Prior to the
constitutionalization of their language, they managed through the Royal Institute
for the Amazigh Culture (generally abbreviated in French as IRCAM, Institut Royal
de la Culture Amazighe), established in 2001, to introduce the teaching of
Tamazight in the primary school education. There was a problem as to which script
to use in standardizing it but it was eventually agreed on using Tifinagh
(an abjad script used to write the Tamazight languages). In September 2003,
teaching started in 300 schools in view of gradually generalizing it to all primary
schools in Morocco by 2010. Currently, Amazigh activists are asking the
government and the parliament to enact further laws for the implementation of their
language.
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French

Although French has no legal status in Morocco and is considered one among
many other foreign languages, it remains the most dominant language on the
Moroccan linguistic landscape as it is used extensively in many vital sectors such
as the administration, education, business, and the media, even in post-independent
Morocco. Up to now, most of the administrative paperwork be it in the public or the
private sector, is still written in French. No doubt, its presence in the public space
reflects the economic and political power that it used to enjoy during the
protectorate period. The only government domain where French is not used is the
judicial system.
The maintenance of the French status in Morocco was prepared long ago during
the protectorate when the French colonizer thought of creating Moroccan elites who
would take over after them. These elites, some of whom were from the poor
indigenous population, were made to believe that the French culture and language
are the symbols of modernity and the vehicle of science as opposed to Arabic that
was portrayed as only serving religious and traditional purposes. Many elites were
bilingual in both French and Arabic and had high hopes of ushering in post
independent Morocco. El Kirat (2008) claims that French “plays an important role
in the socio-economic and educational fields because it is highly valued (generally
associated with the upper class, i.e. the rich and educated people). Until now, it is
the most prestigious language, for it represents the language of the opening on the
modern world” (p. 124).

English

The first prolonged contact with the English language in Morocco was in the
Second World War when American military bases settled in Tangiers and Kenitra.
It was taught simply to facilitate the translation from French into English and from
English into French. After the independence of Morocco, English was taught
together with Spanish and German as optional foreign languages in high schools.
Despite the great dominance of French, the English language has managed to
impose itself especially with the socio-economic challenges brought by
globalization in the last two decades.
According to El Kirat (2008), “unlike French and Spanish, which are a symbol
of political and cultural dependence, English has no colonial connotations [in
Morocco]. Negative attitude towards French increases the positive attitude towards
and popularity of English” (p. 125). In the field of education, currently, English is
taught starting from the last year of the middle school in public education system
until graduation from high school. Although students are introduced to English in
secondary schools, some educators have recommended English be introduced in
primary schools. It is assumed that the early introduction of English in primary
schools will help students learn English at an early age and consequently, they are
likely to be even more competitive when they embark on the labor market.

Spanish

The Spanish language is spoken by less than 6% of Moroccans, mostly in the
northern regions and certain regions in the south. The presence of the Spanish
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language dates back to 16th century when the Moriscos were expelled from Spain.
Many factors have helped in maintaining the presence of Spanish such as the
geographic proximity and the Spanish colonization of the north of Morocco. After
the political independence of Morocco, Spanish was taught as a second language in
the northern part of the Morocco and as an "optional" foreign language in the rest
of the country. The language lost its official status as the administrative and
educational language in the North and has been replaced by French (El Kirat, 2008).
However, recently, “more and more Moroccans choose to continue their studies in
Spain because of its proximity to Morocco and also because of the cost of living”
(p. 124).

The Language Debate and the Educational Language Policies

Morocco has experienced many language policies starting from the eve of
independence. To establish a linguistic and cultural unification, and to distance
itself from the colonial past, Morocco's first national educational project, decided
to opt for Arabization and to adopt the Arabic language as an official language of
instruction. Grandguillaume (1983) sates that “. . . [Its] ultimate goal was to advance
the Arabic language as the official and national language” (p. 153). There were
many problems with this improvised policy because of the lack of a clear vision.
For example, there was a significant shortage of teachers and administrative staff
and the state had to recruit teachers from many Arab countries especially from the
Middle East to make up for this deficiency. This shortage was mainly due to the
fact that all the Moroccan administrators and teachers were educated in French only.
In addition, Morocco as a newly politically independent country was still
economically, socially and culturally dependent on France.
In addition, the policy of Arabization has kept gaining ground and by the year
1980, the Arabization of the primary and the secondary education was complete.
However, the university level has never been Arabized for three main reasons
which, according to Ennaji (2005) are as follows: (1) the language of references or
textbooks in the university is either French or English; (2) the lack of teachers and
professionals who master the Arabic language; and (3) the inevitable need of French
in the socio-economic environment (p. 106). There has also been a long-standing
bias against Arabic as a language of higher learning in the West where many
Morocco professors were trained.
The varying levels of prestige, economic value, and language roles within the
same nation lead to “tension” especially between Arabic speakers and Tamazight
speakers. This tension reflects the prioritization of the Standard/Classical Arabic as
a national language over Tamazight and Moroccan Arabic as “low” languages with
no religious or economic sway. In this context, Ait Dada (2011) argues that
Moroccan Arabic is seen as a “corrupt and incorrect form of Arabic, which is
associated with poverty and downgrade and therefore considered to be inferior to
Classical Arabic for it is neither codified nor standardized” (p. 19).
According to Ibn El-Farouk (2002), Morocco is experiencing a linguistic
crisis which is not visible but persists and worsens despite the measures taken by
the state. The language debates which have been going on for many years in the
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hope of achieving a balanced linguistic market and a clear language policy have
reduced the linguistic varieties in question to merely weapons of struggles among
politicians. In fact, such “politicization and ideologization of languages made it next
to impossible to craft a coherent policy” (Chahhou, 2014, p. 138). The damages of
the shifting language policies which have been implemented for the last four
decades did not yield any benefits for people in general and for the pupils and
students in particular. Rather, they have resulted in a “chaotic” unhealthy
educational system (Cheddadi, 2011, pp. 56-57) and may lead to a kind of
sociolinguistic inter-ethnical conflicts (Ait Dada, 2011, p.19).
For example, after decreeing Tamazight as an official language in the
constitution, the linguistic situation has been even more “complicated” as
“unexpected” issues (pertinent to the educational landscape) have cropped up,
including the lack of trained teachers and supervisors and the precariousness of the
teaching conditions, among other things (El Kirat, 2008). The empowered Amazigh
activists vehemently asked the two chambers of parliament to pass the laws which
would help in implementing their language(s) in all walks of life. However, as noted
previously, the main obstacle to this process concerned which of the three Amazigh
varieties (Tashelhit, Tarifit, or Tmazight) to implement.
Scholars such as Fihri (2013) and Al-Wadghiri (2000) believe that the
failure of the educational system is due to the policy choices that have been
motivated by political considerations rather than the real needs of the majority of
Moroccans. Nowadays, many voices of political leaders, academicians and
intellectuals are defending Arabic against the campaigns of colloquialism,
francophonization and Amazighation (Laroui, 2014). They claim that despite the
negative stereotypes that have been established against the failure of Arabic, it is
still the most qualified language in the country to respond to the urgent needs of
education, identity, modernity and science. Fihri (2013) asserts that among the
factors that should be considered while upgrading the level of Arabic and opting for
the Arabization policy is the increasingly growing number of its speakers all across
the world in addition to its dramatic digital presence on the internet. The number of
internauts (users of the internet) using Arabic has moved from 2.5 million to more
than 70 million between the years 2001 and 2011.

Darija and Education

Another controversial issue which is the subject of heated debate is Darija.
Activists such as Nourddine Ayyouch, in a televised program in 2014, and scholars
like Loutfi (2017) and Slaoui (2014) have persuasively advocated the use of the
Moroccan Arabic or colloquial Arabic as a language of instruction. They argue that
since more than 89% of Moroccans communicate using Moroccan Arabic and since
it is the main mother tongue, why shouldn't it be promoted, implemented, and
included in educational reform plans? They also defended their claim by referring
to the UNESCO's (2008) recommendations, which suggest that children who begin
their schooling with their mother tongue continue to perform better than children
who have to acquire another language when they enter school (Ball, 2010). In
addition, UNESCO considers the use of mother tongue in teaching to be a human
right and claims that the teaching in the mother tongue helps in reducing the number
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of school dropouts (Bender & Dutcher et al., 2005). In September 2018, there was
a big social outcry when the ministry of education agreed to release some primary
school Arabic textbooks which included, for the first time in the history of
schooling, some Moroccan images with some colloquial words. In the following
photo from one textbook (designed for primary school students of the second level),
the three Darija words underneath the Moroccan pancakes and cookies exemplify
this:

Figure 1. The inclusion of words from Moroccan Arabic (My Guide to the Arabic
Language textbook, p. 9).
Many Moroccan parents criticized and condemned the inclusion of colloquial
words in school textbooks designed for primary schools. They regard colloquial or
Moroccan Arabic as a corrupted and incorrect variety of Arabic which is loaded
with many loan words and borrowings from Spanish and French and a lot of
grammatical and syntactic structures from Tamazight. This is why they could not
hear of it being used neither as a subject nor as a language of instruction. Instantly,
the government, through the head of the government and the minister of education,
strongly reacted to this blunder. They claimed that this issue is closed for good and
nobody can violate the clauses of the constitution, which decreed and officialized
MSA not Colloquial Darija. Kasraoui (2018) states that “El Othmani [the Head of
the government] thanked citizens for their strong stance against the use of Darija in
education” adding that “their stance supported the position of the government”
(parag. 4). Conversely, the Ministry of National Education defended the inclusion
of Darija words as progress towards cultural relevance in the curriculum as cultural
products specific to the region with no equivalents in MSA.
Decreeing Tamazight in the constitution and becoming a second official
language equal to Arabic shifted the linguistic debate in Morocco because shortly
after the Amazigh activists wanted to have their language incorporated in all
domains of life such as the court, the administration, road signs, and public spaces
in general. They asked to have their language leveled up to junior and high schools
after launching it in primary education in 2003. The Amazigh activists (Assid, 2019;
Errihani, 2006) even asked to have their language implemented as a language of
instruction for all school subjects. For many Amazigh activists and intellectuals, the
officialization of the Amazigh language was not enough as,
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in many cases, the underlying goal of several language policies is
simply symbolic: the goal of recognising a minority language or
instituting it as a national language could be sometimes seen as
nothing more than a symbolic act often seen as politically
necessary. (Errihani, 2006, p. 145)
Whether politically motivated or not, the teaching of Tamazight in primary school
education was hampered with different constraints including: the lack of qualified
teachers, the difficulty of making the pupils get acquainted with the new script
Tifinagh, the unavailability of textbooks, the teaching of a standard variety which
was not comprehensible to speakers of the main varieties of Tamazight, and last but
not least, the negative attitudes that most non Amazigh pupils and their families
have towards the teaching of Tamazight.
An Amazigh is likely be motivated to learn a language which might be useful
in his personal, social, and professional life; however, it is not surprising to see nonAmazigh speakers questioning why Tamazight should be imposed on them. In one
of my seminars, I asked a student who is Amazigh but does not speak Tamazight
about whether he is looking forward to learning Tamazight. Surprisingly, he said,
“Why should I learn a language which would only help me one day if ever I traveled
to see one of my remaining relatives in my parents’ village in the Souss region? I
would rather learn a foreign useful language instead” (personal interview that took
place in February, 2018).
In addition, research (Errihani, 2006; Soulaimani, 2015) has shown that the
pupils who were subjected to this new experience, learning Tamazight, did not in
any way learn Tamazight but rather they spent all of the three-hour-a-week sessions
getting acquainted with a third somehow hard script, Tifinagh, which was added to
the Arabic and Latin scripts at an early stage in their schooling. Also, the Tamazight
teachers themselves were not familiar with the Tifinagh script in which they had
only a three-week period training during 2003.

French and Education

The main debate which has been around for so many years concerns the strong
linguistic presence of French in all the educational policies. All the policies have
reinforced French either as a subject or as a language of instruction in public schools
depending on the politicians who championed the policy. Currently, Moroccan
pupils get introduced to French in their second year of public schooling and
continue learning it until they graduate from high school. This means that students
learn French as a subject for 11 years before they join the university. The paradox
here is that after all this period of teaching, a considerable number of students,
according to the 2009 report released by the Conseil Supérieur de l'Éducation, de
la Formation et de la Recherche (2009), finish their high school with a very low
level in French which does not even enable them to communicate let alone to pursue
their higher studies in sciences, economics, and medicine at public institutions
where all the teaching is carried out in French (p. 31).
There are many issues to highlight here concerning this big failure. First, there
must be a serious problem with the teaching methodologies when after exposing
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students to a language for 11 school years for a minimum of at least four hours a
week, students are still unable to communicate even at a basic level. Second,
Moroccan pupils, students, and people in general have changed their attitudes
towards French from that strong language of power and prestige to an inferior
language which is losing ground in most of the ex-colonies and even in France itself
(See Table 1). Also, the French government, in the person of the French prime
minister himself acknowledged for the first time ever that English is the language
of the future. On the 23rd of February, 2018, Edouard Philippe said, “Bien
maîtriser l’anglais, c’est mieux maîtriser son avenir : chaque étudiant, à la fin
de son lycée et au plus tard en fin de licence, aura passé un test de type TOEIC,
Cambridge, IELTS, financé par l’État” (Fjarraud, 2018, parag. 2). This means in
English that “Mastering English well is better for securing and controlling your
future. Every student at the end of their high school or at the latest at the end of their
bachelor’s degree will have reached a high score in one of the English international
tests like IELTS, TOEFL, or TOEIC, funded by the state.”
In another address to the students in a press conference in EDHEC Business
school, Edouard Philippe said, “that English is the lingua Franca. That’s how it is.
You have to speak English if you want to act and move in globalisation” (cited in
Kasraoui, 2018). This clearly shows that French is losing ground in France itself
and is no longer a language of academic research, modernity, and openness to the
world. Likewise, French is no longer regarded as the language of the future in
Morocco and even the Moroccan Francophile elites have woken up to this fact and
started sending their children to English or American schools which are booming
in Morocco.

English and Education

The above discussion leads us to another point which has been very
controversial in language debate recently and which concerns the status of English
in the Moroccan educational policies. English is considered to be the second foreign
language in Morocco and as I mentioned earlier, it has been taught as a school
subject for many years in high schools. The popularity of English at the high school
level,
leads to a wider spread at the university level: largest number of registered
students [reside] in the departments of English throughout the country. In
the early 1970s, there were only two departments of English in Morocco
(Rabat and Fez). There are more than 17 departments of English
throughout Morocco. (El Kirat, 2008, p. 125)
In some English departments the enrollments of first-year students outnumber all
the other departments despite the first shortlisting and subsequent placement
interviews that are administered. It is worth mentioning here that the students we
receive at the Ben Msik Faculty of Letters, Casablanca English department are
exposed to English for a maximum period of four years, but what is striking is that
during the interviews, we find that these students are more proficient in English
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than in French, which they had studied for 11 years. Twenty or 30 years ago, this
was not the case. We used to receive only literary or humanities students; however,
for the last 15 years the number of science students has grown significantly higher.
Currently, in the department where I teach (Ben Msik Faculty of Letters,
Casablanca), 68% of our students are science students. Of course, this has made us
question this issue and ask about the reasons which push the students to choose to
learn English instead of pursuing science. The main reasons why most of those
students prefer not to join the sciences schools are first because of their weak level
in French, which is the language of instruction and second because they claim to
have been impressed by the teaching of English in high schools and thus prefer to
study further at university. According to Buckner (2011),
English is becoming a new means for socio-economic competition in
Morocco, by appealing to upper and lower class alike. Upper class view
English as a way to maintain their privilege as Morocco opens itself to the
global economy. In contrast, many lower-class Moroccans, who are weak
in French, see English as a means to access public sector teaching
positions, a traditional channel of mobility, or to sidestep the power of
French entirely and engage directly with the global economy on their own
terms as low-paid labour in Morocco’s tourist industry and informal
economy. (p. 21)
Although English has been developing in Morocco over the last two decades,
Morocco remains to be an exception to other countries because of its heavy
multilingualism heritage of its past. Arabic, Amazigh, French, and Spanish have
been strongly implanted in the country’s way of communicating, thus creating
major challenges in language policy and instruction. As noted earlier, because
English does not have a colonial legacy in the country, it is seen, especially among
younger students, as the language of modernity and future market-led opportunities.
While Moroccans feel very strongly about their national identity, they do not
perceive of English as a threat to it at all. Moroccan students who are strongly
motivated to learn English view it as a popular language, promising opportunities
and social mobility for all classes. El Kirat (2008) sums up the current status of
English in Morocco by emphasizing that,
Moroccans, in general, have a positive attitude towards English. The
Moroccan government policy is extremely influential in encouraging the
spread of English. Moroccan policy makers realized that international
communication between Morocco and the rest of the world could not be
achieved via French alone. English is the key to communication. Its status
is not connected to political considerations or to ties with Great Britain or
the USA. It is not viewed as a sign of colonialism or attachment to another
nation as it is the case with French. (p. 126)
The issues which I have covered throughout this article in relation to the
language debate(s) confirm that the chronology of the educational policies which
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have been successively implemented ever since political independence have been
tremendously unsuccessful (El Kaidi, 2018). Their failure is clearly manifested in
the low quality of the learning output which lags behind the desired outcomes. This
failing language policy and instruction has somehow contributed to a real linguistic
conflict between the two official languages that make up the national identity and
the first foreign but dominant language French.
Further evidence of this can be seen in the improved National Charter for
Education and Training (NCET) which came into being in the year 2000 and
appeared very promising to many educationalists that saw it as an improvement on
the past deficiencies of the previous reforms. However, nine years later, all the
hopes were dashed when many signs of its failure came out, resulting in a
subsequent emergency education reform plan for which a huge budget was devoted
but to no avail. In 2015, the NCET was substituted with the 2015-2030 Strategic
Vision (SV) of reform, a reform which was grounded on the recommendations of
the Supreme Council for Education and Training.
For the sake of this paper, I will examine only the clauses that deal with the
teaching of languages as subjects and the choice of the language(s) of instruction.
It stipulates that children will be exposed to Arabic and French in the two years of
preschooling (the third or fourth year) with a particular emphasis on oral
communication. In the primary school, the two official languages Arabic and
Tamazight are compulsory throughout the level. French is also taught as a subject
in all the levels. At the fourth year of the primary school, English will be introduced
and taught as the second foreign language. Concerning the middle school and the
high school, the same languages will be maintained with a special focus on both
French and English (being taught only as foreign languages and not as a language
of instruction for other subjects). At the high school level, in addition to the
aforementioned languages in the three previous levels, another third optional
foreign language will be introduced and this language will be Spanish. In this
strategic vision, it is clearly mentioned that Arabic is the only language of
instruction throughout the three cycles of schooling. The SV aims at achieving three
fundamentals. The first is to achieve equity and to insure equal chances in the
learning of languages. The second is to standardize the presence of the two national
and official languages with their constitutional and social status. The third
fundamental is to establish a progressive and balanced multilingualism.
Now after nearly three years since this strategic vision has been implemented,
there are still many constraints which obstruct the incorporation of all its clauses.
Last month, the language of teaching scientific disciplines came to the surface again
as some members of the parliament started questioning the fact that Arabic will not
serve this function appropriately since it is not a scientific language according to
them. What is surprising is that the traditional political parties belonging to the
majority do not themselves agree on this. Some political parties suggest either to go
back to French or to use English instead. What is certain is that the fervent defenders
of the Francophonie will struggle again to impose French because they are finding
it harder to take a backseat and watch English become the first foreign language in
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Morocco and the lingua franca of the world, in addition to seeing Arabic gain more
ground and strength in Morocco.

Recommendations

This last section is intended to highlight the implications that can be drawn
from the various issues the paper has raised. The implications range over
theoretical, methodological, and socio-political areas.
The diachronic aspect is crucial for the understanding of the current linguistic
situation is Morocco. This means that any linguistic description remains incomplete
in the absence of a deep, coherent, and reliable understanding of the historical issues
that have given rise to the current linguistic situation in Morocco and its interplay
with the future of education. This diachronic outlook is likely to help researchers
gain understanding of the language policy during the French protectorate and its
impact on the current situation that the French language enjoys in present-day
Morocco.
Multidisciplinarity is another prerequisite for examining the current linguist
situation and the future of education in Morocco. Multidisciplinarity guarantees a
reliable, fair, and non-discriminatory perspective on the investigated issue. In this
very context, it seems that the incorporation of sociolinguistics, the sociology of
education, and the socio-historical awareness seem to be inescapable to the study
of multilingualism in Morocco.
For policy makers, crafting a coherent policy should be free from any
politicization or ideologization of the issue. Ideological attitudes eclipse the right to
linguistic diversity and legitimizes the suppression of certain languages deemed to
be corrupted or inaccurate (e.g., Darija). Language policies should provide an even
playing field for the different national languages in Morocco. Moroccan Arabic or
Darija and Tamazight are the native languages and the mother tongues of the
majority of the populace.
The attitude of policy makers and intellectuals should be directed towards the
potential that these languages hold for the improvement of the quality of education
especially at the elementary levels. Research findings clearly show that learners
benefit from using their native language in education in early grade years.
Concerning the officialization of Tamazight, as El Kirat (2008) correctly argues
“the state would be compelled to promote its usage and to accept it as a legitimate
language for all social activities, including the formal settings” (p. 125).
Research should be directed towards exploring the systematic properties of
Moroccan Arabic. These properties can help place Darija on solid academic
footings compared to well-studied languages such as Classical Arabic and French.
In addition, mass media should work towards valuing the status and role of
Moroccan Arabic, especially towards helping Moroccans reconsider the negative
attitudes held towards their mother tongues.
Situated within its socio-political and socio-historical context, it seems that the
officialization of the Amazigh language is far from achieving its desired result as a
“real” socio-political outlet. Therefore, decreeing Tamazight in the constitution and
becoming a second official language should be coupled with the political will to
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provide the necessary support to this long-repressed national language on concrete
footings (e.g., revising textbooks, training teachers, etc.).
Finally, the status and role of English in the Moroccan educational policies
should also be revitalized in light of its current national and international
socioeconomic role, compared to French. English should be introduced as a medium
of instruction at least for the teaching of science.
Recent educational reforms in Morocco (NCET, the Emergency Plan, and SV)
have embraced the principles of linguistic openness, calling for the establishment
of a progressive and balanced multilingualism. However, more concrete and
realistic steps should be taken by the government policy makers towards ensuring
that national and international languages are enjoying the same socioeconomic
privileges and support as French.

Conclusion

El Kirat (2008) argues that “strong sentimental attachments to a language are
not always accompanied by language use, nor by a desire to actively promote it. But
only people and communities can keep a language alive” (p. 128). I would like to
conclude by questioning whether the multilingual situation in Morocco has ever
been taken as the starting point for educational policy makers. There are many
pragmatic recommendations and solutions which have been suggested in academic
symposia, conferences, and research studies in this regard, but unfortunately, these
proceedings and publications have been mostly ignored, stored, and shelved in
libraries. Hopefully, this article will find more attentive and receptive audiences
interested in supporting Morocco’s multilingualism.
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Moroccan Society’s Educational and Cultural
Losses during the Years of Lead (1956-1999)
Brahim El Guabli
Abstract

In this article, I argue that political repression during the Moroccan Years
of Lead (1956-1999) engendered myriad losses in the fields of education
and culture. However, the scholarly focus on the embodied effects of state
violence on former prisoners and forcibly disappeared individuals has
overlooked the intangible damages both education and culture sustained
during this period. In investigating the imbrication of political
conservatism, educational reform and censorship, the article opens a more
critical space for the conceptualization of the broader implications of the
Years of Lead for education and culture. Drawing on several primary
sources in Arabic and French, including documents of the Moroccan
Student Union (UNEM), Lamalif issues, and ERC’s final report, I examine
how educational and cultural loss was constitutive of the experience of
Years of Lead. Combining close readings with historical analysis, this
article is an invitation to broaden the scope of scholarly investigation of
the multilayered ramifications of statal political violence on socioeconomic and cultural fields in Morocco.
Keywords: Years of Lead, culture, education, loss, potential,
retraditionalization, authoritarianism, Lamalif, Souffles/Anfas
We don’t know yet the extent to which repression impacted the production
and creativity of academics, music, theater, cinema, visual arts, literature,
[and] the press, both written and audiovisual (Fakihani, 2005, p.163).
The Moroccan “Years of Lead” (1956-1999), also known as sanawāt al-jamr
wal-raṣāṣaṣ, al-sanawāt al-sawdā’, les années de plomb, les années de la braise,
and les années noires were decades of multilayered losses due to state violence.
Describing the decades between Morocco’s independence in 1956 and the passing
of King Hassan II in 1999, the Years of Lead were half a century of systematic
violence against dissidents in the midst of the power struggle that pitted the
monarchy against its opposition (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006a, pp. 51-53). Although much
work has focused on the embodied violence victims experienced during this period
(Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006a, pp. 51-117), less tangible losses the state inflicted on
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Moroccan society during the Years of Lead have yet to be examined in theoretical
terms. For example, there was loss of socioeconomic and cultural potential due to
the isolation imposed on the regions that housed former detention centers (Hay’at
al-inṣāf, 2006b, pp. 37-38). Additionally, not only did the Years of Lead leave their
scars on their direct victims, but they also exacerbated the fear of institutions and
undermined the democratic, economic, and artistic prospects of Moroccan society
(Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, pp. 68-72; Fakihani, 2005, p. 163). Since preventing a
people from achieving their full potential in any field is a form of loss, this article
aims to reveal the processes that led to the intangible and difficult-to-quantify losses
that authoritarianism inflicted on Moroccans through the examination of the impact
the Years of Lead had on education and culture.
I argue that education and culture were areas in which the Years of Lead had a
significant, albeit understudied, damage. In this regard, Rachid Benmokhtar, a
former minister of education, has declared that “[t]he opposition between the
monarchy on the one hand and the political parties on the other hand made Morocco
lose forty years of development.” (Akalay, 2017, para. 10). According to
Belmokhtar, “[i]nstead of taking care of development, much time was spent on
power struggles.” (Akalay, 2017, para. 10). The striking absence of academic
studies that ground their analysis of the present state of Moroccan education and
culture in the repressive Years of Lead requires that I craft this analysis based on
written sources. Consequently, I draw on original documents of Union Nationale
des Etudiants du Maroc (National Union of Moroccan Students, UNEM) collected
by Claude Palazzoli in his book Le Maroc politique (1974), some issues of the
monthly journal Lamalif, and the Equity and Reconciliation Commission’s (ERC)
final report to theorize how political retraditionalization, cultural attrition, and
educational losses are interconnected during the Moroccan Years of Lead. In
investigating loss in education and culture as a fundamental aspect of this violent
period in Moroccan history, this article paves the path toward a broader scholarly
engagement with the intangible effects of authoritarianism. The article also provides
a retrospective understanding of the chronic ills that continue to haunt Moroccan
educational and cultural fields today.

Retraditionalization of Education during the Years of Lead

Education and culture were ideal candidates for political repression during the
formative years following Morocco’s post-independence in 1956. Clifford Geertz
(1973) has defined culture as a “system of inherited conceptions expressed in
symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their
knowledge about and attitudes toward life” (p. 89). In Morocco’s postindependence context in which both the monarchy and the nationalist movement
were negotiating the configuration of power, both contenders understood that
monopolizing educational and cultural outlets was key to establish control over
society and the political system that would define the new nation-state. In fact, even
before Morocco’s independence, Moroccan nationalist leaders made access to a
modern education a crucial stepping-stone toward liberation (El Ayadi, 2009, p.
199; Monjib, 2013, p. 7). In the post-colonial period, however, education and
culture were one of the terrains in which the conflict between the monarchy and its
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opposition played out. This very fact turned education into a battlefield in which
were fought out political disagreements over the future of Morocco. Culture and
education were corner stones of the monarchy’s strategy to retraditionalize the
political system by reviving pre-colonial mechanisms of authority despite the
opposition of the progressives who advocated the establishment of a democratic
state. However, the victory of retraditionalization by the enthronement of Hassan II
in 1961 dealt, as an academic would later write, a strong blow to the “modernist
flow in Moroccan culture,” which “was subjected to a real operation of political
abortion whose harbingers appeared in the aftermath of March 23 [1965]
[education-related] events in Casablanca” (al-Naḥḥāl, 2013, para. 5). Noureddine
Afaya, the philosopher who made this statement, has thus attributed Morocco’s
failed modernity to repression in the fields of culture and education.
The strive to quell dissidence in 1960s and 1970s shaped the Moroccan state’s
attitude vis-à-vis education. In a much-referred-to interview with Jean Daniel, the
director of the French newspaper Le Nouvel Observateur, King Hassan II was
reported to have connected education to dissidence. In Hassan II’s opinion,
educated Moroccan youth either turned to Marxism or joined the ranks of the
opposition (El Kaidi, 2018, para. 7). This royal skepticism vis-à-vis education was
translated into an active endeavor “to convince the ruling class that the
massification of education represented a mortal threat to the socio-economic
equilibrium and the worldview on which the regime is [sic] founded” (Monjib,
2013, p. 7). Also, this desire to halt universal education in the 1960s coincided with
the firing of Abdallah Ibrahim’s government, which undertook fundamental socioeconomic reforms in all fields and strove to preserve the autonomy of the prime
minister’s office (Daoud, 2019, pp. 159-160; Kably, 2011, pp. 660-661). UNEM,
which was created to represent all Moroccan students in 1956, blamed the
recantation of the “generalization, unification, Arabization, and Moroccanization of
cadres” on the royal decision to sack Ibrahim’s government to prevent
modernization (Palazzoli, 1974, pp. 422-423). Even the ERC has recorded a
historian’s assessment of the Years of Lead as “a transitional period during which
the educational system [witnessed] the assassination of critical thinking and the
replacement of the younger generations’ learning of love of the homeland and its
territory […] with a superficial education that relied on an artificial history” (Hay’at
al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 72). The assumption underlying this statement is that critical
thinking bred dissidence and “real” history infused people with a spirit of resistance,
both of which were not encouraged during this period.
A progressive school was antithetical to the monarchy’s retraditionalizing
project. Morocco’s independence created a clash of visions of the nascent nationstate between a traditionalist camp that rallied behind the monarchy and a more
progressive camp that wanted to establish a democratic polity (Kably, 2011, p. 658,
661). While the monarchy was surrounded by former French Protectorate
administrators, caïds, rural notables, and officers, the progressive camp brought
together different factions on the left of Ḥizb al-Istiqlāl (Independence Party) as
well as members of the newly formed Armée de libération nationale (National
Liberation Army). The two principles that cemented this camp together was the
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establishment of a constitutional monarchy in which the king reigned without ruling
and continuing the struggle for the complete liberation of all Moroccan territories
(Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006b, p. 51; Kably, 2011, pp. 655-656). Retraditionalization
resulted in royal absolutism, which ended 44 years of colonial modernity by 1960.
Reflecting on retraditionalization, Laroui (2005) underlined the fact that instead of
the anticipated modernity, the monarchy “erased [the colonial reforms] one after
the other” (Laroui, 2005, p. 23). Concepts, such as bay‘a (allegiance) were
reinvented and constitutionalized to further legitimize the royal power (Hammoudi,
1997, p. 13). Moreover, political retraditionalization was accompanied by a return
of annual religious festivals to entrench the “dynastic, territorial and cultural”
continuity of the Alawite monarchy despite the Salafis’ protests (Valensi, 1990, p.
280). Not only that, conservative values as well as mosque education were
promoted in the media and state institutions (Kably, 2011, p. 665). In both school
and politics, the triumph of retraditionalization terminated “an experience in which
a Moroccan humanism could have been born” (Daoud, 2019, p. 174). Therefore,
conservative politics deprived Morocco of the myriad possibilities that could have
emerged from “a synthesis between Moroccan traditional, religious culture and
modernity” (Daoud, 2019, p. 174).
The revival of religious education undergirded political and societal
retraditionalization during the Years of Lead (Kably, 2011, p. 665). Mohammed
Chafik, a pedagogical inspector and former director of the prestigious College
Royal, where princes and princesses still receive their education, was recruited in
the context of May 1968 events in France to prepare “a more technical report on the
pedagogical value of Quranic education that was dispensed in the mosques” (Aït
Mous & Ksikes, 2014, p. 46). Chafik recommended dismantling the religious
education system because, in his very unreserved words, “education in the msids
[mosques] is one of the main causes of our civilization lag” (Aït Mous & Ksikes,
2014, p. 46). Against Chafik’s conclusion, the king instructed his minister of
education to generalize this education; a decision that Chafik would later explain
by the fact that msid education has historically furnished the Moroccan state with
its best servants because, always in his controversial phrasing, it teaches a “culture
of submission” (Aït Mous & Ksikes, 2014, p. 47). Chafik’s highly disputable
statement about Islamic education shows how deep the cleavage was between the
conservative monarchy and the modernist current in society. Speaking to the
consequences of this system, Khadija Merouazi, a human rights activist, declared
that the state’s education strategy “contributed to the creation of the […] submissive
Moroccan citizen” (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2005, para. 13). Princeton-trained sociologist
Mohamed Guessous also accused the state of using schools to “create generations
of hyenas” (Guessous, 2016, n.p.). The distrust of education by the authorities was
reflected in Guessous’s (2016) assertation that “considered school a threat and
education a tool for the training of agitators” who become “opponents of the
dominating economic, social and political regime” (para. 3). Guessous’s analysis of
the demonization of education was twofold: first, he showed that the dominant
discourse attempted to delegitimize the importance of the modern school; second,
in using the ḍabu’ or hyena metaphor to describe the new generations of Moroccan
students, Guessous referred to the fact that school curricula did not teach critical
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thinking skills. Paradoxically, as Monjib (2013) has revealed, in the midst of the
generalization of religious education, the royal palace requested the assistance of
the French embassy to order French first grade curricula for the crown prince (p.
10). This means that retraditionalization in education was not designed for all
Moroccan children.

Colonial Precursors: A Protracted Legacy

The Moroccan state had a model to follow in its revival of religious education
in parallel to a modern school. Acting as France’s first resident general in Morocco
between 1912 and 1925, Lyautey bequeathed Moroccans a dual educational system.
This system included pre-Protectorate, religious schools as well as the modern
school system that was established in 1912. While the former was accessible to all
children through mosques and Sufi orders, the latter was only available to the lucky
few Moroccans who joined the écoles des fils de notables. This colonial educational
system was governed by multiple discriminatory and intelligence-based
considerations, which all aimed to educate some Moroccans just enough to serve
the state without endangering the indigenous way of life (Knibiehler, 1994, p. 490).
In accordance with Lyautey’s vision to spare Moroccans colonial modernity, he
instituted a policy that continued to prevent Moroccan students from attending
French universities until 1930 (Vermeren, 2011, p. 56). Colonial education was also
hierarchized and organized according to class (poor/notables), location
(rural/urban), professions (agricultural and industrial schools), religion
(Jewish/Muslim), and languages (Berber/Arabic) (Chafiqi & Alagui, 2011, pp. 2930). By the end of its 44 years of direct rule in Morocco, France’s most impactful
achievement was the establishment of an elitist system that served a very small
number of Moroccans (al-Jābiṛī, 1972, p. 18). This same system has been reinvented
to be the key to the future and a passport to education in engineering, medical, and
business schools abroad in contemporary North Africa (Vermeren, 2005, para. 5).
This Lyauteyan model was there for the Moroccan government to guide the
reforms it undertook in education in the heated political climate of the 1960s. In
response to students’ increasing political commitment, education was reformed to
stave off the revolution of the educated generations. Controlling foreign languages
became central to the state’s strive to prevent political commitment among students.
For example, Moroccan students in the 1960s acquired solid linguistic skills,
allowing them to read Marx, Engles, Gramsci, Lenin, and Mao Zedong, when they
joined the university. This fact turned French into a revolutionary tool that the ruling
class attempted to withdraw from ordinary Moroccans. Vermeren (2011) has
written that Hassan II “limit[ed] students’ access to primary school, then secondary
school, [then] he start[ed] the Arabization, cancel[led] the teaching of ‘subversive’
topics (European history, philosophy, sociology), and then put[s] an end to
educational cooperation [with France]” (p. 57). In this context, depoliticizing the
youth was Arabization’s main function in the 1960s and 1970s. Although the king,
at least in in his public statements, was in favor of bilingualism (El Ayadi, 2009, p.
201), he did not hesitate to Arabize education when the class interests of his
opponents converged with his conservative politics (El Ayadi, 2009, p. 196).
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Therefore, there is reason to think, however, that Arabization, albeit a demand of
Moroccan nationalists, was used to prevent future generations of Moroccan students
from accessing revolutionary ideas.

Student Protests and Security-Driven Reforms in Education

UNEM, the national student union, opposed the conservative monarchy and
became the incubator of the Moroccan student-led revolutionary thought. Although
Moroccan students played an active role in the construction of Moroccan
nationalism during the colonial period, their activism after independence was
mistrusted by the monarchy. A depoliticized organization when it was established
in 1956 to represent all Moroccan students, UNEM’s first four years were
uneventful (Palazzoli, 1974, pp. 400-401). However, the student union took a
radical turn in the aftermath of the split within the Independence Party in 1959 and
the sacking of Ibrahim’s government in 1960 (Palazzoli, 1974, pp. 400-401). Its
1963 Azrou Manifest called for “the abolition of the regime [as] condition sine qua
non to extricat[ing] the country from the open or latent crisis with which it has not
ceased to wrestle since independence” (Palazzoli, 1974, p. 419). In the face of the
all-out political repression of political parties and student activism at the peak of the
Years of Lead, UNEM stressed that its historical responsibility required that
Moroccan students work toward “overthrowing the current regime and seiz[ing] of
power by popular, revolutionary, democratic and legitimate organizations that
represent the people” (Palazzoli, 1974, p. 421). These radical positions of the body
representing Moroccan students, high school students included, induced securitydriven reforms that aimed to reduce the number of students admitted into the
educational system.
These security-driven, rather than pedagogically-oriented, reforms triggered
the explosion of post-independence frustrations in Casablanca on March 23, 1965.
Minister of Education Youssef Belabès had proposed a bill in February 1965 to
institute an age cap on students’ access to high school (Brouksy, 2005, para. 2). By
proposing to prevent students who were aged 16 or more from passing final middle
school exams, the minister intended to decrease the number of students in
increasingly politicized high schools (Daure-Serfaty, 1993, p. 29). Moreover, these
proposed measures were disadvantageous to working class families at a moment
when the lucrative jobs left behind by former French employees as well as
thousands of qualified Moroccan Jews would be available for educated Moroccans
(Miskīn, 2019, para. 3). As a result of the announcement of this reform, Morocco
witnessed the first post-independence urban rebellion on March 23, 1965. Instigated
by UNEM, which became the de facto “spearhead of the opposition” (Kably, 2011,
p. 665), thousands of students protested peacefully in Casablanca on March 22.
These student protests ended in a bloodbath on March 23 (Brouksy, 2005, paras. 7
& 8). When parents and the unemployed joined the protests, the army intervened,
turning the peaceful protests into a carnage; leaving 500 to 1,000 dead according to
social memory (al-Sanūsī, 2009; Laffort, 2009, p. 43).
Up until the establishment of the ERC, this rebellion was relegated to oblivion.
However, ERC’s final report unsilenced the history of this educational revolt and
established some important facts about it. In addition to refuting the official version
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of the events, which “put the [death] toll at seven dead,” ERC confirmed the death
of 50 protesters (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006a, p. 91). ERC’s report has also specified that
“a large number of the 31 victims died of gunshot wounds in the skull and rib cage,”
including three children under the age of 10 (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006a, p. 75). Not
only did the ERC officialize the existence of higher numbers of dead, but its
investigative work brought more journalistic and scholarly attention to this
foundational urban uprising.
Security concerns also impacted humanistic disciplines, specifically sociology
and philosophy during the Years of Lead. For instance, the Institut de sociologie,
which played a crucial role in the effort to decolonize social sciences, practice
sociology as an “activist-oriented” discipline, rather than a “sociology on demand,”
and subsequently train generations of Moroccan sociologists, was closed in 1970
(El Idrissi, 2017, p. 193). May 1968, the rise of the Moroccan Marxist-Leninist
Movement (MMLM), and the state’s wariness of contact between researchers and
populations created an adverse climate to sociological work. Evoking the events of
this period, Zakya Daoud (2007) has observed that,
The authority suspected the institute of training evil spirits [italics in the
original]. Morocco has no need (for) these birds of bad omen that
sociologists are. Once the institute was shut down, sociology was replaced
by theology, and [the country] plunged into tradition and social archaisms
were encouraged. (p. 141)
Abdelkébir Khatibi, the then director of the institute, downplayed Daoud’s
observations. In his response to Daoud’s assertions, Khatibi refuted the institute’s
political role and foregrounded its academic mission and the diligence of its
students (Khatibi, 2008, p. 35). While expressing his consternation at the
government’s decision to shutter the institute, Khatibi attributed it to the prevalence
of resistance to critical and analytical inquiry among politicians (Khatibi, 2008, p.
35).
Philosophy did not fare any better. The Arabization of the discipline put an end
to 40 years of francophone philosophical practice in Morocco. When philosophy
was Arabized in 1971, Tahar Ben Jelloun, a then unknown philosophy teacher in
high school in Casablanca, left Morocco to live in France. Years later, Ben Jelloun
would say that the “Ministry of Interior decide[d] to Arabize philosophy in order to
prevent Moroccans from learning how to think, to doubt, and to reflect. So, we
[would] Arabize and teach Islamic thought [instead]” (Sorel-Sutter, 2015, p. 160).
Indeed, in tandem with the Arabization of philosophy and the onslaught on
sociology, Islamic studies were introduced in order to Islamize the Marxist youth
(El Ayadi, 2004, p. 114). El Ayadi (2004) has argued that by the time Islamic
Studies became a department during the academic year 1979-1980, philosophy,
which they replaced, became “the victim of the state’s new religious doctrine” (p.
118). Consequently, Islamization and Arabization of academic disciplines were
entrenched even as the Moroccan monarchy consolidated its authoritarian grip on
the country.
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Intellectual work was also denigrated in these disadvantageous circumstances
for education and culture. Intellectuals, especially the ones endowed with
“advanced theoretical training,” in the humanities were met with disregard and
suspicion (Monjib, 2013, p. 7). Analyzing Hassan II’s attitudes toward intellectuals,
including himself, Abdallah Laroui (2005), Morocco’s prominent historian and
philosopher, has written that “[f]for a long time, Hassan II ignored me as he ignored
tens of other intellectuals who prefer to write in Arabic” before adding that,
Hassan II did not like those of his subjects who lived abroad for a very
long time or pretended to have original ideas. […] [Hassan II] was only at
ease among technicians, who are content with finding solutions to the
problems that he brought to their attention (engineers, jurists, physicians,
littérateurs, etc.). He also got along very well with the traditional “ulamā”
who were also, in their own way, technicians of speech and psychological
manipulation. (p. ix)
Adil Hajji, a Moroccan intellectual, has explained Hassan II’s attitude toward
intellectuals by his traditional training (Dalle, 2011, p. 625). Accordingly, Hassan
II understood the intellectual as a learned person who “knew the texts, the scriptural
sources, the Quran, history, and language.” (Dalle, 2011, p. 625). Thus, the critical
intellectual had no place in this traditional understanding of intellectual work
(Dalle, 2011, p. 625). This royal disregard of highly educated citizens was true
across the board, even vis-à-vis educated Moroccan Jewish Communists
(Benbaruk, 1990, p. 51). Hassan II’s preference for technicians and technocrats was
probably due to the wrong assumption that their work is not premised on the
existence of freedom compared to their humanistic counterparts. Whereas
authoritarianism can cohabit with technical modernity, as is the case in places like
China today, freedom and free thought are more challenging to accommodate.
Therefore, this disregard for intellectuals was merely a reflection of an official view
of educated people and education’s place in society.
However, instead of placing all agency with King Hassan II, it is important to
underline that Moroccan political parties also facilitated the constraints imposed on
education. For instance, immediately after March 23, 1965, Mohammed Benhima,
the new Minister of Education, charted a detailed reform program. This reform plan
included pursuing the generalization of primary education, introducing a selection
process in high school to orient students to specialties that better suited their
abilities, instituting bilingualism as a policy, continuing educational cooperation
with France, and improving the quality of education (Adam, 1966, pp. 223-224).
However, the Independence party accused the minister’s plan of “undermin[ing] the
foundations of [the nation’s] personality as well as the unity of the country by
destroying the mother tongue; [and] its cultural unity, which is based on the national
language, the language of the Quran” (Adam, 1966, pp. 224-225). King Hassan II
snatched the initiative from the Independence party and, according to former
minister Mahjoubi Aherdan,
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ordered the institution of the five obligatory prayers in all universities and
schools, [and] the addition of a course of religious education, which will
be taken into consideration to sanction a student’s success regardless of
their grades or language of education. (Aourid, 2019, para. 1)
As El Ayadi rightly has noted, the convergence between “religious reformism of
the Istiqlāl party” and the “monarchy’s religious fundamentalism” accelerated the
implementation of the “Arabization-Islamization of education” (El Ayadi, 2004, p.
117). Therefore, political parties cannot be entirely absolved of their share of
responsibility for the lost potential of the Moroccan education system.
Today’s discussions of the pathetic state of Moroccan education lack the
historical depth. A better contextualization of education and culture within the
politics of the Years of Lead could explain how repression thwarted the
establishment of a progressive and egalitarian school system. It is true that
international bodies’ reports rank Morocco very low in terms of the quality of
education (for instance, UNESCO), but these reports do not ground these rankings
in historical contexts to illuminate the political origins of the failure. A systematic
study of the impact of the establishment of an authoritarian regime on the country’s
move toward educational modernity could elucidate the various ways in which the
rupture it instituted in both politics and society forestalled the potential of Moroccan
education. Moroccan’s rush toward private schools and foreign-language-based
education today does not emanate from society’s natural evolution but is rather a
consequence of the country’s failure to reverse the nefarious effects
authoritarianism-dictated policies had on education. It’s both state and society that
are paying the price for the sabotage of any progressive educational reform since
independence. The social and human cost of Morocco’s lagging behind in education
is now threatening to the state because of “civic disengagement, social delinquency
and political deviance” (Berrada & El Aoufi, 2007, p. 4). Confirming these
scholarly conclusions, none other than the official Haut Commissariat au Plan
(2007) has warned that “it is highly probable that any development strategy is
doomed to fail” if Moroccan human capital is not rehabilitated (p. 66); a belated
realization that, for sure, emerged from the exigencies of neoliberalism and
economic globalization, but which fails to contextualize the attrition in Morocco’s
educational system in the legacy of the Years of Lead.

Cultural Attrition during the Years of Lead:
Banned Cultural Journals

Cultural production, writ large, sustained multiple losses during the Years of
Lead. Sociologist Abdellatif Ezzine (n.d.) has rightly suggested that it is critical to
investigate “censorship and the different restrictions that targeted thought and
culture in their critical dimension” during the multidecade Years of Lead (para. 1).
Ezzine (n.d.) even suggested that culture lived its own Years of Lead. Following on
Ezzine’s proposition, I foreground the significance of cultural losses the Moroccan
cultural scene registered due to state violence. A combination of censorship and
weakening of the legal guarantees for publishers silenced cultural outlets that
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challenged the state or provided a critical approach to Moroccan affairs (Hay’at alinṣāf, 2006, p. 38). Over the years, many important newspapers, such as alMuḥarrir, and cultural journals Lamalif (1966-1988), Aqlām (1964-1982), alThaqāfa al-jadīda (1974-1984), al-Zaman al-maghribī (1980-1984), al-Jusūr
(1981-1984), and al-Badīl (1981-1984) were banned or pushed to bankruptcy
through frequent seizures (al-Sāwrī & al-Qasṭālī, 2014, pp. 72-76; Anoual, 1984, p.
4), thus depriving Moroccan society of their valuable contributions to public
debates. The mere absence of these publications from the public arena and the
suppression of the voices for which they served as a platform was a consequential
loss that scholarship has yet to account for.
Souffles/Anfas (1966-1973) is the cultural and political journal whose loss has
been studied the most (Fondation Laâbi, 2016; Harrison & Villa-Ignacio, 2015;
Sefrioui, 2013,). Souffles/Anfas was MMLM’s cultural outlet and the publication
that set the tone for the radicalization of the Moroccan youth after March 23, 1965.
The termination of Souffles/Anfas’s publication in 1972 dealt a huge blow to
Moroccan leftist thought. Indeed, Souffles/Anfas played a crucial role in creating a
new language and disseminating a leftist consciousness among both francophone
and Arabic-speaking readers. However, the tendency of francophone scholars to
present it as the main driver of intellectual transformation in Morocco is a risky
project. It has had the reverse effect of overshadowing the foundational work of
other cultural magazines during the same period. For instance, while Souffles/Anfas
adopted a rejectionist attitude vis-à-vis political parties, which was in line with
MMLM’s accusation of legal political parties of reformism (al-Shawi, 2015, p.
112), other publications, such as Lamalif and Aqlām, treaded more tactically to
survive. Unlike Souffles/Anfas’s short-lived experience, these journals managed to
sustain their existence for decades, neither compromising their editorial convictions
nor betraying their critical positions, thus making a long-term impact on both
society and politics. Yet the long-term impact Arabic and francophone Moroccan
journals had on culture and politics still demands a comprehensive study.
In terms of numbers, Arabic journals suffered the most from the Years of Lead.
Because of their larger readership, Arabic cultural outlets also played a crucial role
in creating a critical cultural scene in Morocco. Not only did Arabic journals
contribute to the emergence of a Moroccan school of thought, but they also put this
local thought in dialogue with other intellectual traditions from both the East and
the West. For instance, journal Bayt al-Ḥikma translated articles by Michel
Foucault, François Ewald, Jacques Derrida, Claude Lévy-Strauss, and Julia
Kristeva, among others (1985, issue 1, April 1). Al-Jusur’s articles also included
translations of Aleksei Tikhonov’s work on Soviet planning and Jacques Attali’s
work Sovietism (1981, issue 2, June 1). Nonetheless, authoritarian Morocco could
not cohabit with the analyses Moroccan and foreign intellectuals disseminated
through these cultural platforms. As a result, the journals al-Thaqāfa al-jadīda, alZaman al-Maghribī, al-Jusūr, and al-Badīl were banned at once in 1984 (Anoual,
1984, p. 4). Commenting on the administrative decision to close these cultural
journals, Annual (1984), the daily newspaper, interpreted this act as an “abortion of
innovative activities” in the cultural field (p. 4). Anoual also saw in banning these
journals an act of silencing that aimed to isolate serious intellectual work from
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Morocco’s “Arab and global environment” (Anoual, 1984, p. 4). In Anoual’s
analysis, the ban of the four journals “reflected repression’s sensitivity toward the
progressive cultural action” and signaled that this decision was bad news for the
rest of the cultural institutions that they might be targeted as well (Anoual, 1984, p.
4). The shuttering of several media outlets at the same time was meant to shock and
terrorize cultural actors that the state had limitless power over their existence.
The early cultural outlets of Amazigh cultural expressions were also repressed.
Neither Amazigh activists nor their cultural production were spared the generalized
experience of loss during the Years of Lead. Upon Morocco’s independence, Arab
nationalism’s irredentism combined with the Jacobin state model erased Amazigh
identity from the public sphere. The persistence of the legacy of the so-called Berber
Dahir, which was supposedly passed by the French Protectorate in 1930 to divide
Arabs and Berbers in Morocco through French-Berber schools and the application
of customary law to Berber areas, contributed to the negative attitude toward
Amazigh cultural expression. Even worse than the Berber Dahir was the fact that
the leaders of the coups d’états against Hassan II in 1971 and 1972 were Amazigh.
However, the cultural field was the area in which repression of Amazigh rights was
most manifested in the 1980s. For example, Ali Sidqi Azayku, an Amazigh activist,
historian, and littérateur, was accused of posing a threat to the safety of the state
because of an article he published in the first issue of journal Amazigh: revue
marocaine d'histoire et de civilisation in 1981. Entitled “Fī sabīl mafhūm ḥaqīqī
lithqāfatina al-waṭaniyya” [toward a real conceptualization of our national culture],
the article was a revisionist attempt to question the connections between language,
Islam, and national culture in Morocco. In driving a wedge between Islam and
Arabic, Azaykou refuted the argument whereby Arabic as the language of Quran
was used to eliminate Amazigh. Azaykou showed that the Quran did not invent a
new Arabic with the advent of Islam in order to demonstrate that claiming Amazigh
culture and being Muslim were not mutually exclusive (Azaykou, 1981, p. 41).
Azaykou’s
article constituted a frontal attack against the advocates of Arabization,
who falsely linked the primacy of Arabic to Islam and preached incessantly
the need to replace foreign languages with Arabic in order to promote a
national culture while acting in an entirely contrary manner in their own
lives. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011, p. 99)
However, the price was a year in jail for Azaykou and the prohibition of the journal.
With the ban of Amazigh: revue marocaine d'histoire et de civilisation, “Amazigh
cultural movement was deprived of any activity” until the early 1990s (Rollinde,
1999, para. 11).
The end of Lamalif’s journey in 1988 was probably the most significant loss of
a cultural platform during the Years of Lead. Lamalif ()ﻻ, which means NO in
Arabic, was one of the most important journalistic experiences in Moroccan
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history. 1 Started by Jacqueline David (Zakya Daoud) and Mohammed Loghlam in
1966, Lamalif: Revue Mensuelle, Culturelle, Economique et Sociale initiated a
different kind of journalism in Morocco. Combining coverage of culture, economy,
society, and in-depth analyses of specific issues in a monthly journal, Lamalif
targeted readers from across the social and political spectrum (Lamalif, 1966, p. 5).
The conspicuous NO gracing its third page could not be more explicit in terms of
the journal’s position vis-à-vis the Moroccan state throughout the period of its
publication. Established in the tumultuous context of the state of exception (19651970) and the brutal attack on opposition political parties, Lamalif incarnated the
mission of the “fragmented” Moroccan left without being a political party
(Rollinde, 2002, p. 149). However, Lamalif’s editors’ success at striking a balance
between their role as journalists/intellectuals and critics of the socio-political and
cultural conditions in Morocco granted the journal longevity and allowed it to reach
200 issues that shed critical light on a host of issues of interest to Moroccan society.
Lamalif rehabilitated intellectual reflection through a journalistic practice that has
both the “critical gaze and the necessary autonomy to analyze, comprehend, and
react to society in which [the journalist] lives.” (Rollinde, 2002, p. 150). By 1988,
Lamalif was “a reference for a whole democratic current,” thus posing a threat to
the state (Rollinde, 2002, p. 151). Just as Lamalif reached the pinnacle of its success
by the publication of its 200th issue, Daoud and Loghlam shut down the magazine
in a last activist act against authoritarianism. Rather than accepting a humiliating
compromise with the authorities to publish articles by the powerful Minister of
Interior and confining Lamalif’s distribution to university campuses (Daoud, 2007,
p. 323), Daoud and Loghlam terminated the existence of their journal. The
disappearance of Lamalif from Moroccan newsstands in 1988 was synonymous
with the end of a most elegant and subversive way of saying NO to power. It also
meant the loss of the longest existing and one of the most successful cultural
journals in Moroccan history.
Even today, it is difficult to compare Lamalif to other journals. The balance
between political independence, intellectual integrity, and critical engagement with
societal questions was Lamalif’s mission statement from the start. In its first
editorial entitled “Ce que nous voulons,” (this is what we want) Lamalif announced
its identity and explained the three axes that defined its mission. In displaying  ﻻon
its covers, Lamalif (1966) rejected the prevalent feelings of negativity in Moroccan
society and presented itself as “an optimistic journal […] driven by hope,
confidence, and certainty” (p. 5). Representing a project of hope in the morose
Years of Lead required Lamalif to be a “journal that is resolutely open, open to all,
to all professions, all intellectual tendencies, from all sides” (Lamalif, 1966, p. 5).
Lamalif presented itself as part of most Moroccan people’s shared vision to “create
a new state of mind, lift taboos and walk steadfastly toward the future” (Lamalif,
1966, p. 5). In delineating its cultural, economic, and social nature, Lamalif used a
I had incorporated some ideas from this section into the proposal of the Lamalif anthology
I am co-editing with Professor Ali Alalou. Although my work on Lamalif predated my
partnership with Professor Alalou on the anthology, I would like to acknowledge the
discussions I have had with him about the journal in the last two years.

1
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very subversive definition of culture as “contestation, questioning, so renovation,
because it is the profound expression of a people, its problems, aspirations, and its
own reality” (Lamalif, 1966, p. 6). Finally, Lamalif’s self-chosen mission to provide
analyses and studies of socio-economic and cultural questions did not prevent it
from interest in literature and art, which it served immensely over 22 years of its
existence.
The special dossiers, which Lamalif promised to publish on a monthly basis,
were the location in which its 200 issues made a breakthrough in Moroccan thought
and social debates. Opening up new breaches in the walls of social and political
taboos, Lamalif published issues entitled “Yesterday and today’s crazies” (issue 81,
1976), “The war on cannabis” (issue 4, 1966), “ELECTIONS, TOMORROW?”
(issue 10, 1967), “Che Guevara” (issue 16, 1967), and “Is there a Jewish question
in Morocco” (issue 21, 1968), among others. The cover of its penultimate issue was
dedicated to the “Language debate” in Morocco (issue 199, 1988). From women’s
rights to religiosity in the French banlieues and Morocco’s multilayered belonging
to the Maghreb, Africa, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean, Lamalif brought
significant depth to the journalistic practice in Morocco. The combination of
information, analysis, and reflection on the deeper implications of the topics
discussed in its pages made Lamalif a true forum for cutting-edge analyses about
and theorization of a different Morocco. The premature termination of Lamalif’s
publication in 1988 has since deprived generations of Moroccans of the benefits of
these theorizations.
Lamalif survival under repression should not, however, be interpreted as a sign
of democracy. In fact, Lamalif survived for 20 because its editors succeeded at
navigating Morocco’s uncertain political situation. Loghlam and Daoud’s
knowledge of when their work would be tolerated and when it would invite a
backlash allowed them to practice their profession carefully. For instance, Lamalif
did not cover MMLM members’ trials nor those of the soldiers involved in the coups
d’états in 1970s. Additionally, unlike Souffles/Anfas’ support of independence in
Western Sahara, Lamalif’s positions vis-à-vis this issue was closer to the
authorities’. This aptitude to be critical and also careful when criticism is a risky
endeavor helped Lamalif to stay a critical voice in an authoritarian climate for two
decades. Nevertheless, a financially successful and intellectually autonomous
journal could not be tolerated by the authorities. It only took one sentence about the
Moroccan state officials’ habit of making people wait in its 200th volume for the
journal to come under fire. This would ultimately lead to the termination of its
existence.
In 1994, six years after the publication of Lamalif was stopped, Zakya Daoud
provided an insightful reflection on the journal’s experience. Daoud remembered
an independent, successful, and conscientious journal that should not have
disappeared from the Moroccan cultural landscape. According to Daoud (1994),
all our collaborators in the beginning were part-time workers and
volunteers. However, they slowly became permanent in their jobs and
received remuneration. Our commercial means had also been developed.
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By 1988, Lamalif was 90 pages-long and used full color (quadrichronmie),
especially in its covers which were reserved for Moroccan paintings, in an
[an effort that reflected] a nationalist aesthetic will. Also, our
independence has always been preserved, and Lamalif had never any
money issue, which was very rare [in the press sector]. It would have
continued to exist indefinitely by its own means. (p. 162)
However, what Daoud did not say was that this very success was the reason Lamalif
had to cease existing. Since the journal was not struggling enough financially, the
authorities must have known that a compromise with the editors was impossible.
Daoud (2007) would later reveal that the Minister of Interior complained of the
“enormous” nature Lamalif’s sales, which reached 12,000 copies a month (p. 322).
This number might sound insignificant in 2019, but it was quite momentous for a
mostly illiterate society in 1988. Even Souffles/Anfas did not reach such numbers in
its heyday in 1960s. For the Minister of Interior, these high sales indicated that
Lamalif was not just read by the francophone elites, but also by ordinary Moroccans.
To prevent Lamalif’s critical voice from seeping even deeper into society, the
minister offered the publishers the possibility to sell it on university campuses only
(Daoud, 2007, p. 322), a solution Loghlam and Daoud rejected, and, instead, closed
the journal out of their own volition. The pressure to put an end to Lamalif’s
publication in 1988 cannot but evoke the continuity of the same mistrust of
education and culture that reigned over Morocco since independence.

The ERC and the Immaterial Losses in Education and Culture
During the Years of Lead

Upon the recommendation of the Conseil consultatif des droits de l’Homme,
King Mohammed VI put in place Morocco’s ERC on January 7, 2004 (Hay’at alinṣāf, 2006, p. 16). Its founding decree tasked the ERC with “nonjudicial”
prerogatives that “include[d] the inquiry, the investigation, the assessment, the
arbitration, and the recommendation” about the past arbitrary detention and forced
disappearance (USIP, 2009, Article 6). The same decree limited ERC’s mandate to
finding the truth about past violations of human rights without determining
individual responsibility for them (USIP, 2009, Article 6). Specifying ERC’s
temporal prerogatives, Article 8 of the decree stated that the ERC was created “to
deal with the violations committed during the period from the independence to the
date of the royal approval creating the Independent Commission of Arbitration in
charge of compensation of the victims of forced disappearance and arbitrary
detention” (USIP, 2009, Article 8). This period roughly covered Morocco’s
independence in 1956 through the passing of King Hassan II in 1999. Compared to
other transitional justice experiences, ERC had one of the longest temporal periods
in the world (Groupe de travail, 2009, p. 8).
The royal decree establishing the ERC also engaged in a crucial terminological
exercise. The decree defined what was meant by “Gross human rights abuses,”
“Forced disappearance,” “Arbitrary detention,” and “victim” (USIP, 2009, Article
5). Closely connected to these definitions and based on the signification given to
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them, reparation, which is the corollary result of a claimant’s established
victimhood, is also defined by the decree as,
all measures taken for the victims because of the material and moral
damage sustained by them or by their legal successors as a result of forced
disappearance or arbitrary detention, as well as the general and collective
measures. The reparation of damage may take different shapes and be put
into practice through various measures such as compensation,
readjustment, reintegration, rehabilitation, the preservation of memory and
guarantees against the repetition of the violations. In case the victim died
or her fate could not be determined, the reparation of the damage will be
affected in favor of his/her heirs or legal successors. (USIP, 2009, Article
5)
It’s all too clear from the stipulations of the decree that ERC’s investigations and
reparation work were tailored to focus on the tangible damage arbitrary detention
and forcible disappearance inflicted on individual victims. Indeed, ERC’s priority
was to resolve individual suffering and addressing the needs of the direct and
indirect victims of the Years of Lead. After all, it was thanks to the mobilization of
these victims and their families that the state was forced to undertake the ERC
process. Moreover, the violence done to the educational system and cultural
production platforms lacked the brutal tangibility of political disappearance and its
consequences, which explains it not being a priority. Despite the constraints of its
mandate, ERC was able to chart a path for a future examination of losses in
education and culture.
ERC was able to transcend the limitations of its founding decree’s focus on
individual victims. Not only did ERC succeed at assessing how state violence
sabotaged Moroccan society’s potential beyond the direct victims, but it also
elucidated “[t]he relationship between violations and socio-economic issues,”
which it made recommendations to redress (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 66). ERC’s
final report contains an important analysis of the impact of “violations on the fields
of education and culture” (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71). In a summary of the
discussions during a workshop dedicated to “educational and cultural reforms”
organized on March 8, 2005, the panelists’ comments included in this section shed
light on the imbrication of state violence and attrition in education and culture.
According to the participants, violations in the field of education and culture “stifled
creativity” and led to the “beginning of the end of the individual and the citizen”
(Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71). The panelists also argued that the violations in the
“cultural field impacted creativity, including poetry, the novel, [and] music”
(Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71). Because associations working in the fields of
education and culture were targeted, the country’s creative potential was repressed
(Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71). Always according to ERC’s final report, the reforms
undertaken in education “were insufficient, and the educational system remained as
it was in the past.” (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71). This assessment paints a bleak
picture of a society in which 48% of the population was illiterate (Hay’at al-inṣāf,
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2006c, p. 72) and which missed its rendezvous with the open horizons of modernity
in 1960s (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71).
Delving into the contradictions of the educational system, ERC emphasized the
unevenness between languages in Morocco. Arabic and Amazigh languages were
disadvantaged by French’s predominance in business, administration, and higher
education (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71). This confirmed the suspicion that
Arabization in the1960s sought to limit working classes’ access to foreign
languages to protect the interests of the elites. Amazigh language was specifically
presented as having been sacrificed by both the state and media. The identity-related
ramifications of this sacrifice of Amazigh language was a symbolic rejection of the
marginalized Morocco (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p.71), the one inhabited by the
Amazigh speakers. In addition to a lack of linguistic justice, the report asserted that
Morocco’s linguistic policy was designed to serve the goals of the regime, which
produced “generations that mastered no language” (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71).
ERC’s claims about languages during the Years of Lead open up a capacious space
for inquiry into educational and cultural loss that future ethnographic work could
quantify.
The ERC made multiple recommendations to redress the effects of political
violence on Morocco. In order to reconcile the Moroccan state with its people and
prevent the repetition of the same violations in the future, ERC’s recommendations
focused on creating strong legal and institutional safeguards for human rights. For
instance, under the heading “constitutional protection of human rights,” Hay’at alinṣāf wal-muṣālaḥa (2006c) called for the constitutionalization of human rights and
equality between genders as well as strengthening the “constitutional monitoring”
of executive laws (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 84). These changes targeted the
transformation of the legal, security, and human rights culture in the country
through governance-focused reforms in these areas (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, pp. 8491). However, there is a mismatch between ERC’s diagnosis of the educational and
cultural losses during the Years of Lead, and its proposed rehabilitation measures,
which focused merely on a general protection of human rights. Except for
recommendations about the recognition of Amazigh language and culture, the
organization of the national archives and the revision of history curricula (Hay’at
al-inṣāf, 2006c, pp. 92-93), ERC seems to be more invested in a forward-looking
education and sensitization about human rights. Nonetheless, ERC placed education
and culture at the heart of the areas in which the Moroccan state needed to reckon
with the violence of the Years of Lead.

Conclusion

Throughout this article I have demonstrated that education and culture suffered
from state violence during the Years of Lead. Locating the beginning of educational
and cultural attrition in the early years of independence, I have revealed how much
of the power struggle between the monarchy and the opposition played out to the
detriment of education policies. Moreover, I have shown that the skepticism that
governed the state’s attitudes vis-à-vis education also translated in the form of
disdain and disregard for intellectuals and intellectual work. The ban of cultural
journals deprived Moroccans of open spaces for critical engagement with new
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ideas. Reflecting the linguistic and cultural diversity that was lost with the shutting
of journals, I listed some of the main Arabic, Amazigh, and francophone journals
that were closed by administrative decisions. The sheer number of these journals
proves that Moroccan thought and societal development were impacted by these
decisions.
Articulating educational and cultural loss can be elusive and at times difficult
to quantify. Evidence, however, can be found in the most unlikely places. The
official report “50 years of Human Development in Morocco” has concluded that
the failure of the Moroccan school has “revealed itself in its inability to transmit
values of citizenship, openness and progress, freedom of thought and learning of
critical thought” (Mouline & Lazrak, 2005, p. 15). The results are there for us to
understand the impact of authoritarianism on education and intellectual production.
Finally, this examination of the impact of the Years of Lead on education and
culture is only a step toward a more critical investigation of cultural and educational
losses that society incurred during the five decades of mistrust between state and
society in Morocco.

References

Adam, A. (1966). Chronique sociale et culturelle Maroc. Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord,
322-334.
Aït Mous, F., & Ksikes, D. (2014). Le métier d’intellectual: dialogue avec quinze penseurs
au Maroc. Casablanca, Morocco: En Toutes Lettres.
Akalay, A. (2017, May 9). Rapport du cinquantenaire: Histoire d’un projet de règne.
Telquel. Retrieved from https://telquel.ma/2017/05/09/rapport-du-cinquantenairehistoire-dun-projet-regne_1546226/?utm_source=tq&utm_medium=normal_post
al-Jābirī, M. (1972). Aḍwā’ ‘alā mushkil al-ta‘līm bil-maghrib: 2. Natā’ij wa muqaddimāt.
Aqlām, 2-3, 1-23.
al-Naḥḥāl, M. (2013, June 6). Limādhā kāna ak-Ḥasan al-thānī lā yuḥib al-muthaqqafīn. alIttiḥād al-Ishtirākī. Retrieved from https://www.maghress.com/alittihad/175791
al-Sanūsī, M. A. (2009, March 23). Inditifāḍat 23 mārs. al-Ittiḥād al-Ishtirākī. Retrieved
from https://www.maghress.com/alittihad/87701
al-Sāwrī, A., & al-Qasṭālī, L. (2014). al-Majallāt al-thaqāfiyya al-maghribiyya: al-dhākira
wal-imtidād. Rabat, Morocco: Moroccan Ministry of Culture.
al-Shawi, A. (2015). Kitāb al-dhākira. Casablanca, Morocco: Fennec.
Aourid, H. (2019, January 29). Il était une fois le conte de l’éducation. Zamane. Retrieved
from http://zamane.ma/fr/il-etait-une-fois-le-conte-de-leducation/
Azaykou, A. S. (1981). Fī sabīl mafhūm ḥaqīqī lithqāfatina al-waṭaniyya. Amazigh, 1, 3543. Retrieved from https://archive.org/stream/Azaykou/19681986#page/n23/mode/2up
Benbaruk, S. (1990) Trois-quarts de siècle pêle-mêle : Maroc-Canada, 1920- 1950-1990.
Montreal, Canada: Les Imprimeurs du 21e Siècle.
Berrada Gouzi, A., & El Aoufi, N. (2007). La non-scolarisation au Maroc: Une analyse en
termes de coût d’opportunité. Critique économique, 19, 3-47.
Brouksy, O. (2005, March 21). Que s’est-il vraiment passé le 23 mars 1965?. Jeune
Afrique. Retrieved https://www.jeuneafrique.com/86510/archives-thematique/que-sest-il-vraiment-pass-le-23-mars-1965/
Chafiqi, F., & Alagui, A. (2011). Réforme éducative au Maroc et refonte des curricula dans
les disciplines scientifiques. Carrefours de l'éducation, 3(1), 29-50.

160 Journal of Global Initiatives

Dalle, I. (2011). Hassan II, entre tradition et absolutisme. Paris, France: Fayard.
Daoud, Z. (1994). Être ou ne pas être : histoire de LamaIif. Revue Méditerranéennes, n°
Hors-série, 161-164.
Daoud, Z. (2007). Maroc: les années de plomb, 1958-1988 : chroniques d'une résistance.
Houilles, France : Éditions de Manucius.
Daoud, Z. (2019). Abdallah Ibrahim: L’histoire des rendez-vous manqués. Casablanca,
Morocco: La Croisée des Chemins.
Daure-Serfaty, C., & Serfaty, A. (1993). La mémoire de l’autre. Paris, France: Au Vif
Stock.
El Ayadi, M. (July, 2004). Entre islam et islamisme. Revue internationale d’éducation de
Sèvres, 36, 111-122.
El Ayadi, M. (2009, May). Le Manifeste historique des intellectuels du Maroc … contexte
et enjeux. Al-Madrasa al-Maghribiya, 1, 193-205.
El Idrissi, M. (2017). Al-mas’ala al-susiūlūjia wal-qaḍāyā al-ijtimā ‘iyya ‘inda paul pascon:
madkhal liqirā’at fi fikr ‘ālim ijtimā‘ mu’assis wa multazim. Omran, 5(19), 185-196.
El Kaidi, Y. (2018, November 2). Educational Reforms in Morocco: A Chronology of Failures.
Inside Arabia. Retrieved from https://insidearabia.com/educational-reforms-moroccofailures/
Ezzine, A. (n.d.). Années de plomb du savoir et de la culture : fiche projet. Academia.
Retrieved from
https://www.academia.edu/23058943/Années_de_plomb_du_savoir_et_de_la_culture
_MAROC_-_FICHE_PROJET
Fakihani, A. (2005). Le couloir: Bribes de vérité sur les années de plomb. Casablanca,
Morocco: Tarik Editions.
Fondation Laâbi. (2017). Une saison ardente: Souffles 50 ans après. Casablanca, Morocco:
Éditions du Sirocco.
Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures. New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc.,
Publishers.
Groupe de travail sur les disparitions forcées ou involontaire. (2009). OHCHR. Retrieved
from https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/13session/A-HRC-13-31Add1_fr.pdf
Guessous, M. (2016, July 6). Innahum yurīdūn khalq ajyāl jadīda min al-ḍibā‘. Alquds.
Retrieved https://www.alquds.co.uk/%ef%bb%bf%d8%a5%d9%86%d9%87%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%af%d9%88%d9%86-%d8%ae%d9%84%d9%82%d8%a3%d8%ac%d9%8a%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%af%d8%a9-%d9%85%d9%86%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b6%d8%a8%d8%a7/
Hammoudi, A. (1997). Master and Disciple: The Cultural Foundations of Moroccan
Authoritarianism. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
Harrison, O., & Villa-Ignacio, T. (2015). Souffles-Anfas: A Critical Anthology from the
Moroccan Journal of Culture and Politics. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Haut Commissariat au Plan. (2007). Croissance économique et développement humain:
Eléments pour une planification stratégique 2007-2015. Retrieved
https://www.hcp.ma/file/104411/
Hay’at al-inṣāf wal-muṣālaḥa. (2005). Jalsat al-ḥwār al-rābi‘a li-hay’at al-inṣāf walmuṣālaḥa tunāqish al-iṣlāḥāt al-ḍarūriyya ‘alā al-mustawā al-tarbawī wal-thaqāfī.
Retrieved from http://www.ier.ma/article.php3?id_article=895
Hay’at al-inṣāf wal-muṣālaḥa. (2006). Al-taqrīr al-khitāmī: al-ḥaqīqa wal-inṣāf walmuṣālaḥa. Rabat, Morocco: al-Majlis al-Istishāri Li-Ḥuqūq al-Insān.
Hay’at al-inṣāf wal-muṣālaḥa. (2006a). Al-taqrīr al-khitāmī: al-ḥaqīqa wal-mas’ūliyya ‘an
al-intihākāt. Rabat, Morocco: al-Majlis al-Istishāri Li-Ḥuqūq al-Insān.

Brahim El Guabli 161

Hay’at al-inṣāf wal-muṣālaḥa. (2006b). Al-taqrīr al-khitāmī: inṣāf al-ḍaḥāyā wa-jabr alḍarār. Rabat, Morocco: al-Majlis al-Istishāri Li-Ḥuqūq al-Insān.
Hay’at al-inṣāf wal-muṣālaḥa. (2006c). Al-taqrīr al-khitāmī: muqawwimāt tawṭīd al-iṣlāḥ
wal-muṣālaḥa. Rabat, Morocco: al-Majlis al-Istishāri Li-Ḥuqūq al-Insān.
Kably, M. (2011). Histoire du Maroc: Réactualisation et synthèse. Rabat, Morocco: Institut
Royal de la Recherche sur l’Histoire du Maroc.
Khatibi, A. (2008. Le scribe et son ombre. Paris, France: Éditions de la Différence.
Knibiehler, Y. (1994). L'enseignement au Maroc pendant le protectorat (1912-1956). Revue
d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 3(41), 489-498.
Lamalif (March, 1966). Ce que nous voulons. Lamalif Revue Mensuelle Culturelle
Économique et Sociale, 1, 5-7.
Laffort, B. (2009). L'immigration des intellectuels marocains en France. Paris, France:
Karthala.
Laroui, A. (2005). Le Maroc et Hassan II. Québec, Canada: Les Presses Inter
Universitaires/Centre Culturel Arabe.
Maddy-Weitzman, B. (2011). The Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge to North
African States. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
Miskīn, Y. (2019, March 24). 23 mars 1965…al-madhbaḥa allatī ista‘ṣat ‘ala al-nisyān.
Alyoum24. Retrieved from https://m.alyaoum24.com/1227061.html
Monjib, M. (2013, March). Haro sur les intellectuels. Zamane, 28, 6-10.
Mouline, M. T., & Lazrak, A. (2005). Rapport sur les perspectives du Maroc à l’horizon
2025: Pour un développement humain élevé. Retrieved from
http://www.ires.ma/documents_reviews/rapport-perspectives-maroc-a-lhorizon-2025developpement-humain-eleve/
Palazzoli, C. (1974). Le Maroc politique. De l’indépendance a 1973: Textes rassemblés et
présentés par Claude Palazzoli. Paris, France: Sindbad.
Anoual (1984, February 2). Qarār man‘majallāt thaqāfiyyah. Retrieved from
http://www.saidallouch.net/za/za_div4.pdf
Rollinde, M. (1999). Le mouvement amazighe au Maroc: défense d’une identité culturelle,
revendication du droit des minorités ou alternative politique? Insāniyāt, (8), 63-70.
Rollinde, M. (2002). Le mouvement marocain des droits de l’Homme: Entre consensus et
engagement citoyen. Paris, France: Karthala.
Sefrioui, K. (2013). La revue Souffles 1966-1973: Espoirs de révolution culturelle au
Maroc. Casablanca, Morocco: Editions du Sirocco.
Sorel-Sutter, M. (2015). Décomposition française: Comment en est-on arrivé là? Paris,
France: Fayard.
USIP. (2009). Dahir approving Statutes of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission.
USIP. Retrieved from
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Morocc
o-Charter.pdf
Valensi, L. (1990). Le roi chronophage. La construction d'une conscience historique dans le
Maroc postcolonial. Cahiers d'Études Africaines, 119, 279-298.
Vermeren, P. (2005). Maghreb : des élites entre deux mondes. Revue internationale
d’éducation de Sèvres, (39), 47-56.
Vermeren, P. (2011). La formation des élites marocaines, miroir de la mondialisation? Le
Télémaque, 1(39), 53-66.

162 Journal of Global Initiatives

Journal of Global Initiatives
Vol. 14, No. 2, 2019, pp. 163-176.

Moroccan Islamists Debate
the Causes of Violent Extremism
Jack V. Kalpakian
Abstract

Using Moroccan sources associated with the Islamist movement, this
paper outlines the theological and political challenges facing Morocco in
terms of violent extremism, especially those posed by certain Wahhabi and
Salafist views that reject mainstream Moroccan Islam. It outlines the
state’s response to terrorism and evaluates its causes as offered by several
Islamist Moroccan intellectuals.
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Introduction

Many Moroccans believed their country to be immune to terrorist attacks after
September 11, 2001. This belief was associated with a narrative of exceptionalism
that held the Kingdom of Morocco to be exempt from extremism because of its
traditionalist approach to Islam, and the relationship between the state, the
monarchy, and Islam, as well as the prevalence of Sufi, or Islamic mystical, practice
among vast segments of the population. However, it was precisely in this context
that the attacks of May 16, 2003, took place in Casablanca. The country’s
exceptional, ideational context guaranteed these small attacks an impact and
influence far beyond their actual casualty figures, which were about 44 people,
including about 14 attackers. For the following four years, the state played a catand-mouse game against the local Al Qaeda affiliates. By April 2007 with the
dismantling of some of the most active terrorist cells that participated in the May
16, 2003, attacks, that conflict was resolved clearly in the favor of the state, but
certain problems remained (Benchemsi, 2007, pp. 21-27). First, small unaffiliated
groups and individuals continued to pose a threat. This threat was clearly displayed
in the April 28, 2011 Argana cafe attack in Marrakesh that killed 17 people and
injured 25 more people. Second, some Moroccans, particularly those from overseas
and from Northern Morocco continued to join Al Qaeda and Da’esh, (the “Islamic
state” organization), because of alienation and feelings of marginalization, and due
to the ideological appeal of the extremists. For these reasons, the views that
prompted the attacks continued to find currency among a minority of Moroccan
people. The December 2018 murder by local Da’esh sympathizers of Louisa
Vesterager Jespersen and Maren Ueland, two young Scandinavian tourists and
hikers, caused the debates among Moroccan people at all levels surrounding
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terrorism, religion, external influence, and the relationship with the Western world
to be reignited. The attackers posted videos of their attacks and the state was able
to arrest them and much of their support network. This was not surprising given that
there are frequent arrests of terror suspects and a nearly continuous pace of cells
being disrupted and neutralized. A recent example was the arrest of three Daesh
sympathizers in Fez. The Director of the Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation,
Mr. Abdelhak El Khiyame, claimed that his agency apprehended 2,963 suspects and
dismantled 341 cells between 2002 and 2016 (Igrouane, 2016).
Like any other country facing the problem of violent extremism, the Moroccan
state has been trying to address the root causes of the attacks. For example, it created
a development program that tried to address some of the socioeconomic grievances
of the poorest citizens and engaged in a well-structured security campaign against
the terrorist movements, without returning to the excesses of human rights
violations of the past. The conventional policy of political reform, economic
inclusion, and law enforcement worked quite well. In some ways, it helped create
the political condition of relative deprivation, a situation where political instability
increases despite overall economic improvements because some people are doing
better than others. In this context, the Arab Spring arrived in Morocco in the form
of the February 20th movement of 2011. The state's response to that movement
included additional democratization and the election of an Islamist Democrat as the
Government President – a position analogous to Prime Minister, since Morocco is
a monarchy. The government’s efforts are discussed here to provide some context
for the reader; there are more extensive assessments of these efforts by the author
and others elsewhere.
This paper focuses on a neglected aspect of the Moroccan struggle against
extremism – religious debates surrounding terrorism. While religious reforms, such
as the creation of women religious guides, requiring college level education for
Imams and reforming the structure of religious education, have been an integral part
of the Moroccan program against violent extremism, earlier attempts focused on
security did not address theological questions that fed violence against Moroccan
people, other Muslims, and non-Muslims alike when approached from a Takfiri
(declaring other Muslims as apostates and anathemizing them as well as
legitimating violence against them) perspective. The threat of violence coexists with
the rejection of the State’s approach to Islam, which were the rejection of the
religious legitimacy of the state to gain currency, the door to more violence and
even civil war will open. This is the theological challenge that needs to be addressed
before Morocco can transition to a society where democracy and rule of law are
actualized within a Muslim and conservative social context. Therefore, this paper
addresses the origin, extent, and scope of Salafi and Wahhabi thought in a Moroccan
context with particular emphasis on its most extreme views such as those held by
the violent wings of Takfiri Salafis. It also addresses the State’s responses to Salafis
and Wahhabism in both historical and current settings. Nevertheless, the first and
primary focus of this paper is the conversation that took place among self-avowed
Moroccan Islamists concerning the origins of violent extremism. There is a vast gap
in the literature concerning this issue, and this paper intends to bring some of these
debates into the attention of the larger world.
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Preliminary Considerations

This paper deals with the political challenge posed by non-governmental,
particularly Wahhabi and Salafi theological positions, and focuses on the political
and security implications of these challenges for the population and government of
Morocco (in that order), but it does not take a position concerning the accuracy or
“correctness” of any particular set of theological positions. Questions like “is
Wahhabism a correct interpretation of Islam?” are outside the scope of this paper.
There are many overlapping varieties of Wahhabism and Salafism movements, and
most of these do not preach or practice violence. The author simply invites readers
to place themselves in the shoes of a Salafi or Wahhabi Moroccan, who often is a
small independent businessperson struggling to earn a living. After 2003, Moroccan
Salafis and Wahhabis found themselves under the State’s suspicion and under a
certain level of social isolation as well. The vast majority of them do not support or
condone violent extremism, but they nevertheless found themselves feared by many
in the rest of the population, including, in some cases, their own relatives.
To complicate matters, the contributions of Salafi and Wahhabi communities
to the Moroccan economy are significant. As stated earlier, these men and women
are often active in small business, employing themselves and others, providing
services and products, and engaging in new investments using their own savings.
People living in Morocco would attest that the economic contribution of Salafi
communities is vital, and that any program that aims to deal with their violent subset must avoid damaging the majority of its members and followers who do not
condone violence. This paper looks at these beliefs only in terms of their security
and political implications. Other people’s rights are impacted only by the actions of
some members of these communities, not by the beliefs, however exclusionary they
may be, of the majorities within them. Nevertheless, given that terrorists have used
these beliefs to justify their attacks, discussing them is legitimate within the rubric
of political studies, because they are also political beliefs, provided that the
action/belief distinction is kept in mind. Terrorists like Al-Mailoudi have openly
stated that their beliefs motivated their attacks (Al-Mailoudi, Fezazi, Al-Shadali, &
Hadous, 2003, pp. 47-48).

Definitions

For the purposes of this paper, terrorism, also referred to as violent extremism,
is political violence committed by non-state movements or persons against civilians
with the aim of using the resulting fear to insure political and/or social change. The
term was used by anarchist and Marxist terrorists, including those who are selfavowed, without shame or odium in the past. One Marxist theorist and practitioner
of terrorism took issue with the negativity attached to the term:
The accusation of “violence” or “terrorism” no longer has the negative
meaning it used to have. It has acquired new clothing; a new color. It does
not divide, it does not discredit; on the contrary, it represents a center of
attraction. Today, to be “violent” or a “terrorist” is a quality that ennobles
any honorable person, because it is an act worthy of a revolutionary
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engaged in armed struggle against the shameful military dictatorship and
its atrocities. (Marighella, 1969)
While Marxists like Marighella subscribed to the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin,
and Mao, the violent segment of the Salafist movement has less clearly defined
textual boundaries. Like Marxists however, they also tend to write prolifically about
their reasons for carrying out the things they do. They often use theological
arguments to justify their actions. So, Moroccan scholars, including Islamist and
Salafi scholars, have attempted to distinguish between the various forms of Salafi
and Wahhabi discourse. Implicitly, this paper uses a typology created by the late
Moroccan Member of Parliament and religious scholar, Shaykh’Abd al-Barri AlZamzami. There are certain advantages to using a typology derived from Moroccan
political life, because it is sensitive to the local context. Due to his interest in Islamic
mores governing sexuality, Al-Zamzami was controversial in his lifetime and
attracted both ridicule and praise from Moroccan social liberals and Salafis alike.
Nevertheless, his typology, while clearly designed to uphold his own version of
Salafism, can be very useful in navigating Moroccan perspectives of their Salafi
and Wahhabi communities. He participated in the intellectual life of the country,
making presentations in parliament and at scholarly conferences, so his eccentricity
should not disqualify him from inclusion in this analysis.
Al-Zamzami blames the Gulf States for the spread of types of Salafism that he
finds negative in Morocco. However, matters are more complex, as this paper shows
in subsequent sections. He clearly exonerates Moroccan forms of Salafism, such as
his own and those of ‘Allal Al-Fasi, who campaigned for an independent Morocco
and helped found the current political system, where liberalism influences what is
essentially an Islamic kingdom (Howe, 2005). For Salafis and other Islamists,
controversy over what constitutes both “true” Salafism and the “correct” application
of the thoughts of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab is unavoidable. The table below summarizes
and gives a formal structure to Al-Zamzami’s thoughts on problematic forms
Salafism in Morocco. It will be addressed in more detail in the section on
theological challenges.
In the view of this author, a social scientist cannot take a stance on these
questions since these questions are outside the scope of social sciences and properly
belong to Islamic Theology. Nevertheless, it is possible to look at violence, which
is a form of political actions, so the focus here is on actions rather than on beliefs.
Beliefs, as claimed by the terrorists themselves, only become a topic of study here
when they are acted upon. Consequently, the object of study here is the Jihadi
Salafism with its complete focus on violence, terrorism, and war upon all nonbelievers, including other Muslims and its security implications.
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Table 1
Al-Zamzami’s Typology of “Incorrect” Forms of Salafism in Morocco
Type
Arabian
Gulf-style
Wahhabi
Salafism
Popular
Salafism

Characteristics
NGO-level
institutionalization, “Quranic
houses,” and private and
public financial support from
the GCC states.

Doctrine
Represents an extension of Gulf
approaches to Wahhabism in a
Moroccan context. Differs from
traditional and historic
Moroccan approaches to
Wahhabism.
No textual references. It relies
on adherence to satellite TV
preachers.

An emphasis on appearances
and the superficial
characteristics of the
movement, for example
being bearded and insisting
on the headscarf.
Jihadi
A complete focus on
The ideas of Osama bin Laden
Salafism
violence, terrorism and war
and those who inspired him,
upon all non-believers,
including Abu al-Alaa Alincluding other Muslims.
Mawdudi.
Isolationist Rejection of the rest of
Strict focus on Wahhabi
Takfiri
society as pagan and selffoundational texts such as those
Salafism
isolating, restricting social
written by Ibn Qaim Aland personal relations to the
Jouyaza.
“saved” community only.
Source: Al-Zamzami, A. (2006). Salafism and Terrorism. Casablanca, Morocco:
Al-Najah, al-Jadida, and Sunnah Publications, pp. 13-16.

Yet Al-Zamzami has to be placed in a global context. “Salafi” and “Wahhabi”
are terms that have been confused and conflated. There is ideological overlap
between the two movements, and they are often confused, precisely because their
extremist wings tend to overlap and function as one. As with the rest of the world,
Moroccan Salafis represent a broader movement than the specific Wahhabi
movement which originated in what is now known as Saudi Arabia in the 18th
century. A Salafi is a Muslim who adheres to the path of the pious predecessors (alSalaf al-Salih), in contrast to those who adhere to al-Khalaf al-Falih (the productive
successors). The term has seen multiple uses over the generations, with people as
diverse as Melcom Khan of Iran, and Mohmmed Abduh and Abu al-‘Alaa alMawdudi of Pakistan being labeled Salafis. In the Moroccan context, the ideology
of Al-Fasi has been described as Salafi-inspired, because it postulated that Morocco
must be a Muslim rather than a secular state. The term is consequently fluid and
needs proper contextualization both in terms of time and place. Al-Zamzami is
essentially saying that there are correct versions of Salafism and Wahhabism and
these tended to be the earlier forms in Morocco; consequently, his typology allows
us to see some of the diversity in the Moroccan Salafi and Wahhabi movements. As
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for Wahhabism, it is a simpler term, because it refers to its founder, Mohammed
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab an 18th century religious reformer and political activist aligned
with the dynasty that came to rule Saudi Arabia. Like many other Salafis, he
followed the Hanbali tradition of jurisprudence. It is his work, particularly his
reading of Ibn Tammiya, and that of his students that forms the textual basis of what
became Wahhabism. Wahhabism relies on asserting that the precedent of Ibn
Tammiya and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab is pious, and consequently, it is a Salafi
movement. There are non-Wahhabi Salafists, and the two terms are not
interchangeable, despite considerable overlap (Bin Ali & Bin Sudiman, 2016).

Normative Considerations

Given the topic, there is also no escape from normative considerations, and this
paper is no exception. This analysis stands with violent extremism’s civilian victims
first. It also stands with people who face ostracism for their religious views despite
not advocating or practicing violence. To that end, this paper uses a combination of
history, participant observation, and perspectives of Moroccan leaders as a basis for
outlining the theological challenge in a Moroccan context. To do so, it outlines the
overall Moroccan counter-extremism effort, details the history of Moroccan Salafi
and Wahhabi movements in the country, and summarizes the overall Moroccan
policy response in the religious field, particularly the theological response of the
State. Since these items are ultimately reflected in government policies, the overall
approach is influenced by elements of policy evaluation methods. In this case, the
ultimate measure of success is a decline in the performance of terrorist outfits within
the country. Finally, this paper takes what terrorists say about their motives
seriously. Like their Marxist and Anarchist forerunners, Al Qaeda, Da’esh and their
supporters have been vocal both in print and in public statements about their
motives. Taking them seriously, understanding their points of reference, and
responding to them must be part and parcel of any policy designed to reduce
violence.

Attempts at Social and Economic Reforms

Economic improvement is a vital action for governments to take in response to
violent extremism. Poverty creates an environment that, directly or indirectly,
enables violent extremism to grow. On the eve of the May 16, 2003 attacks, the
Moroccan economy languished far behind that of Southern Europe and
unemployment was rife. The tourism sector did not have its current dynamism and
access to and from the country was very expensive. The largest sector in terms of
employment was and remains agriculture and most people still resided in the
countryside when the attacks took place. While Morocco still lags behind Southern
and Eastern Europe, the per capita gross national product on a purchasing power
parity basis (per capita GDP/PPP) rose from 3985 USD in 2002 to 7841 USD in
2015 (World Bank, 2011).
These improvements owed a lot to monetary stability, wherein the Moroccan
dirham is tied to a basket of currencies dominated by the Euro, while trading in a
controlled market. Other factors that assisted economic growth have been
government encouragement of manufacturing, especially of automobiles and
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aircraft parts for export. The call center industry, specializing in providing services
in French and Spanish, was an early success. The economy now suffers from a
paradox of a labor shortage combined with unemployment, which is a better
dilemma than unemployment alone. The problem is increasingly refusal of urban
youth to participate in the workforce due to perceptions of low wages when
compared to the same professions in Europe, and a simpler problem – the lack of
qualified individuals. Despite the obvious and clear improvement of the overall
economy, Morocco still needs a rather generous welfare and development policy
because poverty remains dire and widespread. Poverty complicates the
government’s counter-extremism efforts. The government’s National Initiative for
Human Development (INDH in its French abbreviation), whose first phase ran over
a five-year period until 2010, appeared after the attacks. The initiative was partially
motivated by a desire to reduce the appeal of violent extremism, which in Morocco
takes a religio-political form, but it was also a studied response to a rather dire
situation. The program's first phase cost about 1.2 billion U.S. Dollars over its fiveyear life. However, the Initiative struggled especially in its attempts to impact rural
livelihoods:
At the launch of the operation (2005), Morocco suffered from high levels
of poverty (14.2%, with a further 23% ‘economically vulnerable’),
strikingly poor income inequality, and low human development indicators.
Over half of adults were illiterate, compared to an average of 10% for
lower middle-income countries. Poverty was equally pronounced in both
rural and urban areas, albeit with different characteristics. Although half
of public expenditures were allocated to the social sectors, access and
quality were limited, particularly for rural people because of the centrally
driven approach, with low levels of participation, weak coordination
amongst line ministries, and inadequate targeting. (World Bank, 2013)
The growing pains of the program marked the first phase. The country had to
confront a wide variety of social issues head on with few resources. The second
phase saw the construction of new highways, high speed rail, and solar and wind
power plants. The program is now in its third phase, as new facilities are being
opened by the King under its own title and structure (Nafaa, 2017), and was referred
to as a priority by the current Minister of Finance (Le360Live, 2017). Assessing the
program’s impact is outside the scope of this paper. The INDH program began after
the May 16, 2003, attacks.

Political Reforms

The early reaction to the May 16th attacks, initially included the continuation
of the alternation policy with the elected parliament and State, wherein the monarch
shared power with an elected prime minister elected by the majority coalition in
parliament. By 2007, a conservative, Istiqlal Party-led, government chose a set of
policies that many Moroccans found restrictive. By that same year, Al Qaedas
sound defeat in Morocco had become apparent, and the more conservative political
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forces with Moroccan society and government felt that the threat had waned. Istiqlal
is a conservative, nationalist party that led the country to independence; its ideology
reflects the thinking of Al-Fassi and emphasizes the Islamic nature of Morocco.
Historically, it endorsed the Arabization of Morocco and the abandonment of
Tamazight. Therefore, the pace of political reforms that began under the alternation
governments in the late 1990s slowed and in some cases reversed. “Alteration” was
a power-sharing agreement between Hasan II and the Socialist opposition. The post
of prime minister alternated between a monarchist prime minister and the socialist
opposition. The real or perceived decline in freedoms during 2007-2011 set the
stage for the Arab Spring in Morocco. The Moroccan Arab Spring took the form of
a non-violent youth protest movement named after the day it was launched on
February 20, 2011. The movement was supported by the youth wings of nearly all
mainstream Moroccan political parties. It had the support of well-known and wellconnected businesspeople like Karim Tazi and the late Miloud Chaabi (Mekouar,
2016).
In response to the February 20th Movement, the king offered reform. These
measures included a referendum on a new constitution, more powers shifted to the
parliament, and the replacement of the Prime Minister's office with a newly elected
government president, a title borrowed from Spanish practice, akin to the term
“Minister-President” used in Germany and Belgium. The ensuing elections saw the
emergence of the Islamist-democratic Justice and Development Party (PJD) as the
leading partner in the government coalition. The party performed well in office and
secured re-election, but the parliamentary dynamics prevented the re-election of its
leader ’Abdel-Ilah Benkirane as government president. While there has been noted
progress towards democracy in Morocco, the present situation falls short of the
reform vision outlined by the king on March 9, 2011 (Mohammed VI, 2011). In
part, the shortcomings were due to the fear expressed by the political parties and the
political class over issues related to Moroccan identity, including religion. The
political debates on Moroccan religious identity necessarily included the Islamist
Party of Justice and Development, which won the two following elections.

Religious Reforms

While the political, economic, and policy reforms can be said to reduce the
risks of violence, the root cause of terrorism in Morocco lies in issues connected
with certain extremist interpretations of religion first and foremost. It has been
argued by Sa’id Al-Kahal, a leftist secular Moroccan thinker, that there is no
economic or political reason for the violence. By pointing to the attackers’ own
statements, Al-Kahal argues that the attackers’ reasons are primarily eschatological.
He highlights a statement made in court to a judge by Mohamed Damir, a suspect
connected to the May 16th attacks who viewed his actions as ones that would find
favor on the final day by God:
I would like to surround you with the knowledge that I committed
the actions of which I am accused; I committed them and did them
upon the knowledge of the book of God and the sunnah of his
prophet … I am happy … because I [am] being tried for
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commanding the good and prohibiting that which is forbidden.
(Al-Kahal, 2008, p. 271)
Damir clearly articulated the challenge to the state posed by his particular strand of
the Salafi movement, and to its credit, the government has been trying to institute
reforms to address the ideological challenge it faces. To start, it began reasserting
its monopoly on the religious sphere. After the April 2007 attacks, the state shut
down “Qu’ranic Houses” controlled by Mohammed ‘Abd al-Rahman AlMaghraoui. Al-Maghraoui is known for enjoining the marriage of nine-year old
girls in a well-known fatwa he had issued online (Hemimat, 2009, pp. 103-111).
Today, the state requires aspiring imams to possess a bachelor's degree with at least
the equivalent of a “B” average, have knowledge of foreign languages, and undergo
additional instruction on special topics such as Social Psychology. The Ministry of
Islamic Affairs also reformed the curriculum on clerical seminaries and female
religious counselors. Theses counselors, or Murshidat in the Arabic plural, were the
first such step ever undertaken in the Islamic world (Ministry of Religious
Foundations and Islamic Affairs, 2006).

The Theological Challenge

As Al-Zamzami (2006) argued, there are Moroccan versions of Salafism,
which include elements of Wahhabism in their approach to the religion. While the
state is Maliki (based on the Sunni school established by Imam Malik Ibn Anas,
who emphasized the precedents set in Medina by the Prophet of Islam and the
people of the city or as he called it “the work of the people of Medina”) in
jurisprudence, Asha’ari (following the ideas of Asha’ari who emphasized the need
for context and discussion while arguing that some things need to be accepted on
faith) in doctrine, and Sufi (mystical and directly relational to God through mystical
practice) in foundation, it has had a long history of interaction with the Wahhabi
movement from its inception onwards (Ministry of Religious Foundations and
Islamic Affairs, 2017). It is important to note that the Muslim world does not view
its own divisions in the same manner of denominational differences within Buddhist
and Christian traditions. Informal and less structured influence has been ongoing
since the 18th century, when Wahhabism emerged. Wahhabism's influence in
Morocco is so significant that a book, Wahhabism: the Founder, the Thought and
the Movement (Belkabir, 2004) written by some of the country’s leading luminaries,
was prepared in its defense in an attempt to de-link it from the attacks that took
place only six weeks prior. The manuscript went to the printer the following year
and is a valuable insight on how Wahhabism is understood by the country’s
intellectual elite. The book attempts to defend Wahhabism as a well-meaning, if
largely unsuccessful, reform movement. It contains a speech by the Sultan Slimane
(1766-1822, reigning from 1792 until his death) attacking certain folk practices
such as festivals and shrine visits. One article underscores the connection between
Sultan Mohamed Ibn Abdullah, Moulay Slimane’s grandfather, who was a
contemporary and a supporter of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. Professor Abdelhadi
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Boutaleb (deceased in 2009), a senior Moroccan scholar and a diplomat, recognizes
the historical roots of the Moroccan Wahhabi movement in the book:
Sultan Mohamed ibn Abdullah led an important reform movement. He
focused his attention on the science of hadith, which is the source of the
Salafi movement since the time of Ahmed ibn Hanbal and Ibn Tammiya.
He introduced Morocco to the foundations of Imam Ahmed [sic Ibn
Hanbal] and the foundations of Ibn Hanifa, which were not known in
Morocco … He was a true Salafi, who described himself as Maliki in
jurisprudential orientation and Hanbali in belief. He forbade the reading of
books based on kalam [sic “dialogue” meaning philosophical debate]
along Ash’arite lines, and enjoined stopping at beliefs taking from the
apparent meaning of the book and the Sunnah without interpretation in the
Salafi way. (Boutaleb, 2004, p.142)
Boutaleb is recalling a very different Salafism and a very different Wahhabism that
existed in Morocco’s past. Not only that, the peaceful life exemplified by Boutaleb
and other academic admirers of Wahhabism stands in sharp contrast to the lifestyles
enjoined and pursued by the terrorists. Having served as the Moroccan ambassador
to the United States, Boutaleb’s political and personal philosophy was clearly
realistic and pragmatic. Like other authors in the book, he appears to think that
Wahhabism can be a progressive force. The authors go as far as to invoke the late
Mohamed ‘Abed Al-Jabri, a professor of philosophy and Islamic thought at
Mohammed V University and a quasi-secular thinker (deceased 2010) criticized for
his free thought by Salafis (Al-Hababi, 2004, p. 160).
The pragmatic and rationalistic ideas of Boutaleb concerning Wahhabism are
not shared by Takfiri Salafists (see table on page 4) who would condemn him for
consorting and interacting with pagans (the Americans) during his stint as
ambassador in the United States. The Wahhabi movement has been characterized
by excess and over-politicization, according to a leading Salafi figure, Farid AlAnsari (2007). An often misunderstood and underestimated theologian, Al-Ansari
was a social activist in the Unification and Reform Movement (Tawhid wa Islah).
This was the social movement underpinning the Moroccan Party of Justice and
Development. One of his works directly relates to politics and his concerns about
the Islamist movement in Morocco (Al-Ansari, 2007). Al-Ansari clearly states that
the Moroccan Islamist movement in general has been too harsh against Maliki
Islam, Moroccan Sufism, and the use of non-Hanbali (Hanbalism is the Sunni
school established by Ahmed Ibn Hanbal, emphasizing the literal application of the
Qu’ran, within which Wahhabism arose) references to the point of anathematization
or takfir. Al-Ansari (2007) calls out the Islamist movement for creating six “idols,”
to include, “the idolization of the Hanbali denomination in the Salafi movement.”
Concerning this final idol, Al-Ansari hones an internal critique of his own
movement. First, Al-Ansari argues that the attacks on Maliki Islam, under a new
generation of Salafi and Wahhabi scholars in Morocco have alienated both the state
and many other Moroccans. Second, he argues that their insistence on ideological
purity has harmed their community by fomenting internal divisions. Third, he
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argues that the movement’s attacks on Sufism have earned it the hostility of Sufi
orders in Morocco and their suspicion. Fourth, he argued the movement emphasized
external appearances of piety instead of a values framework. Fifth, he argued that
the form actually advocated by the Salafi and Wahhabi movement is basically what
is practiced in the Gulf States (which he does not mention by name), and that it is a
form alien to the needs and historical heritage of Morocco (Al-Ansari, 2007, pp.
141-175). In short, Al-Ansari forcefully argues that the Moroccan Wahhabi and
Salafist movement is founded on a rejection, a nearly complete one, of Moroccan
traditional approaches to religion. The rejection includes earlier versions of
Salafism that were brought by Sultan Mohamed Ibn Abdullah, his grandson Sultan
Slimane, independence leader ‘Allal Al-Fasi, as well as followers of the current
movement in Morocco. Since the Moroccan constitution and tradition establish the
monarch as the commander of the faithful in Morocco, and Islam as the official
religion, the theological and political challenge posed by the more extreme and
violent Wahhabi and Salafist Islamist movements is serious, because it leaves no
room for compromise.
This challenge is based on specific readings and interpretations of religious
texts. As these can be classified, they are the closest item that can exist to a “cause”
for violent extremism in a Moroccan context. Such causes were outlined by Abu
Zaid Al-Maqari al-Idrissi (2010), a PJD member of parliament, a linguist, and a
researcher in Islamic thought. In essence, he complements and elaborates upon the
criticisms raised by Al-Ansari. He outlines five broad levels of causation for
terrorism: these are cultural, psychological, mental, militant, and political. In terms
of what he calls a cultural set of causes, he also identifies five important factors that
lead people to become extremists. The first one is simply not having the tools to
understand what the Qu’ran means. The second one is the detachment of written
word from its context, including the Qu’ranic verses related to war. The third factor
involves the mixing of missionary work with governance, failing to understand the
difference between the two stages. Fourth, the confusion of what God appears to
promise non-believers with what believers ought to do to them. The fifth factor
involves mixing “right and wrong” in terms of interacting with other cultures,
movements, and sects. Like Al-Kahal, Al-Zamzami and implicitly Al-Ansari, AlMaqari al-Idrissi places the cause of violent extremism first and foremost in
ideology. On the psychological level, he identifies a psychology of oppression and
despair that invites retaliation against the other; he points out that the traditional
distinctions between individuals and their nation-states has broken down in people’s
minds. At the mental level, he puts blame on media in general for making Islam
appear more militant and violent than other religions, which has two effects: it feeds
Islamophobia and simultaneously encourages violence. At the militant level, he
argues that many people believe that military might is the proof that can show the
correctness of the Islamic message and therefore warring against other populations
is warranted. Finally, at the political level, he argues that there are grievances, such
as Palestine, held by Muslims that feed extremism (Al-Maqari al-Idrissi, 2010, pp.
62-72).
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The Role of Education and Dialogue

While security and law enforcement measures are important, they cannot stop
terrorism without the help of society/government in addressing the underlying
threats that extreme Salafi Jihadi interpretations of Islam pose to the Moroccan state
and its citizens. As stated earlier, it is important to avoid the pitfall of putting the
Salafi movement in Morocco into a single category. The clear majority of Salafis
and Wahhabis do not practice or preach violence. A royal declaration, or dahir, was
issued in 2016 calling for reforming the religious education system in Morocco to
emphasize the values of peaceful co-existence, moderation, and tolerance with other
cultures, civilizations, and religions. The declaration set off a debate on how to
reform religious education, as well as debates between those advocating “Islamic”
education against those advocating “comparative religious studies.” Nevertheless,
the king’s declaration was responding to the need to reduce the threats posed by the
violent Jihadi minority branches of the Salafi movement (Al-Kafi, 2016, pp. 3-6).
The strategy used the educational system to recruit members and spread counternarratives (Benhamza, 2016, pp. 7-16).
Educational changes may help reduce the threat in the future, but they can do
little to persuade convinced terrorists that they should give up their planned
violence. Therefore, the government also pursued arrests which led to interactions
that inevitably took place between the accused terrorists and the various officials in
the Moroccan legal system. Subsequent dialogue in the courts resulted in requests
for royal pardons, implying that the convicted terrorist accepts the legitimacy of the
Moroccan state. This was the case with several Salafi clerics who had given
sermons to the attackers but expressed reservations and retractions in prison. A
more formal process took place where the head of the official Moroccan ‘Ulema
Association, Ahmed ‘Abadi, met with a group of 12 convicted terrorists that were
guided by the May 16th leader, Khalid Hadad. The dialogue included such topics
as the Maliki school of jurisprudence, the Command of the Faithful (the Moroccan
king’s religious role), and issues related to dealing with non-Muslims. Based on
recent reports, it appears that some of these prisoners are changing their minds out
of conviction and not convenience (Abu al-Ma’ali, 2017).

Conclusion

Overall, the complex and multifaceted Moroccan response to the challenge
posed by the terrorists and their ideology has been effective. It may be useful to ask
what other countries can do for Morocco, but there is little that outsiders can do.
Nevertheless, there are things that are actionable for foreign states and actors in
terms of reducing the level of threat both within Morocco and outside it. These
actions may not be politically popular or economically cheap, but they are doable.
These include enhanced levels of aid and investment in Morocco as well as a more
cautious approach to Salafi movements than the one exhibited by the West in the
Middle East and Syria. Aside from not creating violence in places like Libya and
Syria, providing help to countries like Morocco also means accepting that these
states are a product of a very different political and religious history. Other areas of
cooperation would include security sector reform and educational improvement.
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Ultimately, however, the theological challenge represented by the extremist
segments of the Salafi movement can be met only by the ideological resources of
the local states and governments in question and the religious establishments they
support. The good news concerning the challenge posed by violent extremists is
that the Islamist movement itself is taking them seriously and is taking apart their
arguments. No less a Salafi thinker than the late Farid Al-Ansari has criticized the
tendency to exclude, demonize, and condemn other people, and the whole
mainstream of Islamist community is engaged in a debate concerning their origins
and what to do about violent extremism, and that is a far cry from the denial that
met the attacks on both May 16, 2003, and on 9/11.
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Morocco’s Makhzen and the Challenge
of National Development
Zakaria Fatih
Abstract

This article explores the question of national development in Morocco
considering the institution of the makhzen. It asserts that to adequately
assess Morocco’s national development as a post-colonial country, it is
necessary to rely on an economic model based in politics rather than in
theories exclusively informed by classical and neoclassical economics.
Among the key economists called upon to investigate the validity of
politics in discussions of national development and income inequality are
the following: Simon Kuznets, Thomas Piketty, W. A. Lewis, and the duo
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, all of whom continue a long
tradition of economic sociology that had been established by George
Simmel, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Thorstein Veblen. Acemoglu
and Robinson offer an especially useful theoretical model to discuss
Morocco in light of its pervasive political institution: the makhzen.
Overall, the paper demonstrates that inadequate national institutions, such
as the makhzen in the case of Morocco, adversely impact national
development and increase the level of income inequality.

Introduction

Taking Morocco as a case study, I argue in this paper that national development
depends on the nature of national institutions. The more democratic and inclusive
national institutions are, the more likely the climate those institutions generate will
spur economic growth and reduce income inequality and social disparities.
Approaching national development from the vantage point of politics and history is
not an unprecedented undertaking; German historicists and American
institutionalists did just that when they advocated for an economics open to “other
disciplines, such as law, political science and arts” (Sandelin, Trautwein, &
Wundrak, 2014, p. 68). Added to those early historicists and institutionalists a new
wave of economists, including but not limited to Acemoglu and Robinson (2013)
and Piketty (2014) have argued for a politically-informed analysis to the question
of economics and national development, considering this move an urgent
undertaking in light of the looming threats of “arbitrary and unsustainable
inequalities” that capitalism may “automatically generate” in the 21st century
(Piketty, 2014, p. 1).
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An analytical approach to the question of national development in Morocco,
taking into account the state of national institutions and the role of politics in
decision-making, has the potential to better assess Morocco’s national development
than a purely economic model that depends, according to Smith (2010), on the
magic of the “the invisible hand” to fix the irregularities of the market economy and
curb the rate of income inequality and social disparities. The pervasive nature of the
institution of the makhzen proves that, far from being a question of economics
alone, national development in Morocco is also a question of politics and political
institutions. By relying on Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) and Piketty (2014), I
will show why non-politically informed economic models of national development
are inadequate for post-colonial economies such as Morocco’s. Specifically, I will
consider the “institution” of the makhzen in Morocco in light of Acemoglu and
Robinson’s (2013) model that focuses on the creative power of inclusive
institutions.

Literature Review

Thus, the literature review deliberately prioritizes a political economy inspired
by the findings of social scientists and, moreover, lists a contemporary sample of
noteworthy representatives of this brand of economics as well as their inevitable
precursors. The allusion here is to George Simmel (2011), Émile Durkheim (2014),
Max Weber (2019), Thorstein Veblen (Lerner, 1964), and Karl Polanyi (2001) who,
in an attempt to refute the self-regulating nature of classical economics, espoused
an economics open to findings from the social sciences, mainly from the fields of
sociology, law, and politics. The affiliation to economics tasks the social scientist
with the ethical responsibility to “inform democratic debate and focus attention on
the right questions” as well as, argues Piketty (2014), “redefine the terms of debate,
unmask certain preconceived or fraudulent notions, and subject all positions to
constant critical scrutiny” (p. 3). The role of social scientific research appears in the
case of Simmel (2011), as Lemert noted in the foreword in how he “tells the story
of the greed of history’s dominant classes” (p. xi). According to Lemert, Simmel
(2011) understood the capitalist system’s new power, money, and its impending
influence on human relations, which entails not only the rise of a new nexus
between freedom and money but also the birth of new forms of social bondage. Of
interest here is how the social order, in the presence or absence of good institutions,
has informed economic life throughout history, an assertion that Simmel (2011)
illustrates with various examples from Roman law through modern times.
Sociological input in economics is also palpable when Durkheim (2014) draws
attention to the social origins of the division of labor that until his time had been
viewed as an exclusively economic matter, if not even a phenomenon of the natural
order: “There is no need to demonstrate the serious nature of this practical problem:
whatever assessment we make of the division of labor, we all sense that it is, and
increasingly so, one of the fundamentals of the social order” (p. 35). The affinities
that the social order has with economics inform Weber’s (2019) distinction between
“social rank” and “social class,” between the economic standing of individuals in
traditional societies, in which the standing depends on social privilege, and their
economic status in modern societies, which is not as much determined by social
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rank or privilege; the conditions of possibility for good economics are antithetical
to social rank:
Every society based on social rank is ordered conventionally, through the
regulation of life conduct; this therefore creates irrational conditions for
consumption. This obstructs the free formation of markets, through
monopolistic appropriation, and by obstructing the free disposition of
individuals’ capacities to engage in gainful activity on their own account.
(Weber, 2019, p. 457)
Weber’s (2019) attitude reflects the risks to individual freedom he observed in
societies of social rank as compromising social mobility and the dynamics of the
market economy through monopolies based on privilege and the persistence of the
natural order of things.
The inextricable nexus of economics and social sciences had as functionality
for Simmel (2011), Durkheim (2014), Weber (2019) as well as for Veblen (Lerner,
1964) and Polanyi (2001) a corrective action to the fateful question of economics.
Veblen (Lerner, 1964), for example, targets the classical economics’ view of the
division of labor as a phenomenon of the natural order and accuses Smith (2010) of
a “teleological bias” (p. 245). In the same vein, sociologist Fred Block not only
underscores Polanyi’s (2001) predisposition to what may be called regulatory
economics, he also believes in its capacity to avert the catastrophes, such as the
great wars, brought about by classical economics:
Although he wrote The Great Transformation during World War II,
Polanyi remained optimistic about the future; he thought the cycle of
international conflict could be broken. The key step was to overturn the
belief that social life should be subordinated to the market mechanism.
Once free of this “obsolete market mentality,” the path would be open to
subordinate both national economies and the global economy to
democratic politics. Polanyi saw Roosevelt’s New Deal as a model of these
future possibilities. (Polanyi, 2001, p. xxxv)
In the second decade of the 21st century, from where I draw the two main sources
for this study, the nexus of economics and social sciences has gained even more
ground even as it became gradually more focused on questions of poverty, income
inequality, and national development respectively in Banerjee and Duflo (2011),
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), and Piketty (2014).
The ubiquity of the makhzen, as a political force in Morocco, calls for
politically informed theories of national development, such as the ones propounded
by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) on the one hand and Banerjee and Duflo (2011)
as well as Piketty (2014) on the other hand. The hypotheses of these economists in
so far as they highlight the nexus of political institutions to national development is
especially relevant for examining non-democratic economies where the struggle
against income inequality, and access to education, employment opportunities, and
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social justice logically call for greater political participation and voice in national
development policy debates. A meaningful discussion of the Moroccan political
economy ought to take seriously the specter of the makhzen due to its far-reaching
powers. In the words of political scholar Boukhars that Hissouf (2016) quotes in his
article, “Benkirane [former Moroccan prime minister] frequently lashes out at the
subterfuge of what he calls the ‘ghosts’ and ‘crocodiles’ of the invisible but
powerful ‘Makhzenian’ force” (p. 50). Moreno Almeida (2013) also tries to expose
the subterfuge, or the hideout, that veils the makhzen’s direct intervention in social,
economic, and cultural affairs: “In other words, through this method [withdrawing
funding for social and cultural events], the Makhzen is not directly accused of
controlling freedom of speech or censorship” (p. 322). In the relative absence of
focused research on the role of the makhzen in national development, I rely mostly
on the work of Mohamed Daadaoui (2011, 2012), as well as Fatima Harrak (2018)
and Abdallah Laroui (1999). These scholars recognize the makhzen as both an
economic and a political force. As an institution, it is a hierarchical composite of
religious entities and administrative agents endowed with political power. Daadaoui
(2011) defines the makhzen as “an administrative apparatus” with “particular social
and cultural symbols,” and “practices and rituals that have always buttressed
functions of the state” (p. 47). He lists the three main groups that formed the
makhzen until the 19th century. The first group, in charge of internal and external
policy, includes “the king,” “the wazirs (viziers or ministers),” and “the hajibs
(major domo);” the second “the chancellery” composed of “katibs (secretaries)” in
charge of communicating “state policies and measures” taken by the first group; the
third “treasurers and intendants” tasked with fiscal issues (Daadaoui, 2011).
Daadaoui (2011) writes, “the establishment of modern political institutions neither
changed nor transformed makhzenite authority. The current modern state in
Morocco features western style institutions of government and precolonial power
traditions” (pp. 59-60). Daadaoui (2011) makes it clear that the traditional structure
of the makhzen still runs the country:
Makhzen has maintained its traditional structures necessary for its
legitimation. At the same time, it has reformed its institutions into a
modern administration within a façade constitutional monarchy. …
Politically, makhzen is the only constant force, while all other political
forces are transient and ephemeral. (p. 67)
In essence, Daadaoui (2011) suggests that institutions implemented during or after
colonialism, such as the king, political parties, the parliament, which is now
bicameral, the office of the prime minister, the judicial system, the appointed
bureaucracy as well as property rights, cooperations, and organizations are all
makhzenite in nature, i.e. they operate following the triad of functions mentioned
above that governed Morocco prior to colonialism. In light of the ubiquity of the
makhzen as a political and an economic force, it makes sense to apply an approach
that takes into account the role of politics in national development.
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Discussion

Thomas Piketty (2014), one of the most prominent economists alive today, has
critiqued Simon Kuznets’ (1955) highly influential and long unquestioned theory
that postulated industrialization leads first to greater income inequality only for the
inequality to later subside sharply at a second stage, supposedly once the
fundamentals of industrialization have been grasped. When the second stage of
industrialization kicks in, those who were disadvantaged will start to harvest the
fruits of their labor and become legitimate contributors to national development and
economic growth. Kuznets seemed to have embraced an overly optimistic theory
that traded the Marxist “apocalyptic prediction” of a permanent “inegalitarian
spiral” for a political economy that believes in the aphorism: “Growth is a rising
tide that lifts all boats” (Piketty, 2014, p. 14). 1 Piketty (2014) rebukes Kuznets’
predictions that “should theoretically reproduce itself everywhere, including
underdeveloped countries then mired in postcolonial poverty” (p. 18). That poverty,
still ever-present decades after the wave of the liberation movements, discredits
Kuznets’ prognostic. His so much hoped for reproduction has never taken place in
the post-colonial world, Morocco included, nor has Kuznets’ hypothesis ever fully
materialized in the United States of America. 2 Ben Nasr, et al. (2019) reproaches
Kuznets’ inverted U-curve for its unsubstantiated “empirical evidence” that
prevents assessing “a long temporal change in income inequality,” and for its
inability to “explicitly” date “the stages” (p. 828). 3 In the case of most developing
countries, “the less privileged” and the poor, the authors argue, have no credit value
and capital remains beyond their reach, preventing their potential in economic
investments and active involvement in wealth production leading to a permanent
gap in social and economic equality and greater instability (Ben Nasr et al., 2019,
p. 828).
The irreconcilability of non-politically informed economic theories with the
realities of post-colonial economies indicates that national development relies more
heavily on strong and credible political institutions than previously thought. The
high rate of income inequality and social injustice in post-colonial industrialized
economies is not due to being unindustrialized, or not industrialized enough, but for
not being democratic enough. There are additional reasons that further discredit
Kuznets’ economic arguments in the developing world. Decolonization coincided
with the moment when industries began to depend less and less on human labor and
soon moved after that moment to automation and robotic industrialization.
First published in France in 2013.
In Piketty’s (2014) view, what led to the sharp decrease in inequality in the United States
points more to the 1929 global depression and to the two world wars, catastrophic events
that disrupted income returns on capital and wealth, and not to the “‘advanced phase’ of
industrial development” (p. 18).
3 As of 2018, Kuznets’ specter still looms larger than life; he continues to be an influential
figure in studies on income inequality, such as Ben Nasr et al. (2019). They open their
article with the following sentence: “A study conducted by Kuznets (1955) is continuously
referenced by most of the research evaluating the possible relationship between economic
growth and income inequality and/vice versa” (Ben Nasr et al., 2019, p. 827).
1
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Industrialization of agriculture, for example, has displaced vast segments of rural
populations without governments making adequate investment in or provision of
quality education needed to train people for jobs in a modern industrialized
economy. This failure leads some observers to believe that withholding quality
education represents a calculated political decision to stem the potential of the
working class as a subversive popular force to political absolutism. 4 The issue of
global inequality and underdevelopment does not stem from the growth rate of
industrialization, or the performance of any other sector of the economy, be it
tourism, agriculture, fisheries, or mining that have witnessed unprecedented growth
in Morocco thanks to modernization, foreign direct investments, and reforms.
Rather, the real problem of national development lies in the nature of the political
institutions that regulate and profit from those sectors and the impact of the political
decision-making process on availability and access to education, training, and job
opportunities.
As both Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue, “Traditionally economics has
ignored politics, but understanding politics is crucial for explaining world
inequality. As the economists Abba Lerner noted in the 1970s, ‘[e]conomics has
gained the title Queen of the Social Sciences by choosing solved political problems
as its domain’” (p. 68). The inclusion of politics in economics is gaining
momentum, as we have already seen with Piketty (2014), who rails against
economics’ “childish passion for mathematics” and its refusal, in the name of
“scientificity,” to collaborate with social sciences, especially with politics, history,
and sociology: “we must obviously take a pragmatic approach and avail ourselves
of the methods of historians, sociologists, and political scientists as well as
economists” (p. 42). In Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), the interest in politics
indicates the desire to see a politically-informed economics, whereas, in Piketty
(2014), the point in placing economic data at the disposition of policy makers,
historians, and politicians nurtures the hope to see a socially-informed and
culturally-conscious economics. 5
Between Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) on the one hand, and Piketty (2014)
on the other, but both proponents of politically-inspired economics, the agreement
on the necessity of the integration of politics in economics is offset by the
disagreement about the share allocated to culture, history, sociology, and other
social sciences in national development. If Piketty calls for full collaboration with
the social sciences, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) restrict the collaboration to the
For more discussion on the nexus of national development and the fear of
industrialization, see the section: “Fear of Industry” in Daron Acemoglu and James A.
Robinson (2012), Why Nation Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New
York, NY: Crown Business. pp. 222-231.
5 Piketty’s (2014) dream job, he writes, “was to teach at the École des Hautes Études en
Sciences Sociales,” because the school gives the best example of an institution of higher
education in which historians, such as Lucien Febvre and Fernand Braudel, rub shoulders
with an anthropologist, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and a sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, among
others. Besides enabling cross-disciplinary interaction, this intellectual environment
enables its residents to constantly check each other’s work and hypotheses (p. 41).
4

Zakaria Fatih 183

institutional side of politics, rejecting geography and culture as well as “ignorance”
for being unreliable criteria in discussions of world inequality (pp. 45-69). For
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), the deciding factor in the failure of poor nations
fighting underdevelopment and the continued economic success of prosperous
nations reside in politics, mainly in political institutions.
While the belated credit to politics does not vindicate Marxist ideology in its
call to erect a proletarian-based system on the ashes of bourgeois capitalism, the
growing interest in politics in theories about income inequality and economic
growth re-centers the issue of national development by awarding to politics a large
margin in the discussion. For Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) a nation’s prosperity
and progress depend on inclusive institutions; the more inclusive institutions are the
more prosperous a nation is and, by contrast, the more extractive or non-inclusive
those institutions are, the less prosperity a nation generates. The symmetry of
political and economic institutions becomes the sole criterion in determining the
cause of affluence and, conversely, in the case of asymmetrical institutions the
reason for a nation’s poverty.
Acemoglu’s own successful story in the West as a Turkish-Armenian
immigrant in England first and then a prominent academic in one of the most
prestigious institutions of higher education in the United States, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, best illustrates how inclusive political and economic
systems can lift people out of poverty. This is what inclusive political and economic
systems do; by embracing all members in society, they transform the individual into
an ethical force in the service of knowledge and beneficial production, creating
prosperity and wellbeing.

The Makhzen and National Development

No one contests the impressive strides Morocco has made in the economic
sector nor does anyone disagree that those valuable gains have disproportionately
enriched and increased the economic and political power of the makhzen. This
Machiavellian power structure balances state violence or hard power with privilege
or soft power by relying on patrimonial practices rooted in the ancient cultures and
traditions of Morocco. Some of those practices were institutionalized within the
makhzen during the reign of Ahmad al-Mansour, AKA al-Mansour al-Dahbi of the
Saadi Dynasty, who “initiated the elaboration of a centralized system of governance
for Morocco, which came to be known as the Makhzen” (Harrak, 2018, p. 283). For
Daadaoui (2011), the birth of the makhzen happened in stages; it designated first
the “whole government,” which included “the army and the administration” when
Morocco seceded from the Abbasid dynasty in Baghdad in the 12th century and,
second, in the 16th century when it referred to an institution in charge of collecting
and transferring taxes to the treasury: “Thus, throughout its development, makhzen
has shifted from its literal meaning as the government’s treasury to a sociopolitical
interpretation as a ‘reservoir of power’” (p. 42). 6
Unlike Harrak (2018) and Daadaoui (2011), Laroui (1999) attaches the birth of the “new
makhzen,” which the Europeans noticed ahead of the protectorate, to the reign of Moroccan
6
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The universal reach of the makhzen is both a blessing and a curse. Morocco
owes its stability to the power the makhzen wields in politics, in public affairs, in
foreign policy, in diplomacy, in trade and economic matters as well as in the social
and the cultural life of the citizen. The state is practically everywhere, a pervasive
presence that also leads to political atrophy and institutional stagnation. As an
imaginary and eternal state symbol, the makhzen also secures national
cohesiveness, but the cohesion comes at the expense of cultural emancipation and
social mobility. The makhzen, which has so far spared the country the turmoil
observed in its regional neighborhood, can best be described using one of Weber’s
(2019) types of legitimate domination. Under the three “pure types of authority,”
Weber (2019) conditions the legitimacy of “traditional authority” to “the sanctity
of age-old rules and powers. The masters are designated according to traditional
rules and are obeyed because of their traditional status (Eigenwürde)” (p. 226).
“Obedience” in such a system, adds Weber (2019), is paid to “the person who
occupies a position of authority by tradition or who has been chosen for it by the
traditional master” (p. 227). In Morocco today, the citizen, as a subject of the
monarch, owes obedience not only to the governor, one of the king’s administrative
appointees, but also to caids, sheikhs, and moqaddems who, by comparison to the
position of governor, find their origin not in French colonialism but in the
makhzenite power hierarchy.
The political structure of the makhzen in the aftermath of colonialism blends
positions of power that French colonialism institutionalized, such as “civil officials
of the modern state” (Daadaoui, 2012, p. 56) and traditional administrative positions
and practices that the Moroccan state revived, such as “the office of grievances,” or
“majlis (court),” as well as the “bay’a,” or allegiance, an annual ceremony that
“reinforces the linkage between the king and his subjects” (Daadaoui, 2012, pp. 6061). Daadaoui (2012) argues that the makhzen commands a composite of powerful
political structures that, to borrow an old adage, is nothing more than old wine in
new bottles:
The institutional reorganization of makhzen after independence was an
attempt to renew local institutions and local community traditions under
the aegis of a new modern state. In fact, the state structure appears modern,
but its nucleus is comprised of renewed traditional modes of government.
Institutional mechanisms for political manipulation are facilitated by the
existence of a primordial system that sets the monarch above the political
system. (Daadaoui, 2011, p.67)
Daadaoui implies that the survival of the makhzen depends on outdated political
practices that are antagonistic to democratic governance. His arguments explain in
part the impossible cohabitation of the old institutions of the makhzen and the
modern institutions of a democratic state.

Sultan Mohammed III who is credited with modernizing it decades after the death of his
grandfather, Sultan Ismail (p. 90).
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The ubiquity of the makhzen’s power and influence is reason to call for a
strategy of national development that factors the impact of national institutions in
economic and social indicators and, not as it is usually the case, especially in NGOs’
reports, of national development as isolated findings about a particular social
criterion or economic scale. In other words, inasmuch as it is necessary to look at
the makhzen as the political body in charge of the success or failure of the national
economy and social policy, it is equally indispensable to assess national
development, especially in the post-colonial world, on the basis of the transparency,
representativeness, and accountability of such national institutions. Furthermore,
the means of production, in this case, are not detached from the political structure
or, to use Fanon’s (2004) words about the colonial world: “[i]n the colonies the
economic infrastructure is also a superstructure” (p. 5). The makhzen has the dual
function of collecting taxes and doing politics; it is as much involved in economic
production as it is in the stipulation of a political economy that serves the interests
of the class(es) it represents.
The makhzen and its extractive institutions have a direct impact on regional
development and social disparities, which could be accounted for by the use of the
“dual economy” paradigm, or Lewis’ (1954) model. Lewis (1954) ties
underdevelopment to structural variations between the modern sector of the
economy, which Lewis calls “the capitalist sector,” and the traditional sector of the
economy, which he calls “the sector of subsistence” (p. 6). The contrast leads to an
economy moving at two speeds and evolving inadequately to be able to resolve
social disparities and bring about sustained human flow from the sector of
subsistence toward the capitalist sector. Even though Lewis’ (1954) model was
formulated decades ago, it offers a description of the social and economic
discrepancies observed in Morocco. Although there has been a modest movement
from the sector of subsistence to the capitalist sector in Morocco, the deplorable
state of public education and the scarcity of capital allocated to poor individuals and
small businesses willing to embrace the spirit of the new economy are major
obstacles to real improvement. The makhzen may also perceive a gathering threat
to its interest in the expansion of the capitalist sector for reasons Lewis (1954) lists
below:
The fact that the wage level in the capitalist sector depends upon earnings
in the subsistence sector is sometimes of immense political importance,
since its effect is that capitalists have a direct interest in holding down the
productivity of the subsistence workers. Thus, the owners of plantations
have no interest in seeing knowledge of new techniques or new seeds
conveyed to the peasants, and if they are influential in the government,
they will not be found using their influence to expand the facilities for
agricultural extension. (p. 6)
Take the example of public education in today’s Morocco, an area with the potential
to spur successful migration from “the sector of subsistence” to “the capitalist
sector.” Public schools at all levels have been marred in a myriad of problems

186 Journal of Global Initiatives

concerning the quality of instruction to the degree that a rising number of Moroccan
families prefer to send their children to private schools. 7 In 2017, the percentage of
children in private schools stood at 14%, or 1 million students, still a low percentage
because only the wealthy could afford to pay tuition, transportation, and school
supplies. 8 Moreover, the state continues to welcome the move from public to private
schools because the relocation relieves some of the financial burden on its treasury
by dumping on private institutions some of the costs of building new schools, hiring
new personnel, and making available other logistics. The catastrophic results of
lowering the standards of public education explain the persistence of structural
disequilibria and the rising rate of inequality, since the majority of those able to
afford private education for their children are the very same people already in the
capitalist sector, those who understand the value of offering their children an
adequate education and can already afford to do so. The Legatum Prosperity Index
(2018) on education shows Morocco with a ranking at 117 among 149 countries,
134 on social capital, and 130 on personal freedom. The fact that 14% of Moroccan
students are able to attend private schools means that only a tiny fraction can dream
of social upward mobility and that education is one of the strongest cards in the
hands of the makhzen, as an extractive institution, to control the flow from the
subsistence sector to the capitalist sector. 9
The binary oppositions between “extractive and inclusive economic
institutions” on the one hand and “extractive and inclusive political institutions” on
the other hand hold the most plausible explanation to what is taking place in
Morocco. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) define “inclusive political institutions”
as “sufficiently centralized and pluralistic” and “extractive political institutions” as
a power monopoly “in the hands of a narrow elite” (p. 81). They maintain that
“economic inclusive institutions” establish the foundations for an equal distribution
of wealth and resources. In addition, they emphasize that “inclusive political
institutions” lead to “inclusive economic institutions” in that the state becomes the
“enforcer of law and order” to protect “public services and regulate economic
activity” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 80). It intervenes to fight fraud and
illegal and dubious economic dealings so as to guarantee, among other things, an
equal playing field for everyone. By contrast, “extractive political institutions”
usher in “extractive economic institutions.” In such cases, political institutions are
designed in a way to serve the interest of the powerful. While one could argue in
favor of “inclusive economic institutions” in Morocco, the inclusion does not touch
In a press conference, the spokesman for the Moroccan government blames the current
educational system for creating a “jobless generation.” He stated that school dropouts stand
at 270,000 a year. See the following link from Morocco World News, accessed on May 7,
2019: https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2019/05/272521/official-morocco-educationsystem-produces-jobless-generation/
8 These statistics appear in this article: “Année scolaire 2017-2018: 1 élève sur 7 est
scolarisé dans le privé,” accessed on May 14, 2019:
https://www.medias24.com/MAROC/Quoi-de-neuf/184572-Education-nationale-lesprincipaux-chiffres-de-l-annee-scolaire-2017-2018.html
9 See previous note on the percentage of students attending private institutions.
7
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all the geographic regions nor are economic opportunities available to all the
citizens.
Many media pundits have described Morocco as a country that runs on two
speeds. The launching of Morocco’s high-speed train created a polemic concerning
the social and economic disparities between the haves and the have nots, or
Morocco moving at two speeds (Rboub, 2017). The unbearable economic and social
disparities between the haves and the have-nots are occasionally met with state
violence to stem the tide of popular revolt, as in the recent Hirak movement in the
Rif for which its leader, Nasser Zefzafi, is now serving a 20-year prison sentence.
According to The New York Times, the court charged him and his acolytes with
“undermining public order and threatening national unity” (Reuters, 2018).
Zefzafi’s case illustrates the unsustainability of the coexistence of “extractive
economic institutions” that the makhzen symbolizes and its spurious “inclusive
political institutions.” The daily eight-month long protests he organized had social
grievances and economic discontent as their dominant themes; although he
denounced state surveillance, he never complained of the inability to organize
protests and hold rallies. In fact, he offered the state the alibi to arrest him when he
interrupted the Friday religious sermon, which was his biggest mistake. In a sense,
Zefzafi did take advantage of the availability of “inclusive political institutions” to
rally public support in the Rif and the rest of Morocco, but that effort failed to
contest the “extractive economic institutions.”
Zefzafi’s example shows that spurious “inclusive political institutions” can
coexist with “extractive economic institutions.” The coexistence becomes possible
when “extractive economic institutions” give the impression of “inclusive
economic institutions,” or alternatively, when “extractive political institutions” pass
for “inclusive political institutions.” However, the limitations of spurious inclusive
institutions, whether economic or political, appear when the system is in crisis
mode, i.e., when individuals or social groups challenge those institutions, either
through a momentum of economic grievances or by protesting their social
condition. In the name of “undermining public order and threatening national
unity,” which is a common allegation in Morocco to muzzle dissidents, as in
Zefzafi’s case, the makhzen intervenes in the process of “creative destruction” that
the protesters may have unleashed. 10 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) rightly point
out that, “[f]ear of creative destruction is often at the root of the opposition to
inclusive economic and political institutions” (p. 84). The Hirak movement exposed
the paradox of the Moroccan state as promoter of democracy and the rule of law,
i.e., as a state that appears to embrace and live by “political inclusive institutions”
while also holding on to the extractive institutions of the makhzen.
The fear of “creative destruction” in the case of Morocco presents itself in terms
of a class struggle. If the power of the makhzen is threatened, it is not only the
10 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) explain Joseph Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” as
the replacement of “the old with the new. New sectors attract resources away from old
ones. New firms take business away from established ones. New technologies make
existing skills and machines obsolete” (p. 84).
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economic interests of a social group that are at risk; it is the privilege of the class
that this social group represents that will be at stake. There is no justice, let alone
compassion, in dealing with dissidence when the stakes are understood in absolute
terms of winners and losers, of haves and have-nots. In such cases, the fear may be
worse than the reality. At the same time, the fear of “creative destruction” has not
prevented the state from promoting progressive political policies and selling an
image of the country as politically stable and culturally tolerant; it will continue to
do so as long as it earns dividends from running a simulacrum of a system of
inclusive institutions. Lacking substantive change, the problem will grow.

Conclusion

To conclude, the present article relies on select theories of political economy,
mainly those of Piketty (2014) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) to show that
national development and income inequality depend on national institutions. The
more inclusive institutions are, the more democratic and prosperous a nation is. If
Morocco’s ultimate dream has been since independence in 1956 to make it to the
club of democratic and prosperous nations, and if that dream has been elusive thus
far, the answer to the failure of democracy along with the states’ structural programs
to shore up chronic poverty, unemployment, and income inequality lies in politics.
While the economic growth rate of industrialization per anum has enabled the
country to be more competitive on a global scale, its political institutions are
impeding any progress towards the country’s espoused economic and political
aspirations. The secret to successful national development is not to succumb to the
irrational fears of privileged elites but to invest in the dreams of hard-working
everyday citizens, to provide the necessary educational support and legal
protections that allow the citizenry to fully participate in both the economic and
political life of the country.
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Empowering Rural Participation
and Partnerships in Morocco’s
Sustainable Development
Yossef Ben-Meir
Abstract

This essay explores the vast potential for participatory and sustainable
human development in Morocco. Though Morocco is a country with many
diverse resources, it remains burdened by severe levels of poverty and
illiteracy, and now growing social discord. There have recently been
increased public calls for participatory development programs designed
and implemented by and for local people. The essay identifies six existing
Moroccan Frameworks intended to initiate decentralized human
development programs, and critically examines their efficacy. Ultimately,
the purpose of the article is to suggest a new model to implement these
Frameworks with maximum impact. The six Frameworks deal with
municipal development plans, a sub-national funding agency,
decentralization, environmental protection and agriculture, women’s
rights, and youth engagement. Each of these Frameworks present positive
ideals which are not fully being capitalized on currently because they lack
sufficient resources and momentum individually. By integrating the six
Frameworks to function in tandem, Morocco could achieve its goal of
initiating widespread decentralized, sustainable development programs
that truly impact local communities in positive ways.

Introduction

This article provides an overview and analysis of Morocco’s national policy
initiatives as related to critical issues of local development. In recent years, while
Morocco has put in place the right frameworks for mobilizing rural communities to
advance the nation’s sustainable development goals, it falls woefully short when it
comes to implementation. What is sorely needed is an action plan for
implementation that provides community training and evaluation processes for
assessing progress. As someone who has been engaged in rural development in
Morocco for the past 26 years, this policy analysis assesses Morocco’s sustainable
development goals highlighting the different frameworks that exist, an analysis of
how these frameworks can work together and complement each other, and
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recommendations for how to engage and empower local communities to
successfully interact with and implement them.
Since 2000, the author leads a Moroccan-U.S. civil organization that assists
local communities in their identification and management of priority development
projects—in the sectors of agriculture, education, health, and women’s and youth
empowerment—and achieved initiatives located in the 12 regions of Morocco. The
community-driven data gathering, assessments, consensus-building, and overall
project experiences engaging with most ministries and administrative tiers have
afforded the author realistic local and national contextual perspectives, which is
drawn from in this essay, in combination with literature on these subjects.
The utilization in the essay of the terms participatory development, sustainable
development, and human development is deliberate, as it is also in their embedding
in Moroccan national policies. Participatory development refers to community
beneficiaries of development being in control of all phases of the project cycle, from
design to evaluation. The process of local people planning projects together and
sharing information itself creates positive outcomes; however, the participatory
approach or “method” (King Mohammed VI, 2008) as commonly referenced in
Moroccan codifying documents) seeks the fulfillment of the participants initiatives
and the measurable change they create (Green & Haines, 2002, p. 14), such as in
regards to employment, clean water, and girls’ participation in education.
Sustainable development focuses on the characteristics that enable project
outcomes to endure, which evaluations over the decades since World War II and
from all parts of the world show people’s participation to be most causal. 1 After all,
sustainable project designs incorporate the full range of factors that bear on matters
of development, such as cultural, economic, environmental, financial, historic,
political, and technical dimensions. Indeed, the more inclusive and participatory
during the project development experience, the more the opportunity is given that
the full range of factors or points of view will be injected into the project design
and decision-making processes. This operational definition, which can also be
found in Moroccan formative programs, such as the National Initiative for Human
Development discussed below (Kingdom of Morocco, 2016), suggests that the
concept of sustainable development has evolved to become more multifaceted since
its coining in a United Nations report in 1987, when it heavily (or even exclusively
(Holdgate, 1996) emphasized natural resource management as its determining
factor.
Finally, human development, also based on pragmatic principles made
functional and evaluative by the United Nations (HDRO Outreach, 2019), refers to
1
A 1990 study of 52 USAID projects across different sectors showed a positive correlation
between participation of beneficiaries and project success—almost as strong as between
availability of funding and success (see Bhatnagar & Williams, 1992, p. 10). The World
Bank’s evaluation of 121 rural water projects around the world showed that one of the
strongest correlations with success was local participation and capabilities—and that it was
more significant than technical solutions and capital expended (see Uphoff, Esman, &
Krishna, 1998, p. 36). An analysis of five case studies of development projects in Thailand
suggests that people’s participation is the most critical determinant in attaining
sustainability (see Gonzalez, 1988, p. 42).
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the conditional opportunities to create the change we seek in our lives. Its focus is
on strengthening personal and group-related capacities (such as in participatory
decision-making, project management, and supporting organizational growth) in
order that effected communities analyze social and natural conditions and design
and create projects that enhance their livelihoods, education, health, and
empowerment. Morocco’s goal is to utilize participatory approaches to achieve
projects that are sustainable and that measurably enhance the standard of living,
knowledge, longevity, and engagement in society.
Morocco is a nation of immense promise in terms of its human development
potential (The World Bank, 2019). The country's naturally bountiful landscape, if
combined with dynamic social development frameworks, could transform Morocco
into a bottom-up haven of community-managed projects and facilitate change in
Africa and the Islamic World. On the other hand, should Morocco not sufficiently
achieve publicly acceptable levels of development, which is currently the case
particularly in rural areas and with marginalized groups, other nations in the region
may feel deterred from committing itself as Morocco has done to charters of
decentralization, women’s freedoms, and participatory community action, for
example. In other words, Morocco’s successful local people’s development
movements are for the profound benefit of its own sustainable future, and due to its
geographic and historic position it is also for the sake of serving as a guiding model
well beyond its borders.

An Action Plan to Implement Morocco’s
Frameworks for Sustainable Development

The following six national policy and programmatic frameworks form the
pillars of people’s development in Morocco. The questions this article addresses
are: how can the six frameworks better fulfill their individual purposes? And, how
can the frameworks work or relate with each other to create sustainable and
participatory human development that is managed by the local community
beneficiaries, with the support of decentralized administrations and partnerships?
These frameworks, which are established national policies and laws that cover
the entire country, aim to initiate human development that is participatory,
decentralized, and sustainable. People-driven initiatives that the frameworks could
enable are, for example, programs through which women define and achieve what
they want within communities, while learning laws that advance and protect their
status in the family and society. The frameworks could help youth overcome the
risks of an exceedingly difficult life, such as their condition of being more likely to
be unemployed the more they are educated (USAID, 2018a). The Moroccan
development approach also provides a basis for innovative (and organic) agriculture
to grow while aiding rural civil associations to plan and create new projects that
meet local needs.
It is not the insufficiency of the principles and guidelines of these frameworks
that accounts for the hardships that afflict the Moroccan people, especially those in
rural areas. There is generally inadequate coordination among ministries to achieve
the synergies of these national initiatives, and a lack of popular understanding and
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the needed skills in order to translate them into reality. Central to fulfilling this
development model is the transfer of knowledge focused on how to organize
community meetings where people together determine the projects they seriously
need and build the multi-sectoral and multi-tiered partnerships to achieve
implementation.
The six government-constructed Moroccan frameworks that set out to guide
community and national growth are:
1) The Municipal Charter, amended in 2010, requires the creation of multiyear community development plans that are formed by people’s
participation (Secretary General of the Government, 2019);
2) The National Initiative for Human Development, which was launched
in 2005 to provide access to sub nationally-managed funding for
multidimensional development projects in rural and urban communities
(INDH, 2019);
3) The Decentralization Roadmap, first unveiled in 2008, and the Charter
ratified in 2018, synthesize three pathways to empower regions, provinces,
and municipalities in development and self-determination: delegation, deconcentration, and devolution (Ministry of Interior, 2019);
4) The Green Morocco Plan, written in 2008, recognizes that essential
financial grants and technical contributions are needed along the entire
agricultural value-chain—from nurseries to processing—to overcome the
systemic poverty that afflicts most rural households (Maroc Vert, 2019);
5) Morocco’s Family Code, or Moudawana based on the Maliki School of
Sunni Islam, was reformed in 2004 to promote equality and joint
responsibility between men and women (United Nations, 2004); and
6) Youth leadership programs created by the ministries of National
Education and Vocational Training; Higher Education and Scientific
Research; among others, to increase youth employment and involve young
people in decision-making in civil society and the public sphere (The
World Bank Group, 2019).
There are other important and forward-thinking national developmental
approaches. Stated briefly, these additional frameworks include: a) Morocco’s
commitment to the Maghreb Union bloc and African unity, with regionalism
representing a transitional phase to global competitiveness (Soludo, 2003, p. 273)
and a strategy to deal with regional challenges, such as pollution and illegal
immigration (Duina, 2006, p. 20); b) the formalization of laws and reforms in 2002
and 2018, respectively, to promote the growth of civil organizations and
cooperatives; c) renewable energy actions (which, however, should be realigned to
be more household-driven) (Hanger-Kopp, Komendatova, & Zejli, 2016); d) culture
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preservation while incorporating human development benefits, such as the example
of Moroccan Muslim-Jewish collaboration for building organic fruit tree nurseries
for family farmers and schools (Ben-Meir, 2018); and e) a multidimensional trade
strategy that attempts to balance global free trade with protections from hegemonic
powers enabled by integrated regional markets and rewarding domestic markets
(Delener , 1999, p. 1). Nonetheless, the six frameworks listed above lay out
exemplary guidelines and potential community empowerment basis, according to
this author, that are critically needed for these and other national programs and
policies to be implemented productively, inclusively, and equitably.
Sadly, essential human development outcomes are not being realized in
Morocco as hoped and needed. I have found after observation and engagement with
Moroccan development from positions in civil society, government, and academia
that there is an abysmal pace of rural sustainable development. There are few
examples in which government agencies and officials have successfully applied
participatory development methods, even though these methods are codified in
national charters and policies. This is largely not the fault of the personnel and
officials, but the result of their lack of training to facilitate inclusive community
planning.
The participatory approach has developed and expanded to comprise hundreds
of “families” or methods of carrying out group dialogue on community needs and
data-gathering to identify and meet project development goals (Kumar, 2002, p.
16). To enable an inclusive planning process to take place the approach applies
visual—and therefore generally accessible—diagramming and planning centered
around projects addressing high-priority goals (Lyons, Smuts, & Stephens, 1999, p.
10). Typical methods of analysis include mapping, where local communities
analyze household wellbeing, risks, and community assets and gaps. Using visuallybased methodology, community members improve their ability to determine and
evaluate solutions to problems, create and present action plans, link available funds
with priorities, manage projects, and advocate successful local initiatives for greater
scale.
There is a severe lack of development progress in rural areas, where 75% of all
impoverished Moroccan people reside; they experience close to five times the
national poverty rate (Noury, 2007). The social discontent from chronic poverty has
boiled over into disruption and localized demonstrations, mostly in the north.
Considering the overall ineffectiveness of Moroccan development programs—no
matter how progressive their founding visions—there is reason to be seriously
concerned that growing civic dissatisfaction will continue to outpace the rate of
fulfillment.
The urban-rural stratification remains alarming and is growing in Morocco
(The World Bank and the Morocco High Commission for Planning, 2017), even as
both groups generally experience economic hardship. Rural communities have great
agricultural and human development possibilities in regards to the range of potential
organic and endemic food product, niche artisanal crafts, and available markets; yet
in recent years, there has been a 15% rise in households that consider themselves
poor (The World Bank and the Morocco High Commission for Planning, 2017).
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They lack basic essential human development projects such as water for irrigation
and clean drinking water; rural women’s and children’s education; completing the
agricultural value-chain, from tree and plant nurseries to processing and
commercialization of product; and people’s empowerment to implement their own
initiatives.
The problem is that Morocco’s programs for national growth and development
through people’s participation are not being orchestrated in tandem. As will be
explained, and as recently acknowledged by the Moroccan government (Purgeon,
2018), integrating these programs would enable their mutual reinforcement to
promote accelerated growth and success of development initiatives. In response to
the public calls by King Mohammed VI that the nation reconsider its development
model, this essay takes the position and explains with case evidence that it is the
implementation process of the nation’s development model that requires the major
reevaluation and overhaul, not the guiding principles or vision of the model itself
(Koundouno, 2018).
This article recommends a new action plan to advance Morocco’s sustainable
development—emphasizing disadvantaged people and regions and resting on
participatory democratic methods and decentralization. The challenge that Morocco
faces, however, to achieve its vision is seriously daunting, especially when we
consider that even as there is supporting evidence of the efficacy of participation on
a small scale, there is insufficient evidence around the globe of its effectiveness as
a strategy for broad-based and long-term social change (Cleaver, 2001, p. 36). Thus,
the successful unfolding of Morocco’s bold development approach, guided by its
frameworks, bears existential consequences for itself, its position on the larger
African and Middle Eastern stage, and potential transfer to other nations of the
world by exemplifying a decentralized participatory development course.
To Morocco’s lasting credit, key laws, policies, and programs already exist—
for instance, the Moroccan Constitution itself—to promote development projects
that reflect locally shared priorities and have democratic decision-making and
governing arrangements. The lack of rural development is predominantly due to the
poor implementation of the existing frameworks, the continued pervasive poverty,
and widespread gender biases—not lack of opportunities. Morocco has declared
positions on sustainable development that could result in successful, scaled
community movements, engaging and improving life within the society, but only if
applied correctly.
As will be discussed in section six, the outstanding potential of Morocco’s
agricultural economy—with strategic local community investments in
implementing farm-to-fork initiatives—is that it can become the financial engine to
create projects in education, health, new businesses, and capacity-building in
management and technical areas, to implement the change that local communities
and their associations determine. The organization and process necessary to achieve
sustainable, revenue-generating enterprises is supported by Moroccan laws, and
prototypes of community initiatives have proven successful. Fortunately, social
conditions and economic opportunities—coupled with a sense of necessity, if not
urgency, to fulfill—are such that a significantly more accomplished Moroccan
model could potentially be at hand in the not-too-distant future.
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Morocco’s Municipal Charter

The first framework, Morocco’s Municipal Charter, requires locally elected
representatives to create one-, three-, and five-year development plans derived from
people’s participation in the determination of local projects. This could be a major
chance for sustainable development to take hold as people’s participation and
financing are the key factors of project sustainability (Chambers, 1993, pp. 11-13).
However, in Morocco there is a constant challenge: elected members to municipal
councils, who are given the responsibility to carry out the community plans, are
typically not trained in facilitating participatory project methods. Representatives
(and other community members) would highly benefit from applied learning
workshops organized by government, civil society, universities, and socially
responsible businesses to effectively fulfill the development-related articles of the
Municipal Charter.
Catalyzing widespread and inclusive development projects means first
implementing experiential training programs for university students,
schoolteachers, technicians, civil society members, elected officials, and local
people, for example, to be active agents of participatory development. Through
hands-on training, the aforementioned municipal development plans can reflect the
actual will of the people in regard to the projects and future they most want. The
participatory community planning approach has been applied with success in a wide
variety of situations. The projects cited below all successfully emerged from group
assessments of their own needs. In rural areas, improvements have taken place in
farming systems (Chambers 1993, p. 957), food production (Ruddell, 2002, p. 186),
natural resource management (Campbell, 2001, p. 382), cooperatives (Sargent,
1986, p. 109), land use (Forester, 1989, p. 103), pest control management (Uphoff,
Esman, & Krishna, 1998, p. 70), sanitation (Vernooy, Qui, & Xu, 2003, p. 99), and
protected area management (Warford, 1989, p. 19). Similarly, in the field of
business and public services, improvements have been noted in business
management and production, infrastructural projects, poverty alleviation and
economic development, technological developments including software,
architectural planning, community control of policing and schools, the creation and
delivery of services, and waste management (Ben-Meir, 2009, pp. 235-237).
With regard to health care, improvements are visible in terms of access and
empowerment for the disabled (Jason, Suarez-Balcazar, Keys, Taylor, & Davis, ,
2004, p. 4), disease control (health education) (De Koning & Martin, 1996, pp. 12), sexual and reproductive health (Kumar, 2002, p. 49), public health, and nutrition
(Hampshire, Hills, & Iqbal, 2005, p. 340). In pedagogy, this methodology has been
shown to assist formal and informal education (Jason et al., 2004, p. 4), experiential
learning and communication (Campbell, 2001, p. 382), adult education (Kumar,
2002, p. 29) and—on college campuses—in increasing student involvement in
academic decisions (Wengert, 1976, p. 27) university-community partnerships
(Van der Eb et al., 2004, pp. 224-225), gender and youth development (Pancer &
Krasnor, 2002, p. 62), and in overcoming racial prejudice and other forms of
discrimination (Wengert, 1976, p. 27). Participatory planning methodology
improves disaster management, including crisis situations such as war and drought
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(Kumar, 2002, p. 49), as well as their amelioration and peace-building (Rodríguez,
2000, pp. 147-148), management of displaced people (Brand, 2001, p. 962),
emergency relief in a conflict situation (Symes & Jasser, 2000, p. 149), and the
work of welfare organizations (Thomas-Slayter, 1995, p. 9). Finally, it is cited as a
crucial factor in improved organizational development (Kumar, 2002, p. 29);
building civil society (Symes & Jasser, 2000, p. 149); human resources
management (Taylor, 2001, p. 122); project and program evaluations (Campbell,
2001, p. 382); management practices (Cornwall & Pratt, 2003, p. 4); and policy
development, reform, and advocacy (Kumar, 2002, p. 29).
Much of Morocco’s development success depends upon dispersing skills to
create and assist inclusive community planning meetings as well as implementing
the projects that become designed by the people, who are the project beneficiaries
and managers. The Municipal Charter—directing the administrative tier closest to
the people—establishes an avenue for the success of participatory development.
People-driven projects instituted in the Municipal Charter, are necessary for
sustainable development and actualization of the other frameworks that compose
the Moroccan model. Without local representatives understanding how to
implement people’s participation in development and without the local people
aware of this vital right, plans are typically drafted in a top-down manner with
impossible or unrealistic levels of uniformity. It has come to the point that the
statutory requirement to create community plans through genuine participatory
processes now often appears merely rhetorically. In my experiences over recent
years, on multiple occasions governors have voiced concerns upon their reflection
of the quality of the plans they receive; municipal council members discuss their
desire to fulfill the participatory planning requirement while being without the
information and material capacities to do so; and municipalities resorting to outside
expertise to conduct the needed local assessments are able to access a limited
number of people due to time and trust level constraints—discouraging the
continued momentum that is needed to achieve project implementation and
sustainability. Skills-building workshops in facilitating local consensus as well as
gender- and youth-based dialogue to understand the different needs among the
different demographic groups are absolutely critical if these dimensions of the
Municipal Charter are to be effectively delivered.
I have met municipal council members in the Beni Mellal, Marrakech,
Mohammedia, and Taroudant provinces who cite their Charter’s statutes and state
they are without instruction on how to procedurally accomplish development plans
generated from the people. It would be helpful if actual participatory planning
methods were included at the annex in the published Charter that all council
members receive at the approximately 1,500 municipalities. Considering the lack
of guidelines on how municipalities might proceed, it is not a surprise that I have
also met governors of provinces who faced the impossible likelihood of receiving
identical development plans from more than a dozen municipal councils. The plans
contained the exact projects defined by hundreds of villages at the same precise
level of priority, having been copied from one another. Effectively training council
members and others in real community settings can be the primary remedy against
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this awful loss of opportunity and result in plans for projects that accurately reflect
the people’s ideas.

The National Initiative for Human Development

The second framework, Morocco’s National Initiative for Human
Development (NIHD), is a national fund for infrastructure projects, capacitybuilding, social and cultural revitalization, and job-generating activities on the subnational level. Its budget through 2023 was approved in September 2018 at $1.9
billion (North Africa Post, 2018).
In theory, the NIHD should primarily help to actualize development projects
designed under the Municipal Charter. Indeed, the NIHD and the Municipal Charter
can only be successful if they work in tandem. The NIHD is meant to help fund the
participatory development plans embodied in the Charter and finance the projects
that local people expressed they most need during participatory planning processes
(such as during the fulfillment of the Communal Charter requiring such actions) and
want to implement, helping to ensure their sustainability. If this were the case, and
if the NIHD’s budget were doubled through 2023, then it is my assertion—based
on budgetary analyses and project evaluations at municipal levels—that Morocco
could potentially fulfill its development model and vision through local communitydriven development movements that incorporate multisectoral partnerships at all
administrative tiers, rather than remaining ranked 123 among nations on the Human
Development Index following an enormity of expenditure, intentions, and effort
(United Nations Development Programme, 2018).
If the Municipal Charter does not result in projects properly defined over the
course of community-wide meetings (inclusive to the general public (Mikkelsen,
2005, p. 72), disadvantaged groups (Kapoor, 2002, p. 104), professionals (Swantz,
1982, pp. 114-115), and the vulnerable (Kumar, 2002, p. 51), which is unfortunately
often the case due to inadequate participatory training and finance, then it can be
expected that the NIHD will not have adequate local projects to fund and that the
aggregate of results fall short of national goals, as is already happening.
There are many other practical NIHD reforms to increase its development
impact. First, the provincial administrations of NIHD should accept development
proposals all year round. As of now, the shifting periods during the year when they
receive proposals mean that opportunities open and close, and most local
associations and cooperatives remain unaware.
Second, the NIHD should be maximally flexible to fund the range of projects
communities determine most important to them (whether in health, education,
construction, etc.). The NIHD’s criteria regarding project types they consider
supporting also often changes, such as their across the board prohibition in recent
years of local community construction projects, while rural community priorities
have remained consistent, such as building of preschools, drinking water towers and
irrigation canals, and work centers for local cooperatives and associations.
Third, the NIHD should double the amount of the funding ceiling for local
projects to $60,000 to enable construction of irrigation systems, agricultural
processing facilities, and other vital infrastructure, as well as reduce the requirement
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that recipients contribute toward the financial amount requested to 10% from the
current 30%. The requirement to co-invest is understandable because it seeks to
encourage buy-in and a deeper level of commitment by the beneficiaries. However,
the 30% level has become a prohibitive barrier for many people to access the
program, as was expressed by community representatives in the Oujda, Beni Mellal,
Marrakech, and other regions. 2 In-kind giving on the part of community applicants,
such as labor and land, should be acceptable by the NIHD in place of the financial
contribution. Furthermore, there also appears to be a many month lag between when
beneficiaries manage to pay their financial contribution and when NIHD finally
disburses the total grant. In Morocco, it is customary for financial transactions
related to goods and services to be immediate upon delivery, just as people’s needs
are immediate. The NIHD ought not be an exception to this norm.
Finally, and most critically, the NIHD should co-create project proposals
among its staff with the prospective local beneficiaries. Rural areas’ illiteracy rate
is nearly double that in urban places at over 40%, and rural women’s illiteracy is
close to double that of men (Hemidach, 2015). Drafting the required project
proposals and documents is impossible for people and communities who could most
utilize NIHD. Credit Agricole, Morocco’s leading bank that finances professionals
in agriculture and the agri-food sector, and USAID in northern Iraq are starting to
gain experiences in co-creating project proposals with community representatives
and beneficiaries, 3 lessons from which might be helpful if NIHD adopted this
approach. Incorporating these measures and aligning the NIHD and the Municipal
Charter regarding participatory planning and development could create a sharp rise
in the implementation of new local development projects that are consistent with
the necessities of sustainability.

Moroccan Decentralization

The “roadmap” of Moroccan decentralization—derived from a series of public
statements of the King of Morocco since 2008—aims to utilize ongoing national
level engagement (devolution) along with sub-national partnerships (deconcentration), to help implement community projects (delegation). In other words,
the Moroccan pathway aims to rally national resources and partnerships for local
development. In principle, this is good for sustainability. However, appropriate and
lasting construction of decentralized systems must happen in tandem with the
implementation of community planning, projects, and partnership-building between
the public, private, and civil sectors (Friedmann & Klauss et. al., 1984, pp. 189194). These relationships and joint development actions are what decentralized
systems are actually made of, and this requires sustained community initiatives on
a widespread basis. Therefore, without the Municipal Charter and the NIHD
working together, adequate decentralized arrangements of public administrations
will neither be effectively formed nor adequately enduring.
2 Yossef Ben-Meir, based on meetings with community representatives in the regions of
Oujda, Marrakech, Beni Mellal, and others during 2018-19.
3 Ali Benmokhtar (Credit Agricole, Marrakech) and Timothy Lavelle (USAID,
Washington, DC), based on meetings with Yossef Ben-Meir in 2018.
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Morocco’s decentralization has been referred to as “regionalization,” meaning
that its emphasis is on the devolution of power to its 12 regions (Pignon &
Braconnier, 2017). Nevertheless, regional public administrative centers in Morocco
remain too distant from the dispersed communities of their jurisdictions. This
causes considerable delays of basic authorizations needed to carry development
initiatives forward. Even provincialization, which is the breakdown of regions into
their provinces, resembles an unnecessary limitation on reasonable actions for
sustainable change and growth.
In Morocco overall, decentralization has not significantly taken hold, which
only further suppresses new local development. The national level still generally
decides the parameters, terms, cases, and situations for sub-regional actions, as I
have observed generally across all ministries that engage in sustainable human
development as part of their mission. For example, local education directors defer
decisions about opening beds in a middle school dormitory, During the fall of 2018,
the King of Morocco tasked the government to submit a draft Decentralization
Charter, which has now been developed and would ideally bind national and
regional government agencies to specific functions for the administration of human
services (ElJechtimi, 2018). The human development course of the nation depends
upon clear articulation and implementation among the relationships between public,
civil, and private institutions.
Without hardly a mention of the municipal level, the Decentralization Charter
will likely fall short of enabling the system of sub-national management of
development to fulfill its promise for Moroccan local communities. The elements
of the Municipal Charter, particularly the community creation of participatory
development plans, should clearly be referenced in the Decentralization Charter, as
well as the central elements of the Decentralization Roadmap being deconcentration (intersectoral subnational partnerships) and delegation (community
management). Devolution (ongoing national level engagement) is already well
codified in the Decentralization Charter, whose function appears to be that of
establishing parameters for the national and regional levels to interface, without
establishing the necessary roles of the provinces and municipalities with the
nation’s decentralization system.
Decentralization advances autonomy of societies to determine their own
development path (Parfitt, 2004, pp. 538-539). Brazilian economist Theotonio Dos
Santos stated that for developing nations to no longer be dependent on foreign trade
and be able to build a locally controlled economy, they must restructure internally
and direct their development efforts and resources toward the interior, which
decentralization can help to do (Dos Santos, 1978, pp. 57-80). For Dos Santos
(1978), internal conditions determine the potential effects of the international
situation (pp. 57-80). Therefore, he suggests that underdeveloped economies
develop their own productive autonomy. Decentralization by its very nature
promotes the growth of alternative centers in what were previously areas of the
periphery. A certain amount of autonomy from political, administration, and
economic national centers and from global dynamics is thus created (Rolly, 2001,
p. 55). Decentralization then becomes a potential means of conflict resolution by
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providing autonomy to sub-regions, which can have a stabilizing effect (Hulbe,
1980, p. 56).
Here again, informational workshop sessions on decentralized organization and
its bottom-up formation are necessary with national, regional, and local leaders.
Conducting workshops that help demonstrate overlapping parallels between
localized control over social affairs and Islamic religious concepts would also be
helpful and is sorely needed today. For some national leaders, particularly Islamists,
this could heighten decentralization’s appeal by placing it in this cultural-traditional
context, where it can be naturally integrated. For example, some writers on Islamic
political philosophy describe the notions of shura, ummah, baya, and tawhidi as
involving dimensions of local governance, social justice, leadership, and personal
empowerment (Said, Abu-Nimer, & Sharify-Funk, 2006, pp. 159-162). By
developing understanding as to how Islamic precepts relate to characteristics of
participatory decentralization, supportive coalitions can be expanded by having
more shared frames of references for furthering sustainable development. By further
developing this understanding as to how specifically Islamic ideas exist in
participatory and decentralized pathways, development advocates are able to
expand the community of the people and groups with whom there may be regularly
dialogue and partnership, with more closely aligned and relatable frames of
references.
There are concerns that the process of decentralization in pursuing
development may lead to destabilizing political outcomes (Rolly, 2001, p. 56). With
regards to Morocco, the emphasis on participatory approaches by local communities
to create these projects centers around their livelihoods and meeting their immediate
human needs. Having directly or indirectly helped bring about local meetings and
projects in all its 12 regions, I have observed no basis for concerns that stem beyond
these developmental factors involving the unrealized plethora of socioeconomic
and environmental opportunities of the people. Communities are focused on
meeting their needs; creating and furthering their associations and cooperatives
toward their goals; and somehow addressing what can seem stifling difficulties for
progress. There has certainly been ample opportunity to redress the needless
poverty, and there still is if only Moroccan leadership were to fulfill the model of
decentralized participatory development to which it is committed.
However, human service ministries’ consistent deference to Rabat remains as
fixed as ever. Reflecting upon dozens of meetings regarding community
development projects in an array of sectors since 2008 when the Decentralization
Roadmap was launched, my experience begs the question: What compels regional
directors of public agencies that oversee the different human service deliveries over
vast areas to still refer to central administrations for their approval of modest-sized
initiatives and partnership agreements? Is it that they actually do not understand
their full authority or that it has not been specifically enough defined, or is it that
the pattern of centralized behavior is so deeply entrenched that regional managers
are not as of yet comfortable or confident to execute the power that they have? Even
as these possible explanations are ultimately conjecture within an ongoing
decentralization process, it may be a combination of these and other factors that
keep decentralization an intention rather than a reality.
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Understandably, executing decentralization, particularly at an accelerated pace,
can be a delicate balance. The local level is stratified socio-economically,
environmentally, and in regards to gender just as it is on the societal level and
globally (Brohman et al., 1996, p. 235). Advancing decentralization quickly can be
fraught with unhelpful consequences, such as entrenching further the locally
affluent and political classes (Heller, 2000, p. 139). However, genuine
implementation of frameworks one and two could create the initial participatory
and sustainability conditions that would enable Morocco to eventually opt for an
emerging form of decentralized development management to the municipal level.
In order for this to unfold, local communities and their associations require greater
guidance, support and practice in managing projects (that incorporate multi-sectoral
partnerships) through their different phases, and to also directly experience their
development benefits.

Moroccan Agriculture and Rural Development

The fourth framework, which is constituted by Morocco’s agricultural
development programs to promote product cultivation, processing, and
commercializing, are not making a sufficient difference for the majority of farming
families who cultivate five hectares or less of land and who experience intractable
poverty (Maroc Vert, 2019). The social unrest in northern Morocco is a direct
reflection of the ongoing rural poverty and a fallout in the application of the
country’s agricultural, human development, and participatory frameworks. Rural
poverty—despite immense local and national potential—is the “Achilles’ heel” of
Morocco’s stability and, ultimately, national prosperity.
Local people are left deeply frustrated with the anemic progress made over the
past three decades in implementing rural development projects they prioritize—a
period that has seen rural poverty increase most dramatically in the 1990s (Levy,
2005) and is currently three times higher than urban poverty (Ghanem, 2015). I
would suggest that the rural poverty conditions in Morocco are increasingly
impossible to justify. Even with viable projects aplenty, donors and financiers
complain of a lack of viable business and development proposals. But how could
that be when, for example, farming communities know exactly the irrigation
infrastructure that is needed to uplift all village households? Local people
consistently prioritize this, yet even when the local beneficiaries would gladly
contribute their labor in-kind, there has been no construction. Irrigation
infrastructure projects are prohibitively expensive, especially in mountain areas,
and hardly any other project will more greatly improve agricultural production, food
security, and income.
Rural development conditions are very problematic; there are the near complete
losses of local fruit tree varieties of fig, apple, pear, grape, clementine, carob, date,
and others that are endemic to the northern region, and other varieties elsewhere in
Morocco. These local crop varieties are encouraged in Morocco’s “Green” plan for
agriculture. The crops offer a genetic resource for small farmers that enhances food
security in the face of water scarcity and climate change. However, agrobiodiversity
remains seriously undermined because of a few high-yielding varieties that cause
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genetic erosion; in addition, there is the backing of government programs that
currently deem agriculture for export of greater national importance (Ouarghidi,
2018).
This is occurring in Morocco at a time when billions of trees and plants are
needed (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Rural Development and Waters and
Forests, 2013). Farming families are also compelled by the market and population
to transition away from growing the traditional staples of barley and corn.
According to the Ministry of Agriculture, these staples are grown on 70% of
agricultural land, yet account for only 10-15% of agricultural revenue (King
Mohammed VI, 2008). Government tree nurseries have been closing over the years
when they should be at maximum production capacities based on the enormous
public demand for trees. One simple policy shift would make a profound difference
for tens of thousands of farming families—fig and potentially walnut trees
(depending on water availability) should be allowed to be planted at high elevations
on public domain lands, just as carob is allowed on public domain lands in lower
lying ones.
One of the intolerable consequences of rural poverty is the horrendous drop in
participation in education of rural girls, particularly between primary to secondary
schools, which is three times higher than urban girls and 15% higher than rural boys
(Benyakhlef, 2017). In addition to gender role expectations, such as domestic work,
marrying early, and fear of ostracization, other contributing factors of lower female
participation are insufficient dormitories, affordable transportation, and adequate
decentralization (Auletto, 2017). Many rural families must choose between sending
their daughters to fetch drinking water miles away or sending them to school.
Available safe drinking water improves girls’ education outcomes more than boys
(Khandkur, Lavy, & Filmer, 1994).
Agricultural programs understandably put pressure on the entire upstream
value chain, from nurseries to markets, of raw and processed product. Enormous
value is lost by Moroccan family farmers due to tree and seed dependency,
irrigation inefficiency limiting the size of arable lands, ineffectual or nonexistent
cooperatives, and by selling their raw product through traditional local market
channels. These conditions characterize the experience of the vast majority of
farming families, who are without the production capacity, partnerships, and means
to add value and reach a consistent standard and quality of product necessary to
enter more rewarding markets. These stifling barriers ensure that up to five times
the average household income is lost as compared to if a viable cultivation,
production, and management system were in place, based on my conservative
calculation. Thus, rural people’s potential savings, income, and revenue for
reinvestment—their basis for growth—only serve to improve livelihoods elsewhere
while they themselves reap no benefit.
Agricultural finance programs have to make choices as to where they can
catalyze the greatest possible developmental difference with their limited resources.
In this regard, project priority solutions are widely shared and are in irrigation:
water canals, basins, towers, pipes, pumps, infrastructure—all of which can
conserve water by 50% or more and create the opportunity to expand agricultural
cultivation. Meeting the equally-widespread need for clean drinking water could be
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appropriately incorporated into the technical scheme. Only approximately 60% of
rural Moroccans have access to clean drinking water. Though this has increased
from 14% in 1995, access to house connections and good water sources has
improved only slightly (Benargane, , 2017). Clean drinking water projects remain
a top priority expressed by rural communities. Too often, there seems to be a
disconnect, as in this case, between the national human development figures that
show marked improvements, and the reality of rural communities that have been
left behind.
The obvious counter-response to the recommendation regarding irrigation is
that there are already government programs to subsidize some of these activities for
farmers (pressure drip systems, for example). However, those programs need to be
brought to the farmers where they are, and the needed partnerships and local
institutional growth are aided by facilitating farmers’ strategic planning, outreach,
and experiential learning. Programs should fund nurseries on public land lent to
community associations to reduce risk and cost to farmers, similar to what the
Moroccan High Commission of Waters and Forests, public schools, universities,
and others have done with the High Atlas Foundation (HAF), the U.S.-Moroccan
nonprofit organization I founded and help lead that works to strengthen cooperative
capacity-building in management and technical areas, organic, food safety, and
other certifications, and revolving lines of credit in order for cooperatives to acquire
certified product for its processing and sale. The results of these combined actions,
as HAF has observed in rural cases in Morocco, will be a surge in cultivation and
market-ready product, along with improved local organization, reinvestment in
human development, and decentralized partnerships that conduct decision-making
considerate of such multiple factors. The HAF model can be adopted and adapted
by other community-based organizations.
For example, the Moroccan Jewish community is also participating in the
national agricultural development effort by providing land in-kind to cooperatives
and associations (with HAF guidance and support) in order for rural communities
to build their needed tree nurseries, and most recently in the Province of Ourzazate
with government funding to help build the irrigation infrastructure and assist intercultural collaboration. The 300 or so agricultural extension centers and the 54
training schools in Morocco under the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Rural
Development, Water and Forest should be fitted for endemic and organic fruit tree
and medicinal plant nurseries. In this way, these locations will be natural extension
technical skills transference sites for the surrounding areas, essential in order for
Moroccan communities to generate the one billion agro-forestry trees the nation
requires (Ben-Meir, 2015). Their students and staff should be the future trainers
who are themselves trained experientially in facilitating participatory planning and
development projects with local communities.
But how do we get there? Again, the first framework of the Municipal Charter,
forming community development plans driven by the intended beneficiaries,
women and men of all ages, is key for sustainable agricultural project identification
and implementation. Facilitation of project development is helpful and needed; in
this regard, establishing centers of participatory planning to assist with dialogue,
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meeting space, and coordination will be vital. Provincial governors and other local
leaders who understand the important contribution such centers can make should
exercise greater authority to assign underutilized public or civil building
infrastructure for this participatory development purpose.

Moudawana and Women’s Empowerment

The fifth framework, Moudawana—Morocco’s family code—represents a
major opportunity for equality and prosperity for women. Like the deficiencies in
positive outcomes from the other frameworks relative to opportunity, the groundlevel application of Moudawana’s articles—which are of a rights-based approach
to sustainable development—have not broadly translated into positive change for
the vast majority of rural women. In an action-research study conducted by the High
Atlas Foundation, 94% of 194 participating women in the rural Al Haouz province
said that they had never heard of Moudawana. The purpose of the study was to assist
the High Atlas Foundation in the delivery of workshops that involve 1) recognizing
and exercising rights, 2) growing capacities for participatory cooperative
development, and 3) building the knowledge and facilitative skills of citizens in
empowerment processes.
The lead researcher, Gal Kramarski (2018), stated in her yet unpublished
results, “All groups mentioned illiteracy as a core obstacle that holds them back
from knowing their rights” (p. 15). The distances between communities and their
closest middle and high schools create practical (infrastructural) and cultural
barriers for participation in education by rural girls. Without cell phone coverage
and independence, one person expressed the sentiment: “No one cares about us, we
are neglected here; how could we know our rights?” Kramarski (2018) observed,
“Many women indicated that they are dependent on their relatives; their lack of
financial and social freedom prevents their access to rights” (pp. 17-18).
The observations from the fore mentioned study, and the ongoing
empowerment program it launched, point to a multidimensional course to advance
the status and opportunities of Moroccan women. First, 10 urban women from
universities in Marrakesh who were part of the above study, and all of whom had
awareness about Moudawana as an issue of political and civil struggle recognize
the opportunity to strengthen the capacities of both rural and university women in
Morocco by facilitating women’s workshops that teach integrated self-discovery,
Moudawana rights, and cooperative development programs. Such exchanges have
many reciprocal advantages.
Second, in order to expand empowerment experiences and development, it
would be helpful to have the theoretical and methodological perspectives of
Western and Islamic feminisms analyzed together for similarities and differences.
Their integration could create enhanced approaches and outcomes toward greater
participation, potentially benefiting both societies (or civilizations).
Third, self-discovery, human rights-based, and confidence-building strategies
can then also achieve greater financial independence for women through
cooperatives, further human development, management and technical capacities,
and social networks. Just as participatory planning needs to result in measurable
improvements in people’s lives to be successful, so too should the women’s
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empowerment processes result in more sustainable development. For example, Gal
Kamarski’s (2018a) published report indicates that the initial self-discovery
workshops, utilizing participatory democratic procedures, helped women to identify
economic solutions for development. A group of 35 Moroccan women in the
Marrakesh region addressed illiteracy by hiring a female university student and
starting a literacy program in their village, and 65% of participants have joined
parent associations and are actively involved in efforts to improve local schools for
their children’s benefit.
Finally, education alone is not enough to increase women’s employment, as
evidenced by the fact that in Morocco, women already comprise 47% of the
population holding a tertiary degree of some kind, and yet the vast majority remain
marginalized from the workforce (“Ratio of female to male tertiary enrollment,”
World Bank World Development Indicators Database, 2010). Education programs
must be combined with empowerment workshops to give women the confidence
they need to overcome patriarchal notions preventing them from entering the
workforce. Women, as community leaders, also must be involved in identifying and
implementing development projects. Only with women’s close involvement will
such projects truly be successful at the local community level and beyond.

Youth, Activism, and Development

The sixth framework—the advancement of youth enterprises and their civil and
political participation in decision-making—is full of opportunities and challenges
in Morocco. There are many avenues to engage youth in community-based
volunteerism and internship experiences for human development. It comes down to
investment, leadership, and implementation management. University-based action
research and service learning, youth centers, and schools show every day how they
can be the catalysts for people’s projects and social change, while forging students’
best possible futures through formative skill-building. However, lack of funding
makes it hard to maintain these programs, which actually form the basis to redress
the 40% urban youth unemployment and extenuate innovative social development
(Reddy, 2017). In the long term, these programs, which are not very expensive, pay
for themselves, especially when considering the hope and sense of purpose these
experiences give young people and the development results that youth subsequently
create in their communities.
Capacity-building programs for groups of young people—such as in education
and youth center settings, with urban students assisting local communities, and
children protection centers—should couple two streams of mutually reinforcing
actions. First, the application of participatory methods among the youth training
participants, so that they themselves analyze and strategize to achieve their selfdefined needs. Simultaneously, they learn the participatory approach. Second, as
they learn planning methods from their own use of them, the students apply the
techniques with neighboring communities to affect change beyond their own
schools, centers, or neighborhoods. In this way, student and community projects are
identified and implemented as skills in participatory planning and project
management are built among the youth participants. Learning-by-doing is cost
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effective, but it requires management and integrated programs involving participant
reflection, writing, collaborative learning, and critical thinking.

Conclusion—Morocco: Setting the Table for Sustainable Prosperity

The Moroccan frameworks for development enumerate what is needed to
catalyze sustainable development of marginalized areas and groups, and a few
instructive cases have proven capable of bringing ideas to full implementation with
replicable and enduring results. These successful cases underscore the importance
of participatory approaches for defining and implementing sustainable initiatives.
They encourage decentralization in order to enable local communities and civil and
public agencies to make decisions and allocate resources for people’s projects. The
frameworks target rural communities, women, and youth in recognition of their
disadvantaged situations, and their role as key drivers of transformational change.
Taken together, these frameworks provide the needed comprehensive pathways
for the people of Morocco to achieve the future they want, providing a course and
means to help reach their human development goals. The Municipal Charter could
provide the plans for project development and sustainability that the National
Initiative for Human Development could then get behind and help accomplish.
Decentralized arrangements are subsequently built and enhanced through
community project implementation that involves multi-sectoral partnership.
Moroccan agriculture and agroforestry, with its income-generating and
environmental-enhancing potential can and should be the engine for self-reliant
financing of the people’s projects, especially in rural areas that need it the most.
Agriculture projects also become identified and determined through the process of
implementing the mandates of the Municipal Charter potentially providing jobs for
university trained project facilitators. The Moudawana embodies a rights-based
approach and recognizes the centrality of sustainable development as a product of
human rights. Thus, it not only secures and protects the just and rightful status of
women and girls but also enables a vital pathway toward independence in regard to
economic decision-making and empowerment. For youth, increased programs to
promote experiential learning, the creation of capacity-building community
projects, and the building of employable skills improve both urban and rural
livelihoods.
To highlight and reiterate, implementation priorities must include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Provide community development training/workshops;
Create Centers for Participatory Rural Project training, planning, and
implementation;
Empower greater decentralized local control in identifying and
implementing development projects;
Provide more irrigation infrastructure;
Provide greater support for agroforestry, especially for indigenous
plants that strengthen biodiversity;
Involve and empower women to take active roles in development
project planning and implementation; and
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7.

Involve and empower youth especially through schools and self-study
experiential learning programs to take active roles in development
project planning and implementation.

Sustainable development depends on people’s participation. The first steps to
improving community development in Morocco have been taken and rest within the
existing frameworks themselves. Communities now need to learn and apply these
frameworks in their daily lives by gathering, assessing, implementing, and doing. I
have found that all that is needed is to give men and women of all ages the chance
to come together through community workshops. If successful, implementing these
frameworks will ultimately deliver projects that they and their families have hoped
for too long. Thus, empowered rural communities will transform Morocco into a
model for sustainable development.
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Panoptic Vision: Disjuncture, Transgressions,
and Imagination in Laila Marrakchi’s Film
Rock the Casbah
Touria Khannous
Abstract

This article focuses on Laila Marrakchi’s film Rock the Casbah (2013),
which reflects the exchange between global and local cultural and
sociopolitical ideologies of a new Morocco. The film highlights the
contradictions of globalization as it occurs through disjuncture. Arjun
Appadurai’s theory of the world in motion and “a world of flows” provides
a relevant framework for this analysis. The article uses Appadurai’s notion
of “disjuncture” as a theoretical framework to discuss the dynamics and
interrelationships involved in the protagonist’s movement between
Western mediascapes as a filmstar and her Moroccan family’s local
context. Appadurai’s conceptualization of globalization is crucial for
understanding the inherent disjuncture between the homogeneity of media
representations and the local heterogeneity of Morocco. One aspect of the
film represents the reality of a changing, glocalized Morocco. Another
engages with Western media tropes in order to reveal the false
representations of reality that are often depicted in Western films. The
film’s panoptic vision reveals the power structures present in both the local
and global contexts, inspiring the viewer to imagine new identities and to
be more aware of glocal possibilities.
Moroccan women filmmakers such as Laila Marrakchi construct a particular
model of Moroccan cinema emerging from a global perspective. 1 Such a
perspective is enhanced by their connection to Europe and the United States, their
multinational production, as well as by the significant attention their films have
drawn at international festivals. Most contemporary Moroccan women filmmakers
enjoy international funding and have international connections, as this is the only
way they can produce their films. What they also share is professional
1 In his essay “The Limiting Imagination of National Cinema,” Andrew Higson (2000)
examines if Benedict Anderson’s theory of the nation is relevant for investigating national
cinemas. Higson argues that an understanding of national cinema needs to take into account
more transnational aspects of cinematic production, since the communities imagined by
cinematic techniques tend to be transnational.

216 Journal of Global Initiatives

marginalization and a common project of solidifying a woman’s gaze and claiming
subjectivity, as they struggle against the sexist ideologies that control their filmic
productions both at home and abroad. Despite the relative circulation of their films,
Moroccan women filmmakers remain marginalized because of the hegemony of
Hollywood constructions of spectatorship and distributions of film, which is true
for practically all filmmakers outside Hollywood. 2 The circulation of their films in
the digital age has been mainly aided by different media and platforms such as
Amazon and Netflix (Caillé, 2016, p. 72). The category “Moroccan women’s
cinema,” however, is very broad and does not communicate important factors such
as generational issues and other differences in contexts and locations. For example,
Valérie Orlando has noted the difference between Moroccan filmmakers living at
home and those in the diaspora. She argues that, “Young audiences have
emphatically supported international MRE [Marocain résident à l’étranger]
productions because they associate them with what they think is most important:
connection, not only to their own country, but to the outside world” (Orlando, 2011,
p. 39).
This article focuses on Marrakchi’s film Rock the Casbah (2013), which
highlights the changes in Moroccan society and culture that have happened since
the 1990s shaped by the sociocultural, economic, and political forces of
globalization. Being part of the diaspora, Marrakchi enjoys a unique vantage point
as a commentator from both inside and outside Morocco. My use of the term
“diasporic” in describing Marrakchi is framed by cultural theorist Stuart Hall who
defines diasporic cultural producers as those who adopt in their work a “diaspora
aesthetic” and “diaspora identities” “which are constantly producing and
reproducing themselves anew through transformation and difference” (Hall,
1995/2006, p. 438). In this sense, the term diaspora refers not necessarily to
Marrakchi’s physical movement from a place, but also to the unconventional ways
in which she represents the reality of a new Morocco which is often perceived by
conservatives as “unconventional.”
Marrakchi also fits the framework of cinéma-monde, a concept that has been
used to describe emerging transnational francophone cinema from former French
colonies. Florence Martin has argued that the “translocal” and global funding of
cinéma-monde constitutes “a de-orbiting from” France, “since we are no longer
dealing with postcolonial films … with France as the main pull, but rather with a
reconfiguration of transnational teams for a local/translocal/transnational
collaboration of people, and movements of ideas and languages that are de-centered,
With regards to Moroccan women’s cinematic production, I would like to suggest that we
can read their films drawing on certain feminists of color’s frameworks pertaining to class,
race, and ethnicity. This intersectional approach will allow us to consider racial, gendered,
and cultural hegemony in film criticism. Despite these filmmakers’ relative wide
circulation, only few scholars study their films, with the exception of Francophone scholars
such as Valerie Orlando, Suzanne Gauch, and Florence Martin, among others, who only
work on non-Hollywood films. My views echo those of bell hooks who notes that film
theory has erased the cultural productions of women of color when she points out that
“Feminist theory rooted in an historical psychoanalytic framework that privileges sexual
difference actively suppresses recognition of race” (hooks, 1992/2003, p. 214).
2
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de-orbited, free” (Martin, 2016, p. 473). Thus, it would be safe to label Marrakchi
as a cinéma-monde cineaste whose film Rock the Casbah draws in global and local
parameters. It uses the international languages of cinéma-monde, which permeate
films from former French colonies, including Morocco, all while decentering
hegemonic languages and narratives. Brian Edwards has argued that since the
1980s, Moroccan cinema has adopted American models against the French model
because the American model has proven to be freer and far from domination
(Edwards, 2007, p. 292). Marrakchi appropriates the tools of American cinematic
styles not only to free herself from French domination but also to counteract
Hollywood’s misrepresentations and false images. Rock the Casbah begins with the
tunes of the 1940s Hollywood musical “On the Road to Morocco,” thus squarely
setting the referential mood of the film. While, at first glance, it contains many
familiar elements of Hollywood movies, including an upbeat Hollywood-style
narrative, a closer reading readily reveals serious elements of critique. The film
mixes melodrama, which is marked by sensational themes and suspense, with
humor. It also employs a fantastical ghost played by Omar Sharif who offers
commentary on the actions of his family in the style of a Greek Chorus. The use of
Arabic, French, and English in the film has significant implications. The
relationship between the use of French and the influence France held in Morocco is
called into question. Moroccan characters are not only bilingual, but also understand
English. Their use of French is a consequence of French colonialism, but their
understanding of English is more related to polycentric multiculturalism and a
decentering of France. The film then can be interpreted as being informed by Ella
Shohat and Robert Stam’s (1994) theory of polycentric multiculturalism which “is
about dispersing power” (p. 48), thus de-centering authority and foregrounding
multilingual and global spaces.
Marrakshi’s film is reminiscent of other films about globalization such as
Alejandro Iñárritu’s diasporic Babel (2007), which displays an array of languages
but no dominant language, thus contributing to lack of communication across
borders. Both Rock the Casbah and Babel highlight global connections combined
with disconnection and exclusion.

The Plot and Sub-plots

Well-financed, Rock the Casbah is polished, demonstrating impressive and rich
color designs. The setting is the beautiful estate of Sophia’s father Moulay Al
Hassan, a well-off businessman in Tangier who benefited from economic
globalization. Yet, the beautiful façade hides a world of violence, incest, and severe
punishments. The film interweaves two different narrative strands that take place in
two different parts of the world (the United States and Morocco) in a way that
highlights global connectivity. The film consists of a main plot and two sub-plots.
The main plot centers on Sophia’s immigration from Morocco to the United States
to become a Hollywood movie star, at the price of being typecast as a terrorist.
Sophia is a diasporic migrant who, as an actress, only plays roles involving violence
and immobility. Her privileges in Morocco, however, are a result of her father’s
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wealth, which has made it possible for her to immigrate to the United States and
initiate a career in Hollywood.
The first sub-plot revolves around the dead father who has a large presence on
the screen, often commenting on his funeral and interacting with Sophia’s son,
Johnson, who he has not met prior to his death. Moulay Al Hassan introduces
himself to the audience as a businessman who has just passed away. His death
prompts the gathering of his family members to honor the three-day mourning
period. The audience hears Moulay Al Hassan observe, “The old man on the table,
the body, is me. I died yesterday of a heart attack … There was no announcer to
prepare me for it. … But fortunately, as our saying goes: The dead rule the living.”
Hearing the dead patriarch talk about what he is seeing, the filmmaker is making
him omnipresent and a charismatic presence through his commanding gaze. His
wife is worried that he will reappear and reproach her for mismanaging the funeral.
His daughter Kenza refuses a cigarette for fear he is watching. In Foucault’s
(1977/2012) words, the father is a “panopticon,” a symbol of the disciplinary power
of surveillance (p. 196). The dead father is an observer who can oversee everything
and everyone; each person is seen by him but they, themselves, are limited in what
they see. What the film reveals from outlining the history of Moulay Al Hassan’s
surveillance and punishment is a shift from a bodily spectacle, where the dead body
is seen by all family members, to the dead man as all-seeing and all-knowing, even
after his death. Moulay El Hassan’s “gaze is alert everywhere,” which renders his
family “a segmented, immobile, frozen space” (Foucault, 1977/2012, p. 195).
Through the lens of the panopticon, different layers of narratives unfold in the film.
In the second sub-plot, the film’s rich estate makes clear the gap between
Morocco’s poor subalterns and the global elite who have benefited from flows in
globalized neoliberalism. To further dramatize such divisions, the film tells the
story of Zakaria, the son of the family servant, who falls in love with Leila, the
daughter of Moulay Al Hassan, who embodies the wealth and privilege that Zakaria
has been denied. The details of their love story provide the context of the spectacles
and dramas that later unfold in the film. Their love relationship ends in tragedy as
Leila commits suicide when banished to London by her father and forced to have
an abortion. The tragic side of the relationship between the two lovers is tied in the
film to the new relationship that almost developed between Zakaria and Sophia. At
the end, the film provides a vision of a new world beyond the gap between wealth
and poverty when Zakaria learns that he is Moulay Al Hassan’s biological son and
thus set to inherit half of his father’s fortune. Thus, we see at the funeral how the
camera now captures a different image of the dual worlds, as Zakaria and his mother
pose for a family picture with the rest of Moulay Al Hassan’s family members.
Although far from perfect, world order is also restored in another happy ending
when Sophia reconciles with her American husband.
Rock the Casbah echoes Marrakchi’s earlier film Marock (2005), which also
focuses on the vast gap between the world of wealth and privilege and the world
below. It portrays an unconventional relationship between a Jewish boy and a
Muslim girl. Both films, through stunning scenes and diverse perspectives, make
manifest the complex movement of global capital, products, peoples, and ideas.
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Critical responses to Marrakchi’s films
Critics of Marrakchi have focused mainly on the global aspect of her films, as
well as the impact of globalization on gender roles, without taking into account her
subtle critiques of globalization. Brian Edwards discusses the cultural choices in her
film Marock (2005). For Edwards, the circulation of American cultural products in
Marrakchi’s film Marock promotes a Hollywood-like product that becomes the
dominant narrative. Edwards describes Marock as a Hollywood teen romance that
“exhibits the circulation of an American look, which is doubled by the film’s
interest … in American commodities” (Edwards, 2016, p. 165). However, such
reading overlooks the complexities that characterize the process of globalization.
American culture has permeated Morocco via Western media, but its consumption,
as Stuart Hall (1997) notes, is “a process of profound unevenness” (p. 33), which
can generate a sort of defensive assertion of local cultural identities. The
consumption of American cultural products is not necessarily to be equated with
the Americanization of local culture. In this regard, Edwards questions “the ways
in which American cultural products circulate through the world and what the
meaning of their transnational circulation portends for U.S. hegemony (both
political and cultural)” (Edwards, 2016, p. 22).
My reading of Rock the Casbah draws from cultural studies more than film
studies, particularly critical globalization theory. Through this lens, the film
highlights the contradictions of globalization as it occurs through disjuncture. Arjun
Appadurai’s (1996) theory of the world in motion and “a world of flows” (p. 4)
provides a relevant framework for my analysis. Appadurai argues that globalization
involves five scapes or disjuncture that occur in global contexts which are usually
more manifest in the developing world than in the West. These are ethnoscapes, by
which he refers to the mobility of people; mediascapes, by which he refers to the
global flows of images produced by a variety of media such as film and television;
technoscapes, by which he means the dissemination of technology across borders;
financescapes, which refer to the global flows of finance, and ideoscapes by which
he means the global flow of ideologies such as freedom and human rights
(Appadurai, 1996, p. 35). The relation between these scapes is marked by
disjuncture, separation, and dislocation rather than unity. I will use Appadurai’s
notion of “disjuncture” as a theoretical framework to discuss the dynamics and
interrelationships involved in Sophia’s movement between Western mediascapes as
a filmstar and her Moroccan family’s local context. Appadurai’s conceptualization
of globalization is crucial for understanding the inherent disjuncture between the
homogeneity of media and the local heterogeneity of Morocco.

The “Glocal” in Rock the Casbah

The term “glocal,” which is related to Appadurai’s notion of disjuncture,
represents the tension between the local and the global in Marrakchi’s film, thus
providing a new space for a new identity that is neither limited by local values nor
by the stereotypes perpetuated by Western media. The term glocal was first used by
sociologist Ronald Robertson when he stated during a 1997 conference that
glocalization "means the simultaneity—the co-presence—of both universalizing
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and particularizing tendencies” (“Glocalization,” n.d.). An Encyclopedia
Britannica entry further explains glocalization as constituting “a challenge to
simplistic conceptions of globalization processes as linear expansions of territorial
scales. Glocalization indicates that the growing importance of continental and
global levels is occurring together with the increasing salience of local and regional
levels" (“Glocalization,” n.d.).
Marrakchi is eager to depict images that are constructed from a local point of
view despite her global connections to France and the United States (she is married
to an American film director and she resides in France). In one interview, she is
quick to affirm her strong connection to Morocco when the interviewer remarks that
some Moroccans view her as an outsider: “I feel I’m deeply Moroccan and anchored
in my roots. I also feel very Parisian. For a long time I worried about this, thinking,
‘I’m a crossbreed. …. What’s annoying is that some Westerners expect me to be an
Arab filmmaker and to focus on what is miserable, to have the same approach as
the media’s … I’ve tried to show something else, from the inside” (Koral, online
interview). Hers is an identity in motion that breaks borders because of her on-going
in-depth contact with Morocco despite her diasporic status. Marrakchi’s reference
to the Eurocentric and imperialist perspective of Western media and its
misrepresentations of Arabs shows that she is aware of the politics of postcolonialism, a view certainly also evident in her protagonist’s career as an actress
in Hollywood playing terrorists. While she critiques media representations that are
biased and Eurocentric, she particularly challenges the racism and sexism that are
present in Hollywood. One could also say that Sophia is Marrakchi’s alter ego. The
film highlights their connections through their participation in Hollywood
filmmaking and their marriages to American filmmakers.

Disjuncture between Global Media and Local Meanings

Rock the Casbah reflects the exchange between the global and the local cultural
and sociopolitical ideologies of a new Morocco. One aspect of Marrakchi’s film
represents the reality of a changing, glocalized Morocco. Relatedly, another
engages with Western media tropes in order to reveal to Moroccans the false
representations of reality that are often depicted in Western films. Sophia’s
participation in Western media places her at the dis/juncture of the global and the
local, between the United States and her Moroccan family. The film highlights the
ruptures that she experiences as she navigates authoritarian structures both within
Hollywood and Morocco. The positive aspects of Hollywood’s global and
international aspirations foster imagined communities, and this is initially an
attractive position for women like Sophia who are in pursuit of freedom and selffulfillment. However, type casted, the only roles she is given to play in American
films are those of terrorists. She might have opted to act in some other roles if they
were available, but she was assigned only stereotypical depictions. Her American
lifestyle and her insistence to a travel agent at the beginning of the film that she is
a Hollywood film star make it clear that she is proud of being a successful actress.
Yet, American ethnic and cultural stereotyping in her roles is obvious: all Arabs are
potential terrorists whose religion and values place them in opposition to American
beliefs. In the aftermath of 9/11, Western media has perpetuated images of Muslim
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men as terrorists and oppressors of women (Abu-Lughod, 2006, p. 7). In creating a
female terrorist heroine, Marrakchi mocks a Hollywood that has continuously
exaggerated a hegemonic masculinity, and a subordinate, submissive femininity.
The film critiques Hollywood’s stance with respect to typecasting Arabs in roles
full of racist clichés, as either villains or caricatures. 3
By exposing the stereotypes of Western filmmaking, Marrakchi’s film
deconstructs the industry’s ideological messages and false representations. Sophia’s
Moroccan family is in shock as they watch one of the scenes in which she is strapped
to a suicide bomb and about to pull the trigger, shouting “Allahu Akbar.” This
particular scene also shocked Moroccan audiences, who watched Rock the Casbah
following the Casablanca and Marrakech bombings that occurred in 2003 and 2011.
The film criticizes the way American media associates Islam with terrorism and
portrays Muslims as suicide bombers, and how such misrepresentations affect the
feelings of Moroccan audiences and generates their strong reactions. Marrakchi
regards Hollywood’s representations as a disjuncture between what is represented
on the screen on the one hand and the reality in the local Muslim context on the
other hand. Reminiscent of Canada’s hit television series Little Mosque on the
Prairie, and through the technique of film within a film, Marrakchi shows how
global media images of Muslims are recreated and influence the very local context
where Sophia’s family is situated, as her Moroccan family now view Sophia with
suspicion and ridicule. She is subjected to mockery when her sister Miriam whispers
to her mom that Sophia “never does anything like normal people.” Sophia’s
experience with her family exemplifies the cultural disjuncture that occurs when
global actors (pun intended) attempt to relocate themselves in local contexts.

Anxious Border Crossings as Acts of Transgression

Sophia’s mere return to Morocco provokes fear and anxiety. She is not
enjoying free circulation even though she is “cosmopolitan.” She has to come to
terms with two ideologies, in Appadurai’s framework, that represent two axes of
power. The first ideoscape represents Western media (also a mediascape) which
assumes a homogenous stereotype of Muslim women as terrorists. The second
ideoscape is Moroccan patriarchy, which assumes that good women are submissive.
Here, Marrakchi uses her international film to deal with internal issues that
Moroccans do not want to discuss in public. Control of Moroccan women occurs
not only overtly through controlling fathers but also covertly through mechanisms
of normalization whereby women come to internalize power in abiding by norms
Jack Shaheen is the most outspoken critic of Hollywood’s stereotypes of Arabs. He states
that, “the time is long overdue for Hollywood to end its undeclared war on Arabs, and to
cease misrepresenting and maligning them” (Shaheen, 2012, p. 34). Tania Kamal Al Din’s
1999 documentary Hollywood Harems also examines Hollywood movies since the 1900s
that have perpetuated stereotypes about Arabs. She looks particularly at the image of the
oversexualized and exotic Arab female beauty who is rescued from the harem by a white
male hero, thus adding to the corpus of race and gendered images that constitute fantasies
about the orient and contribute to the homogenization of Arabs. This study is pertinent in
light of continued racial profiling of Middle Easterners in the aftermath of 9/11.
3
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and understanding themselves by way of these norms. Power is inscribed in
women’s bodies through their very actions and commitments to norms that render
them, in the words of Foucault, “legible and docile” (Foucault, 1977/2012, pp. 187188). According to Foucault (1977/2012), disciplinary power in the modern era is
not public but rather “exercised through its invisibility” (pp. 187-188).
Entering Morocco, Sophia experiences that the border is a site of policing that
exercises control of women. The border is a gendered site where women are not
viewed as independent agents but only on the basis of their relationship to a man
who is either a father, a brother, or a husband. Their act of crossing without a man
is deemed a transgression (Macklin, 2009, p. 276). The disjuncture resulting from
Sophia’s movement results in a display of power by the border agent, who ignores
her greeting, flirtatiously asks her to remove her glasses, and reprimands her for not
carrying her Moroccan national identity card: “Even though you have a U.S.
passport, you are still Moroccan.” The agent also ridicules her son’s name
“Johnson,” and makes a snide remark that her son cannot be Moroccan because his
father is American. The agent’s comments on her perceived cultural transgressions
are interrupted by a stranger who asks him to “spare her,” because her father is the
boss of a famous company. Such scenes demonstrate what Moroccan feminist
Fatima Mernissi (1987) means when she states that in Moroccan culture some men
have the right to police women in public space (p. 82).
The viewer also senses such anxiety in the scenes in which Sophia interacts
with her family. Brian Edwards argues that globalization triggers local anxieties
(Edwards, 2007, p. 296). Globalization is often perceived as a threat when it comes
to identity and uniqueness. This explains the schizophrenic and anxious
consciousness represented in the film, where some Moroccans still want to claim “a
pure culture.” In one scene, Sophia’s grandmother reproaches her for not teaching
her son Arabic and decries that “marrying a foreigner produces little bastards.” The
disjuncture between the local and the global is evident here since the grandmother
is open to American cultural products when she eats a hamburger from McDonald’s,
but objects to Sophia’s marriage to an American. The circulation of American
cultural products is at variance, as Appadurai would affirm, with the rejection of
others (ethnoscapes). The film presents the viewer with a mixed marriage between
Sophia and her American husband Johnson but, despite the tone of hope that the
film sets for acceptance, conservative ideologies put a strain on their relationship.
Sophia’s uncle instructs her son to eat couscous with his hands the Moroccan way
and accuses Sophia of being ashamed of her Arabic roots, alleging that she did not
bring her American husband for fear “he would be scared off by her Arab family.”
Her sisters Miriam and Kenza also chastise her for trying too hard to assimilate to
U.S. culture. Sophia bonds with Zakaria to escape her family’s dramas, not yet
realizing that he is her half-brother. Marrakchi forces the viewer to think about such
disjuncture and their implications for a new Morocco. Hence the film demonstrates
tensions between local traditions and the global manifestation of different cultural
norms and meanings. Disjunctures become most acute when people’s values are
met with a counternarrative.
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Glocal Disjuncture

The film portrays contradictory images of gendered and social values in
contemporary Morocco. It also highlights the image of the “modern” woman as a
global subject represented by Sophia who feels at home in the United States and
speaks only English to her son. Initially, American culture presented a viable
alternative to a local culture which Sophia views as too exclusive in its adherence
to authenticity and purity. The United States offers her opportunities for freedom
and self-realization that do not exist yet in her Moroccan family. The United States
is also portrayed as a model of cultural hybridity and progressive notions with
respect to immigration and citizenship, as the film coincides with the presidency of
Barack Obama. Sophia’s sister Miriam is represented as a modern woman, who
flirts openly with her doctor and expresses her sexual desire in a free, nonchalant
way. Miriam’s attitude shows a disjuncture between the images perpetuated by
Western media and the local realities of Moroccan women. There is also a
disjuncture between the manner in which Moroccan women like Sophia and her
sisters are conducting themselves in Moroccan society and the local norms
regarding gender relationships. In this regard, when confronted by her sister Kenza
about her entanglement with the doctor even though she is a married woman,
Miriam acts as if there is nothing wrong with her behavior. Such attitude is in
conflict with local norms regarding male-female relationships and interactions.
Miriam might have been exposed to the idea of open relationships from Hollywood
movies, which can be accessed easily in Morocco through local cable networks.
The film also shows the disjuncture between global and local values as
manifested in the changes of aesthetic values. Miriam’s plastic surgery to augment
her breasts shows the interplay of both patriarchy and consumer capitalism in the
construction of the “modern” woman in Morocco. Global forces have influenced
women in their new interest in body images and sexuality. Through Miriam’s
obsession with finding the perfect body, Marrakchi suggests that Moroccan men’s
preferences and global market forces dictate what Moroccan women should look
like, forcing them into conformity and self-inflicted violence. While Miriam defines
herself through her body, her older sister Kenza has constructed her identity in terms
of her job as a schoolteacher and a stable marriage. In one scene, she is portrayed
performing the Muslim prayer. As shown in the film, the different experiences of
Sophia and her sisters indicate that globalization in Morocco has created
heterogeneous and contradictory situations for women.
The film contrasts the roles of women in the global north with their roles in the
local context. Gaining insight into the role of women in her family results in
Sophia’s own self-perception of positive change for herself in the United States,
and a feeling of superiority with regards to women in Morocco. She scolds Kenza
for marrying her cousin and becoming a schoolteacher just to please her father. She
also mocks Miriam’s plastic surgeries, challenging her to be a critical thinker
instead of following latest fashions and trends: “If they all wore the veil, would
you?” When her mother advises her against getting a divorce, Sophie exclaims, “So
I accept everything like you? Like all the women here?” The film seems to be
critical of the way Sophia has internalized Western media’s biased portrayals of
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Moroccan women ignoring their lived diversity. Such patronizing attitude clearly
originates from Western media’s stereotypes and objectification of Moroccan
women as lacking agency. Lila Abu-Lughod has written about the disjuncture
between Muslim women’s experiences and public attitudes in her book Do Muslim
Women Need Saving (2013). She points out how “popular rhetoric is put to political
use” (Abu-Lughod, 2013, p. 8) in the United States, where mediascapes serve also
as the ideoscapes of the state, which continues to target Muslims through its
discriminatory policies.
In fact, Western media’s rigid representations of Moroccan women have
misconstrued Moroccan women’s reality. The film shows that much has changed
in Moroccan culture since the 1990s. Morocco now has a new generation of
Moroccan women with new ideas and more freedom. On the day of their father’s
funeral, the sisters do not seem to be constrained by traditional expectations of
female behavior. They put scarves around their necks instead of wearing white veils
as dictated by Moroccan custom. Amidst Koranic chants by the Talba, Miriam
complains about the scars from her plastic surgery that have not healed, while
Kenza lights a cigarette, expressing relief that her father who policed her is now
dead. The sisters also drink American beer a few days after the funeral. The
surveillance in Foucault’s use of panopticon is repressive and reactionary, as if
people who are watched are being punished by being watched. The deceased father
in the film acts as a mischievous and positive force that actually brings the family
together in the end. While in Foucault’s conceptualization of the panopticon being
watched is repressive, in the film it is liberating.
The attitude of the daughters towards their deceased father in the film borders
on being disrespectful. This is acted out by Sophia through monologues with the
corpse. Instead of crying over his death, she reads him her sister’s suicide note.
From Sophia’s perspective, he is to blame for the incestuous relationship Leila
unknowingly had with her brother Zakaria, and for her eventual suicide. As the men
taking care of the body prepare to put the corpse in the refrigerator to keep it cool,
Sophia remarks, “Like a side of lamb. It’s what he deserves.” Sophia’s uncle
questions her sense of respect and wonders whether “she left it in America.” To
Sophia, her father’s double standards and hypocrisy invite such disrespect. While
manifesting local Moroccan values outwardly through his clothes, Moulay Al
Hassan demonstrated global values through his French speech, a sexual relationship
with his maid, and his access to Western pornographic magazines. His children are
unaware of the disjuncture between his reality and what he projected to the outside
world. In this way, the film is critical of both local Moroccan values and Western
media.

Global Imaginations

Appadurai has argued that while globalization is characterized by disjuncture
“one positive force that encourages an emancipatory politics of globalization is
the role of the imagination in social life” (Appadurai, 2001, p. 6). The imagination
is the power through which “collective patterns of dissent emerge,” since it
“works across national lines to produce locality as a spatial fact and as a
sensibility … without either the predatory mobility of unregulated capital or the
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predatory stability of many states” (Appadurai, 2001, p. 6). It is such “patterns of
dissent” that Marrakchi might have meant during a YouTube interview when she
refers to the power of Moroccan women’s transgressions in Rock the Casbah. In
the interview, Marrakchi discusses the intersection between global and local
customs and pressures in her film. She notes that Rock the Casbah offers an
insider’s perspective on the sociopolitical reality of Moroccan society and the
position of its women. Women’s transgressions during the three days of mourning
following the death of the patriarchal father uncover hidden taboos and the
hypocrisy of a schizophrenic society. Their transgressions also herald an interior
revolution that is symbolic of another Arab spring in the making. The film does
hint at the Arab revolutions as the title resonates with Robin Wright’s book Rock
the Casbah (2011), where the author discusses the positive dynamics of change
that are taking place in the Arab world in the aftermath of the Arab Spring due to
social media and the power it has on people’s imaginations. Suzanne Gauch has
astutely noted that the monumental ousting of Tunisian leader Azedine Ben Ali in
2011 triggered “a newly excited, mobile curiosity” (Gauch, 2016, p. 1). What
clearly emerges from Marrakchi’s film is how Moroccan women are key agents
able to navigate the complexities of the current glocal condition and imagine a
better future.
In conclusion, the film highlights its characters’ interaction with global forces
through Western media, where they undergo a disjuncture between their local
context and global norms, between their lived reality and their imagined
experiences. Marrakchi uses her film to critique global media, as she tries to
counter the ideoscapes and mediascapes represented by the power structures of
American media. In this sense, she has used globalization to critique hegemonic
narratives which contribute to unease at the local level. The disjuncture stemming
from globalization have forced characters to reimagine their local identities. The
film suggests that an imagined glocalization has given women new identities,
critically aware of both global and local forces and problems. Rock the Casbah is
critical of how women have been marginalized in Morocco through legal and
verbal violence, as evident in the scenes that hint at unequal inheritance laws. It
thus challenges Moroccans to take into consideration women’s rights in
reimagining the nation.
The film also departs from the rhetoric of Western anti-imperialism and from
the anti-Americanism that was prevalent in earlier films of the 1980s such as
Farida Benlyazid’s Door to the Sky (1988). While the film, at times, idealizes
what is American, it also shows that Sophia has lost all sense of self, being
remade in an “American” image, as she strives to be something she is not. While
Sophia’s mobility has endowed her with an analytical eye in Morocco that might
have allowed her to effect some change, in the United States, her assigned
Hollywood role as a terrorist is indicative of her liminality and marginality. By not
making a more explicit statement against racism in the United States, the film
highlights the powerlessness of racialized immigrants.
Sophia is unable to emancipate herself because she is forced to choose
between two competing ideologies. She either has to be a self-hating stereotype in
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America or a “modern” woman in a schizophrenic Morocco. The film suggests
that the transnational is not truly possible because racialized people are unable to
change the West, thus demonstrating that becoming “modern” is not enough for
women to escape patriarchy. Sophia was ready to leave her husband and entertain
a romance with Zakaria until she found out he is her half-brother. When her
husband returns from the United States at the end, she assumes her passive role as
mother and wife. The film’s panoptic vision reveals the power structures present
in both the local and global contexts, inspiring the viewer to imagine new
identities and to be more aware of glocal possibilities.
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